Opinion
99 Civ. No. 4711 (GEL).
March 6, 2001
John Standley, pro se, for Plaintiff John Standley
Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the State of New York (Bruno V. Gioffre, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, New York, NY, of counsel), for Defendants Linda Lyder and Dennis Bliden
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff John Standley brings this action pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging defendants intentionally tampered with his incoming legal mail, and thus interfered with his ability to respond to a motion in a proceeding before the New York Court of Claims. Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted.
Background
A. Prior Proceedings
The original complaint in this action was filed on June 29, 1999. That complaint alleged, inter alia, that defendants engaged in a "systematic pattern of malice and reckless indifference of interfering and tampering with privileged correspondence." (Compl. ¶ 1.) Then-Chief Judge Thomas P. Griesa immediately dismissed all of plaintiffs claims relating to alleged interference with his mail "save [those] concerning interference with his legal mail in ¶ ¶ 30-34 [of the Complaint]." Standley v. Lyder, No. 99 Civ. 4711 (June 29, 1999). On December 27, 1999, Judge Griesa denied plaintiffs motion for reconsideration, but permitted plaintiff to amend the complaint "to include any new allegations regarding his legal mail" upon reassignment of the case to a different judge. Standley v. Lyder, No. 99 Civ. 4711 (TPG) (December 29, 1999). On April 4, 2000, the case was reassigned to Judge Harold Baer, Jr., and on June 21, 2000, plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint recasts some of the claims dismissed by Judge Griesa as interference with "legal mail," but is otherwise identical to the original complaint; the only claims that survived the original complaint (Compl. ¶ ¶ 33-34) are recast in identical language (Am. Compl. ¶ ¶ 26-29). The case was reassigned to me on September 15, 2000. Defendants now move to dismiss the remaining claim of interference with legal mail.
The Amended Complaint does not raise any additional claims of interference with legal mail, or any additional claims besides those already dismissed pursuant to Judge Griesa's Order of June 29, 1999. Judge Griesa made clear that "the instant complaint shall proceed only as it relates to the alleged interference with plaintiffs Court of Claims action." Standley v. Lyder, No. 99 Civ. 4711 (June 29, 1999). Plaintiffs claims that defendants inspected letters sent to plaintiff from, among others, the Mexican Embassy (Am. Compl. ¶ 14), the National Archives and Records Administration (id. ¶ 15), Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (id. ¶ ¶ 16, 17), and the United States Senate (id. ¶ 19), do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation for substantially the reasons already stated by Judge Griesa. Standley v. Lyder, No. 99 Civ. 4711 (June 29, 1999), at notes 1 2 (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-350 (1996) (requiring actual injury to an existing legal claim)).See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576 (1974) (defining "legal mail" generally as "communications . . . specifically marked as originating from an attorney, with his name and address being given"). Inspection by the authorities of incoming mail that involves neither attorney-client communications nor actual litigation documents does not implicate the right of reasonable access to the courts, and, contrary to plaintiffs apparent belief, does not constitute "legal mail." Accordingly, in addressing Standley's complaint, I consider only those facts relating to the claim of interference with legal mail that survived Judge Griesa's order.
B. Facts
The facts alleged by plaintiff are as follows. During the events alleged in the Amended Complaint, plaintiff was incarcerated at the Green Haven Correctional Facility ("Green Haven"). (Am. Compl. ¶ 3.) Defendant Linda Lyder ("Lyder") was the Senior Mail and Supply Clerk for the Facility. (Id. ¶ 4.) Defendant Dennis Bliden was Green Haven's First Deputy Superintendent and was responsible for ensuring that all staff assigned to the Green Haven's Correspondence Office complied with Department of Corrections procedures for distributing inmate mail. (Id. ¶ 5.)
On November 10, 1998, plaintiff received an Airborne Express package from the Office of the New York Attorney General, in regards to a legal proceeding pending before the New York Court of Claims. (Id. ¶ 26.) The Court of Claims action was apparently brought by the Plaintiff against the State of New York, though it is unclear from the record what exactly that case entailed. Plaintiff alleges that upon receipt of the package, defendant Lyder "intentionally opened [it] outside of plaintiff's presence." (Id. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff further alleges that when he received the package "it appeared that some of the legal documents contained within had been intentionally removed" (id. ¶ 27), though he does not allege what documents, if any, were missing. Plaintiff does not state when the New York Attorney General sent the package, or when it was received at Green Haven.
The basis of plaintiffs § 1983 claim is that the opening of the package frustrated his Court of Claims proceeding. (Id.) On December 22, 1998, the Court of Claims granted the state's motion to dismiss plaintiffs claim, in part (he alleges) because plaintiff failed to submit opposition papers. (Id. ¶ 28.) On January 31, 1999, plaintiff wrote a letter to the Court of Claims alleging that he was unable to respond to the state's motion to dismiss "in light of the fact that the Airborne Express letter containing the Attorney General's motion to dismiss had been opened outside of plaintiffs presence and had been clearly tampered with." (Id. ¶ 29.) On February 10, 1999, the Court of Claims informed plaintiff that he would still be permitted to submit papers in opposition (Pl.'s Mem. Law at 2). or to make a motion for reconsideration (id. ¶ 30). Plaintiff does not state whether he availed himself of either opportunity, nor does he allege that he lost a meritorious claim on account of the defendant's alleged tampering with his legal mail. Rather, in opposition to the instant motion to dismiss, he claims only that "[f]inal adjudication was delayed several months." (Pl's Mem. Law at 2.)
Discussion
A. Legal Standard
A court may dismiss an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., only if "`it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which will entitle him to relief'" Cohen v. Koenig, 25 F.3d 1168, 1172 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). In considering the motion, the court must take "as true the facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor." Jackson Nat. Life Ins. v. Merrill Lynch Co., 32 F.3d 697, 699-700 (2d Cir. 1994). The court can dismiss the claim only if, assuming all facts alleged to be true, the plaintiff still fails to plead the basic elements of a cause of action. Where, as here, a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court must liberally construe the complaint. See, e.g., Boddie v. Schneider, 105 F.3d 857, 860 (2d Cir. 1997). "A complaint should not be dismissed simply because a plaintiff is unlikely to succeed on the merits." Baker v. Cuomo, 58 F.3d 814, 818 (2d Cir. 1995).
Even afforded the liberal construction to which his pleadings are entitled, however, Standley's Amended Complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
B. Standard Applied to Standley's Section 1983 Claim
Standley's allegations regarding interference with legal mail does not state a cause of action under § 1983. it is accepted that a prisoner must be present when, for whatever reason, legal mail (clearly marked as such) is opened by prison officials, Wolff, 418 U.S. at 547-76, and that the Constitution guarantees a prisoner's "reasonable access to the courts." Washington v. James, 782 F.2d 1134, 1138 (2d Cir. 1986) (citingBounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821-23 (1977)). But Second Circuit decisions make clear that one isolated incident of interference with legal mail does not state a claim for denial of reasonable access to courts. See James, 782 F.2d at 1139 (prisoner states a claim where he "indicates an alleged continuing activity rather than a single isolated instance"); see, e.g., Costello v. Hynes, No. 96 Civ. 6808 (LBS), 1997 WL 580704, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. September 18, 1997) ("The Second Circuit has clearly held that an isolated incident of interference with prisoner's mail does not give rise to a cognizable claim under § 1983") (internal citation omitted). Here, Standley alleges precisely such a "single isolated instance" of improper procedure in delivering legal mail.
The Amended Complaint does allege in general terms that defendant Lyder "has engaged in a systematic practice of opening plaintiffs legal mail outside of his presence." ¶ 31. But the only instance of such opening alleged, other than those already dismissed by Judge Griesa as relating to non-legal mail, is the Court of Claims incident discussed in the text.
Standley's claim also fails because he fails to allege facts establishing that this single incident interfered with his reasonable access to the courts. This Court has routinely dismissed claims of sporadic interference with mail that did not allege actual prejudice to a prisoner's ability to vindicate his legal claims. See, e.g., Davidson v. Scully, No. 81 Civ. 0390 (PKL), 1999 WL 961775, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. October 21, 1999) ("To prevail on a claim of interference with legal mail, a plaintiff must show that a pending or anticipated legal action was prejudiced by the alleged interference") (citing Morgan v. Montanve, 516 F.2d 1367, 1372 (2d Cir. 1975) and Herrera v. Scully, 815 F. Supp. 713, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)); Costello, 1997 WL 580704, at *3 ("Plaintiff must allege facts . . . demonstrating that the alleged interference actually impeded his access to the courts or prejudiced an existing action") (internal citations omitted). In Costello, Judge Sand ruled that even where there were two incidents, and the court assumed that the interference resulted from deliberate collusion by state officials, the plaintiff failed to state a claim where no actual injury to the plaintiff was alleged. 1997 WL 580704, at *3-4. Judge Preska has similarly held that to state a cognizable claim for interference with legal mail, a plaintiff must show deliberate and malicious interference with access to the courts and a resultant material prejudice in a pending legal proceeding. See Hudson v. Greiner, No. 99 Civ. 12339 (LAP), 2000 WL 1838324, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. December 13, 2000) ("plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that defendants deliberately and maliciously interfered with his access to the courts, and that such conduct materially prejudiced a legal action he sought to pursue") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
This case is strikingly similar to those cited. Standley's Amended Complaint makes no claim of actual prejudice. Rather, he merely alleges in conclusory fashion that he thinks something from the package was missing, without explaining what, or why the missing items (if any) frustrated his access to the Court of Claims. (Am. Compl. ¶ ¶ 26-27.) He does not allege that he received the package after a court-imposed deadline (id. ¶ 27), or that he was denied an opportunity in the Court of Claims to present his opposition to the state's motion to dismiss (id. 30). Nor does he allege that the defendants' conduct caused him to lose an otherwise meritorious claim.See Jermosen v. Coughlin, 877 F. Supp. 864, 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("To state a valid § 1983 claim . . ., [plaintiff] must show that the alleged deprivation actually interfered with his access to the courts or prejudiced an existing action").
These failings to not appear to be mere oversights by a pro se litigant. His memorandum of law, which fleshes out his allegations, makes clear that the chief consequence of the defendants' alleged conduct was that adjudication of plaintiffs Court of Claims action was "delayed" for several months, and admits that the Court of Claims did indeed "ultimately permit plaintiff to file a reply brief" (Pl.'s Mem. Law at 2.) Thus, as in Costello, plaintiffs Amended Complaint "does not demonstrate actual injury as a result of the claimed interference with his legal mail." 1997 WL 580704, *3. Even if it is presumed that defendants acted deliberately and maliciously to interfere with his access to the courts, a § 1983 claim is supportable only where a complaint "show(s) facts indicating frustration of [plaintiff's) reasonable access to the courts." Id. (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 345 (1996)). Standley's Amended Complaint, which contains no more than conclusory allegations, without any indication of what was pending before the Court of Claims, or how, specifically, the defendant's conduct frustrated his suit, fails short of that standard. These allegations do not establish that defendants' conduct frustrated his reasonable access to the Court of Claims. Indeed, it appears that he did have such access, and was provided with every opportunity to present his legal arguments to the Court of Claims. "A delay in being able to work on one's legal action or communicate with the courts does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation." Jermosen v. Coughlin, supra, 877 F. Supp. at 871.
Nor is there merit to plaintiffs claim that the defendants' alleged violations of Department of Corrections (DOCS) procedures raise a colorable § 1983 claim, rather than simply a question of state law. Standley argues that the DOCS "has created a constitutionally protected liberty pursuant to DOCS Directive 4421, which mandates that a prisoner has an unmistakable right to be free from intrusions upon `legal' and `privileged' mail." (Standley Aff. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff is correct that due process liberty interests may be found in the dictates of prison regulations, but the Supreme Court has limited those interests to "freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Demont, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995); Taylor v. Rodrigeuz, 238 F.3d 188, 194 (2d Cir. 2001) (same) (quoting Sandin). Because regulations concerning the processing of incoming mail plainly does not involve freedom from restraint or impose atypical hardship, plaintiff's claim fails. See, e.g., Pacheco v. Comisse, 897 F. Supp. 671, 680 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (rejecting similar challenge to alleged violation of DOCS Directive 4421 on grounds that such violation does create a liberty interest under Sandin).
In his opposition to the instant motion, Standley relies principally onKey v. Artuz, No. 95 Cv. 0392 (HB) (S.D.N.Y. September 12, 1995), which held that "[t]he inability to comply with . . . a court imposed deadline is precisely the kind of injury or prejudice that courts have referred to in determining if an inmate has actually been denied access to [the] courts." (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original). But Key confirms the defects in Standley's Amended Complaint. There, plaintiff alleged "repeated and significant delay" in delivering legal mail, resulting in plaintiffs receipt of the state's opposition to a pending § 440.10 motion after a court-imposed deadline for plaintiffs reply. Id. Here, by contrast, Standley does not allege that he received legal mail after a court-imposed deadline, only that something (without alleging what) appeared to be missing, which hindered him (without alleging how) from preparing a timely response, which (in any event) he was later granted leave to file. Such conclusory allegations cannot sustain a § 1983 claim.
Plaintiff also relies on decisions from other circuits which he cites as supporting the claim that one instance of opening legal mail outside an inmate's presence is enough to state a Section 1983 claim.See, e.g., Taylor v. Sterett, 532 F.2d 462, 475 (5th Cir. 1976); Huston v. Burpo, 1995 WL 73097, at *2 (N.D. Cal. February 13, 1995). Neither case support such a claim. In Burbo, the plaintiff alleged several instances of interference and delays in receipt of legal mail, yet the court dismissed the complaint because (like Standley) the plaintiff "did not alleged an `actual injury' to court access." 1995 WL 73097, at *3 As for Sterett, the Fifth Circuit has since explicitly questioned its continued authority, holding that violation of a "prison regulation requiring that a prisoner be present when his incoming legal mail is opened and inspected is not a violation of a prisoner's constitutional rights." See Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 825 (5th Cir. 1993).
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs Amended Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Because plaintiff has already availed himself of an opportunity to replead, and has failed to allege any relevant facts beyond those in his initial Complaint, it would be permissible to dismiss without leave to file further pleadings. See, e.g., DeJesus v. Sears, Roebuck Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 65, 71-72 (2d Cir.) (no abuse of discretion to dismiss a complaint without leave to replead "when a party has been given ample prior opportunity to allege a claim"). Nevertheless, because plaintiff is pro se, the Court will consider a motion for leave to amend his pleading if filed within 30 days, if there are additional facts that plaintiff has inadvertently failed to include. Plaintiff is advised not to replead unless he can truthfUlly allege sufficient facts to establish (1) that there were more than isolated or sporadic instances of interference with incoming legal mail (not including the purported violations that have already been dismissed), such that his reasonable access to the courts was denied, or (2) that as a result of the defendants' deliberate indifference with his legal mail, plaintiff suffered actual prejudice in the Court of Claims.
Conclusion
The motion to dismiss is granted.
SO ORDERED