Opinion
NO. 2013-CA-000721-MR
04-17-2015
CHARLES R. STANFILL, JR. APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Charles R. Stanfill, Jr. Pro se Burgin, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway Attorney General of Kentucky Frankfort, Kentucky David W. Barr Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM CALLOWAY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TIMOTHY C. STARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CR-00148
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
BEFORE: DIXON, KRAMER, AND THOMPSON, JUDGES. KRAMER, JUDGE: Charles R. Stanfill, Jr. appeals the Calloway Circuit Court's order denying his RCr 11.42 motion to vacate his sentence. After reviewing the record, we reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing because there was nothing on the face of the record showing that the requirements of Faretta were met. We decline to review Stanfill's remaining claims because the outcome of those claims will be based in part upon the circuit court's findings concerning the Faretta requirements.
Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Following a jury trial, in which Stanfill proceeded with hybrid representation, Stanfill was convicted of: (1) possession of anhydrous ammonia in an unapproved container with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine; (2) first-degree possession of a controlled substance; (3) use of drug paraphernalia; and (4) manufacturing methamphetamine. Additionally, another charge with which Stanfill had been indicted, i.e., possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, was severed from the counts that went to trial. He entered an Alford plea to that charge, which was conditioned on his right to appeal.
"Hybrid representation" is "a defendant's ability to proceed pro se with standby counsel, controlling counsel's role in the litigation." Commonwealth v. Berry, 184 S.W.3d 63, 64 (Ky. 2005).
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). An Alford plea "permits a conviction without requiring an admission of guilt and while permitting a protestation of innocence." Wilfong v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d 84, 103 (Ky. App. 2004). "The entry of a guilty plea under the Alford doctrine carries the same consequences as a standard plea of guilty. By entering such a plea, a defendant may be able to avoid formally admitting guilt at the time of sentencing, but he nonetheless consents to being treated as if he were guilty with no assurances to the contrary." Id. at 102 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Stanfill filed a direct appeal from the trial court's judgment on the issues that went to a jury trial, as well as from a CR 60.02 motion he had filed. This Court affirmed his convictions for possession of anhydrous ammonia in an unapproved container with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine; manufacturing methamphetamine; and use of drug paraphernalia, and affirmed the denial of his CR 60.02 motion. However, this Court vacated Stanfill's conviction for first-degree possession of a controlled substance on the basis that it was a violation of his right against double jeopardy. See Stanfill v. Commonwealth, Nos. 2008-CA-001718-MR, 2009-CA-000803-MR, 2010 WL 1253223, *1, *10 (Ky. App. Apr. 2, 2010) (unpublished).
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure.
Stanfill then filed his RCr 11.42 motion and a motion for an evidentiary hearing. The circuit court denied Stanfill's RCr 11.42 motion without holding an evidentiary hearing.
Stanfill now appeals, contending that: (1) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to ensure that the requirements of Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), were met before Stanfill proceeded with hybrid representation; (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel when defense counsel unreasonably stipulated to all scientific evidence and physical exhibits; (3) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel when defense counsel failed to object to jury instructions that denied Stanfill a unanimous verdict resulting in a double jeopardy violation; and (4) the circuit court should have held an evidentiary hearing concerning these RCr 11.42 claims.
In Faretta, the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant is entitled to represent himself at trial if, after conducting a hearing, the trial court finds that the defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. The Faretta requirements must also be met when a defendant chooses to proceed with hybrid representation. See Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 423 S.W.3d 152, 160 n.3 (Ky. 2014).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In a motion brought under RCr 11.42, "[t]he movant has the burden of establishing convincingly that he or she was deprived of some substantial right which would justify the extraordinary relief provided by [a] post-conviction proceeding. . . . A reviewing court must always defer to the determination of facts and witness credibility made by the circuit judge." Simmons v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 557, 561 (Ky. 2006), overruled on other grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151, 159 (Ky. 2009). An RCr 11.42 motion is "limited to issues that were not and could not be raised on direct appeal." Id. Pursuant to RCr 11.42(5), if there is "a material issue of fact that cannot be determined on the face of the record the court shall grant a prompt hearing. . . ."
III. ANALYSIS
The only issue that we will get to in the present case is Stanfill's first claim, i.e., that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to ensure that the requirements of Faretta were met before Stanfill proceeded with hybrid representation. On the face of the record before us, there is nothing to indicate that proceedings consistent with Faretta took place; consequently, we reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing and further consideration regarding this claim.
We note that it is not the Commonwealth's burden to cite to us in its appellate brief where we could find in the record proceedings consistent with Faretta. Often to rebut similar claims by an appellant in such cases, the Commonwealth does direct the Court to a citation in the record where the proceedings of which an appellant complains can be found. In this case, however, the Commonwealth has not guided us to a citation in the record that the Faretta requirements were satisfied. Consequently, there is nothing before the Court to satisfy us that the Faretta requirements were met.
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Due to the fact that the analysis of Stanfill's remaining arguments will be based in part upon the decision regarding the Faretta requirements, we will not consider Stanfill's remaining arguments at this time.
Accordingly, the order of the Calloway Circuit Court is reversed and the case is remanded for an evidentiary hearing and further consideration of Stanfill's Faretta claim.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Charles R. Stanfill, Jr.
Pro se
Burgin, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
David W. Barr
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky