In South Carolina, the conduct of a minor is judged by the standard of behavior to be expected of a child of like age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances. Standard v. Shine, 278 S.C. 337, 339, 295 S.E.2d 786, 787 (1982). The undisputed evidence was that Joshua and the other children knew of the need to look before entering a street.
Thus, instructing the jury that the reasonableness of a defendant's conduct could be judged in light of an assumption that others will obey the law would have effectively abrogated the law's protection, at that time, of small children through modification of the contributory negligence standard. Subsequently, in Standard v. Shine, 278 S.C. 337, 295 S.E.2d 786 (1982), the Supreme Court abandoned the age-based presumptions that supported the rule in Herring. In Standard, a six-year-old boy and his parents (collectively "the tenants") lived in an apartment.
Jones v. Ridgely Communications, Inc., 304 S.C. 452, 405 S.E.2d 402 (1991); Burns v. South Carolina Comm'n forthe Blind, 323 S.C. 77, 448 S.E.2d 589 (Ct.App. 1994). In Standard v. Shine, 278 S.C. 337, 295 S.E.2d 786 (1982), our Supreme Court enunciated the standard of care involving minors: Heretofore, we have held, by analogy to the criminal law, that a child under seven years of age was conclusively presumed to be incapable of contributory negligence; a rebuttable presumption existed that a child between the ages of seven and fourteen was incapable of contributory negligence; and a child of fourteen years and over was presumed capable of contributory negligence.
Statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly construed. Standard v. Shine, 278 S.C. 337, 295 S.E.2d 786 (1982); Major v. Nat'l Indem. Co., 267 S.C. 517, 229 S.E.2d 849 (1976). "Where no conflict with common law exists, however, this Court will not substitute its view of public policy for that of the legislature."
Southern Cotton Oil Co., 78 S.C. 10, 18, 58 S.E. 960, 962 (1907). In Standard v. Shine, 278 S.C. 337, 295 S.E.2d 786 (1982), we abandoned age-based presumptions previously used in assessing whether an injured child's own negligence contributed to his injury. "The capacities of children vary greatly, not only with age, but also with individuals of the same age.
In Standard v. Shine, 278 S.C. 337, 295 S.E.2d 786 (1982), we abandoned age-based presumptions previously used in assessing whether an injured child's own negligence contributed to his injury. "The capacities of children vary greatly, not only with age, but also with individuals of the same age.
On appeal, and at oral argument, Thompson's counsel acknowledged that for the purpose of this appeal, Thompson admits she was grossly negligent. He then frames the first issue for our review as whether the conduct of Michael constituted gross contributory negligence as a matter of law. Thompson relies principally on the case of Standard v.Shine, 278 S.C. 337, 295 S.E.2d 786 (1982). Our Supreme Court in Standard v. Shine adopted the Restatement's view that "a minor's conduct should be judged by the standard of behavior to be expected of a child of like age, intelligence, and experience under like circumstances."
Two states, Kentucky and South Carolina, had abandoned the presumption in favor of the child. Williamson v. Garland, 402 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Ky. 1966) ("We believe there is no longer any useful purpose in the rebuttable presumption against capacity for contributory negligence as to children within the seven to fourteen age group"); Standard v. Shine, 278 S.C. 337, 295 S.E.2d 786 (1982) (overruling cases that established presumptions of capability based on age). Importantly, the Court was unable to find any other state that has a rebuttable presumption adverse to children between the ages of seven and fourteen.
Some courts have held that where parental liability statutes limit liability, the statutory purpose must be only to deter juvenile delinquency, not to compensate victims. See, First Bank Southeast v. Bentkowski, 138 Wis.2d 283, 405 N.W.2d 764 (1987); Stang v. Waller, 415 So.2d 123 (Fla. App. 1982); Standard v. Shine, 278 S.C. 337, 295 S.E.2d 786 (1982); Insurance Co. v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 645 (1963). However, the legislative history establishes that 43-801 is related both to the legitimate governmental purposes of compensating, in whole or in part, victims who suffer damage at the hands of juvenile delinquents, and to the legitimate governmental purpose of deterring juvenile delinquency through encouraging parents to control their children.
We affirm. In Standard v. Shine, 278 S.C. 337, 295 S.E.2d 786 (1982), we abrogated the arbitrary age presumptions in determining a minor's negligence or contributory negligence holding the behavior of minors under the age of fourteen should be judged by the conduct expected of a minor of like age under like circumstances. In this case, since both parties were fourteen years old or above at the time of the accident, the adult standard of care should have been charged.