Standard v. Shine

12 Citing cases

  1. McCormick v. Campbell

    329 S.E.2d 752 (S.C. 1985)   Cited 4 times

    We affirm. In Standard v. Shine, 278 S.C. 337, 295 S.E.2d 786 (1982), we abrogated the arbitrary age presumptions in determining a minor's negligence or contributory negligence holding the behavior of minors under the age of fourteen should be judged by the conduct expected of a minor of like age under like circumstances. In this case, since both parties were fourteen years old or above at the time of the accident, the adult standard of care should have been charged.

  2. Inman v. Thompson

    375 S.E.2d 358 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 22 times
    Affirming a verdict for the plaintiff, holding even if the trial court erred in charging the doctrine of last clear chance, it could not be determined whether the jury could have found that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the accident or merely that the child was not contributorily negligent

    On appeal, and at oral argument, Thompson's counsel acknowledged that for the purpose of this appeal, Thompson admits she was grossly negligent. He then frames the first issue for our review as whether the conduct of Michael constituted gross contributory negligence as a matter of law. Thompson relies principally on the case of Standard v.Shine, 278 S.C. 337, 295 S.E.2d 786 (1982). Our Supreme Court in Standard v. Shine adopted the Restatement's view that "a minor's conduct should be judged by the standard of behavior to be expected of a child of like age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances."

  3. Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox

    232 Neb. 846 (Neb. 1989)   Cited 51 times
    Explaining that an award of punitive damages to a plaintiff violates a provision of the Nebraska Constitution that requires "all fines penalties ... arising under the general laws of the state" to be paid to counties for the "support of the common schools" (citing Neb. Const. art. VII, § 5 )

    Some courts have held that where parental liability statutes limit liability, the statutory purpose must be only to deter juvenile delinquency, not to compensate victims. See, First Bank Southeast v. Bentkowski, 138 Wis.2d 283, 405 N.W.2d 764 (1987); Stang v. Waller, 415 So.2d 123 (Fla. App. 1982); Standard v. Shine, 278 S.C. 337, 295 S.E.2d 786 (1982); Insurance Co. v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 645 (1963). However, the legislative history establishes that 43-801 is related both to the legitimate governmental purposes of compensating, in whole or in part, victims who suffer damage at the hands of juvenile delinquents, and to the legitimate governmental purpose of deterring juvenile delinquency through encouraging parents to control their children.

  4. Cooper v. the County of Florence

    299 S.C. 386 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 2 times

    Our Supreme Court has recognized a lesser standard of care for some minors because of their diminished mental capacity. See Standard v. Shine, 278 S.C. 337, 295 S.E.2d 786 (1982) (minor of tender years not required to observe adult standard of care; minor's conduct should be judged by the standard of behavior expected of a child of like age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances). Cooper argues that the same reasoning should apply to the mentally ill, although the analogy between children and mental incompetents has been criticized.

  5. Brown v. Smalls

    325 S.C. 547 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 24 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Jones v. Ridgely Communications, Inc., 304 S.C. 452, 405 S.E.2d 402 (1991); Burns v. South Carolina Comm'n forthe Blind, 323 S.C. 77, 448 S.E.2d 589 (Ct.App. 1994). In Standard v. Shine, 278 S.C. 337, 295 S.E.2d 786 (1982), our Supreme Court enunciated the standard of care involving minors: Heretofore, we have held, by analogy to the criminal law, that a child under seven years of age was conclusively presumed to be incapable of contributory negligence; a rebuttable presumption existed that a child between the ages of seven and fourteen was incapable of contributory negligence; and a child of fourteen years and over was presumed capable of contributory negligence.

  6. Maynard v. Ind. Harbor Belt R., (N.D.Ind. 1998)

    997 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D. Ind. 1998)   Cited 7 times
    Finding no Indiana presumption as to child's capacity to exercise care and discretion

    Two states, Kentucky and South Carolina, had abandoned the presumption in favor of the child. Williamson v. Garland, 402 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Ky. 1966) ("We believe there is no longer any useful purpose in the rebuttable presumption against capacity for contributory negligence as to children within the seven to fourteen age group"); Standard v. Shine, 278 S.C. 337, 295 S.E.2d 786 (1982) (overruling cases that established presumptions of capability based on age). Importantly, the Court was unable to find any other state that has a rebuttable presumption adverse to children between the ages of seven and fourteen.

  7. Jones ex Rel. Castor v. Carter

    336 S.C. 110 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 3 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Thus, instructing the jury that the reasonableness of a defendant's conduct could be judged in light of an assumption that others will obey the law would have effectively abrogated the law's protection, at that time, of small children through modification of the contributory negligence standard. Subsequently, in Standard v. Shine, 278 S.C. 337, 295 S.E.2d 786 (1982), the Supreme Court abandoned the age-based presumptions that supported the rule in Herring. In Standard, a six-year-old boy and his parents (collectively "the tenants") lived in an apartment.

  8. Erica Bailey v. C.S

    12 S.W.3d 159 (Tex. App. 2000)   Cited 14 times
    Stating that " person commits a battery if he intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another when he knows or should reasonably believe the other person will regard the contact as offensive or provocative."

    However, several jurisdictions have held minors liable for intentional torts. See, e.g., Ellis v. D'Angelo, 253 P.2d 675, 677 (Cal.Dist.Ct.App. 1953) (four year old is not incapable of the intent required for battery); Jorgenson v. Nudelman, 195 N.E.2d 422, 424 (Ill.App.Ct. 1963) (six year old may have capacity to intend injurious act); T.Z. Standard v. Shine, 295 S.E.2d 786, 788 (S.C. 1982) (minors of any age can be held liable for intentional torts); Garrett v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Wash. 1955) (five year old could be liable for battery).

  9. Estate of Haley ex Rel. Haley v. Brown

    370 S.C. 240 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 7 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding directed verdict proper where the “only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence is that [plaintiff's] negligence in running into the side of [defendant's] truck outweighed any possible negligence by [defendant] and was the more determinative factor in causing the collision.”

    In South Carolina, the conduct of a minor is judged by the standard of behavior to be expected of a child of like age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances. Standard v. Shine, 278 S.C. 337, 339, 295 S.E.2d 786, 787 (1982). The undisputed evidence was that Joshua and the other children knew of the need to look before entering a street.

  10. Madison v. Babcock Center

    370 S.C. 42 (S.C. 2006)

    In Standard v. Shine, 278 S.C. 337, 295 S.E.2d 786 (1982), we abandoned age-based presumptions previously used in assessing whether an injured child's own negligence contributed to his injury. "The capacities of children vary greatly, not only with age, but also with individuals of the same age.