Standard Scrap Metal Co. v. Poll. Cont. Bd.

6 Citing cases

  1. Park Crematory v. Pollution Control Bd.

    264 Ill. App. 3d 498 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)   Cited 3 times
    In Park Crematory, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 264 Ill.App.3d 498, 506 (1994), the reviewing court found the monetary penalty punitive in that it "in no way aid[ed] in the enforcement of the Act," noting the violator misunderstood the permit requirements, cooperated promptly with the IEPA, and corrected the violations prior to the complaint.

    ' " In support of this reasoning, the State asserts that this court's decision in Standard Scrap Metal Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1986), 142 Ill. App.3d 655, 491 N.E.2d 1251, is "instructive." The State contends that Park's failure to comply with the permit requirements was not a mere "paper" or "minor" violation and cites the following language from the Standard Scrap case:

  2. Trilla Steel Drum Corp. v. Pollution Control Board

    180 Ill. App. 3d 1010 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 5 times

    The Board has not shown that Trilla's omission has harmed in a serious manner either the information gathering or oversight roles of the Agency. See Standard Scrap Metal Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1986), 142 Ill. App.3d 655, 491 N.E.2d 1251. The circumstances here are readily distinguishable from those cases where a violation of the permit program could create a harmful impediment to the Agency's responsibility to protect the environment and the public.

  3. People ex rel. Raoul v. Lincoln, Ltd.

    2021 Ill. App. 190317 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021)

    This distinguishes them from other violators who attempted to remedy their violation and received a lesser penalty. See e.g., Standard Scrap Metal Co. v. Pollution Control Board, 142 Ill.App.3d 655, 662 (1986) (defendant violator applied for and was granted permit after suit filed against it); People ex rel. Ryan v. McHenry Shores, 295 Ill.App.3d 628, 638 (1998) (after receiving enforcement letter from Agency, defendant made some attempt to remedy violations). ¶ 68 The majority does not dispute that the defendants violated the Act for years and profited considerably.

  4. People ex rel. Madigan v. J.T. Einoder, Inc.

    2013 Ill. App. 113498 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)   Cited 3 times

    To the contrary, they are indicative of flagrant violations of the Act, distinguishing defendants' conduct from that of other violators who were assessed comparatively lesser penalties. See, e.g., Standard Scrap Metal Co. v. Pollution Control Board, 142 Ill.App.3d 655, 662, 96 Ill.Dec. 791, 491 N.E.2d 1251 (1986) (defendant violator applied for and was granted a permit after suit was filed against it); McHenry Shores, 295 Ill.App.3d at 631, 230 Ill.Dec. 264, 693 N.E.2d 393 (after receiving enforcement letter from Agency, defendant made some attempt to remedy violations). Accordingly, we do not find the court's decision to impose fines against each defendant or the amount of those fines to be an abuse of discretion.

  5. Modine Mfg. Co. v. Pollution Control Bd.

    193 Ill. App. 3d 643 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 3 times
    Adopting reasoning of Trilla Steel

    Additionally, good faith or lack thereof is pertinent to the issue of whether a penalty should be imposed and, if so, the amount of the penalty. Archer Daniels Midland v. Pollution Control Board (1986), 149 Ill. App.3d 301, 305, 500 N.E.2d 580; Standard Scrap Metal Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1986), 142 Ill. App.3d 655, 662, 491 N.E.2d 1251; see also City of Chicago v. Pollution Control Board (1978), 57 Ill. App.3d 517, 521, 373 N.E.2d 512. • 7 Applying these principles to the instant case, we note that with respect to the first statutory factor, the PCB found that "[t]he Board does consider that the degree of interference with the public health, welfare or property is considerable for operating without a permit.

  6. Archer Daniels Midland v. Poll. Cont. Bd.

    500 N.E.2d 580 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)   Cited 7 times
    In Archer Daniels Midland, even had the case been affirmed on appeal, the Board on remand would still have had to fix the amount of the penalty.

    In addition, the good faith, or the lack thereof, on the part of ADM is pertinent to the issues of whether a penalty should be imposed, and, if so, the amount of the penalty. (See Standard Scrap Metal Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1986), 142 Ill. App.3d 655, 491 N.E.2d 1251.) Imposition of penalties under the Act is not to be invoked for punishment but to aid enforcement of the Act. Harris-Hub Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1977), 50 Ill. App.3d 608, 365 N.E.2d 1071.