Opinion
Civil Action 20-cv-0703
02-16-2021
CARLOS STANFORD, Plaintiff, v. WARDEN ORLANDO HARPER, MARK v. TRANQUILLI, RICH FITZGERALD, and MAYOR BILL PEDUTO, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
CYNTHIA REED EDDY, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that this case be dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply with the Order to Show Cause entered by this Court on January 4, 2021. (ECF No. 13).
II. REPORT
Plaintiff, Carlos Stanford, commenced this case on May 13, 2020, by the filing of a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis, with an attached civil rights complaint. (ECF No. 1). At the time he initiated the case, he was incarcerated at the Allegheny County Jail. By Order entered May 15, 2020, Plaintiff was advised that he had a continuing obligation to notify the Court of any change of address and failure to do so may result in dismissal of his case. (ECF No. 2). After some intervening proceedings regarding the filing of a complete Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis, Stanford's request to proceed in forma pauperis was granted and his Complaint formally filed on July 10, 2020. (ECF Nos. 9 and 10).
Defense counsel in Case No. 2: 20-cv-618, Stanford v. Kaschauer and Homestead Police Dept., advised the Court that Plaintiff had been released from custody and was no longer detained at the Allegheny County Jail. Counsel provide the Court with a forwarding address for Plaintiff of 160 Hazelwood Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15207. A call to the Allegheny County Jail confirmed that Plaintiff had been released from custody.
Despite having been released, Plaintiff has not filed a change of address with this Court. On January 4, 2021, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause on Plaintiff on why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (ECF No. 13). The Response to the Show Cause Order was due on January 29, 2021. As of this date, Plaintiff has not filed a response to the Order to Show Cause and in fact has not taken any action in this case since July 9, 2020, and has not attempted to contact Chambers.
A plaintiff's failure to comply with court orders may constitute a failure to prosecute the action, rendering the action subject to dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b), which states in pertinent part:
Involuntary Dismissal; Effect. If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it. Unless the dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) and any dismissal not under this rule -except one for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19 - operates as adjudication on the merits.
A district court has the inherent power to sua sponte dismiss under Rule 41(b) for a plaintiff's failure to comply with an order of court. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 62930 (1962); Adams v. Trustees of New Jersey Brewery Employees' Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 871 (3d Cir. 1994) (“The Supreme Court affirmed, stating that a court could dismiss sua sponte under Rule 41(b).”); Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369 (3d Cir. 1992) (dismissal was appropriate response to deliberate defiance of court orders where district court judge determined that no other sanction would adequately insure future compliance). See also Kenney v. Cal. Tanker Co., 381 F.2d 775, 777 (3d Cir. 1967) (“authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an ‘inherent power,' governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”) (quoting Link 370 U.S. at 630-31).
A court's decision to dismiss for failure to prosecute is committed to the court's sound discretion. See Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 230 (3d Cir. 1998) (“We review for abuse of discretion a district court's dismissal for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41(b).”), abrogated on other grounds by, Winkelman ex rel. Wilkelman v. Parma City School Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007). In exercising that discretion, a district court should, to the extent applicable, consider the six factors set out in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1994), when it levies the sanction of dismissal of an action for failure to obey discovery schedules, failure to prosecute, or to comply with other procedural rules. Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1311, 1330 n.18 (3d Cir. 1995). These factors are (1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868. Poulis does not, however, “provide a magic formula whereby the decision to dismiss or not to dismiss a plaintiff's complaint becomes a mechanical calculation easily reviewed” by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373.
A great deal of deference will be given the district court which is in the best position to weigh all of the Poulis factors and any other pertinent matters. Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373 (“the decision must be made in the context of the district court's extended contact with the litigant. Ultimately, the decision to dismiss constitutes an exercise of the district court judge's discretion and must be given great deference by this Court - a court which has had no direct contact with the litigants and whose orders, calendar, docket and authority have not been violated or disrupted.”). Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recognized that “no single Poulis factor is dispositive, ” Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003), and “not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.” Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373; see also Allen v. American Fed. of Gov't Emp., 317 Fed.Appx. 180, 181 (3d Cir. 2009) (district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing complaint without explicitly weighing the Poulis factors when plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint as ordered by the court).
With the above principles as our guidepost, this Court will review the Poulis factors in this case, seriatim.
(1) The extent of the party's personal responsibility. The Court notes that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. Hence, he bears sole responsibility for the failure to respond to the show cause order and/or to keep the Court informed of his current address. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
(2) Prejudice to the adversary. Defendants have yet to be served, so this factor is a neutral consideration.
(3) History of dilatoriness. Plaintiff has failed to obey Court orders and failed to keep the Court informed of his current address. His failures are sufficient evidence, in this Court's view, to indicate that he does not intend to proceed with this case in a timely fashion. This factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
(4) Whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith. There is no indication on this record that Plaintiff's failures were the result of any “excusable neglect, ” Poulis, supra.
(5) Effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal. If Plaintiff has in fact lost interest in pursuing his case, which would appear to be the case, it seems there is little else to do. This factor therefore weighs in favor of dismissal.
(6) Meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Absent the ability to communicate with Plaintiff, which cannot be accomplished without his current address, even a meritorious claim cannot proceed. This factor therefore weighs in favor of dismissal.
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the Poulis factors weigh in favor of dismissal. Consequently, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's case be dismissed with prejudice for his failure to comply with the orders of this Court and for failing to keep the Court informed of his current address.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set out in this Report and Recommendation, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's case be dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff is permitted to file Objections to this Report and Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) and 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, Plaintiff, because he is a non-electronically registered party, must file objections to this Report and Recommendation by March 8, 2021. He is cautioned that failure to file Objections within this timeframe “will waive the right to appeal.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011).