There was no act of a third party which intervened between the negligence in parking the vehicle in the emergency lane and the collision with that negligently parked vehicle. Compare Gulf Oil Corp. v. Stanfield, 213 Ga. 436 ( 99 S.E.2d 209) (1957) (intervening negligent acts of third parties); Baughcum v. Cecil Key Paving, 190 Ga. App. 21 ( 378 S.E.2d 151) (1989) (intervening negligent acts of third parties); Southern Bell Tel. c. Co. v. Dolce, 178 Ga. App. 175 ( 342 S.E.2d 497) (1986) (intervening negligent act of third party); Standard Oil Co. v. Harris, 120 Ga. App. 768 (3) ( 172 S.E.2d 344) (1969) (intervening negligent act of third party); Cain v. Ga. Power Co., 53 Ga. App. 483, 486 ( 186 S.E. 229) (1936) (intervening negligent act of third party); Morrison v. Columbus Transp. Co., 39 Ga. App. 708 (1) ( 148 S.E. 276) (1929) (intervening negligent act of third party). The only act which intervened between the negligence in parking the vehicle and the collision was the act of appellee's deceased herself in losing control of her vehicle.
The foregoing acreage is part of a 22.059-acre tract of land, which was the subject property in City of Smyrna v. Ruff, 240 Ga. 250 ( 240 S.E.2d 19) (1977), wherein it was held that, under the evidence of record in that case, the single-family residential zoning classification of the property resulted in a taking of property without just compensation and thus was unconstitutional under Barrett v. Hamby, 235 Ga. 262 ( 219 S.E.2d 399) (1975). In the present case, the appellants contend that this holding in Ruff is a "binding precedent" here. Standard Oil Co. v. Harris, 120 Ga. App. 768 (1) ( 172 S.E.2d 344) (1969); Bray v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 103 Ga. App. 783 ( 120 S.E.2d 628) (1961). The appellants also contend that, under criteria enunciated in Guhl v. Holcomb Bridge Rd. Corp., 238 Ga. 322 ( 232 S.E.2d 830) (1977), the evidence here shows in a clear and convincing manner that the existing zoning causes them a significant economic detriment and bears an insubstantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.
[a]n event is not regarded as being foreseeable if it is one in the nature of an extraordinary coincidence, or a conjunction of circumstances, or which would not occur save under exceptional circumstances; if it is unusual and unlikely to happen, or if it is a rare event in experience, or if other and contingent experiences preponderate largely in causing the injurious effect.Standard Oil Co. v. Harris, 120 Ga.App. 768, 774(5), 172 S.E.2d 344 (1969) (citations and emphasis omitted). It follows that
[a]n event is not regarded as being foreseeable if it is one in the nature of an extraordinary coincidence, or a conjunction of circumstances, or which would not occur save under exceptional circumstances; if it is unusual and unlikely to happen, or if it is a rare event in experience, or if other and contingent experiences preponderate largely in causing the injurious effect.Standard Oil Co. v. Harris, 120 Ga.App. 768, 774(5), 172 S.E.2d 344 (1969) (citations and emphasis omitted). It follows that
[a]n event is not regarded as being foreseeable if it is one in the nature of an extraordinary coincidence, or a conjunction of circumstances, or which would not occur save under exceptional circumstances; if it is unusual and unlikely to happen, or if it is a rare event in experience, or if other and contingent experiences preponderate largely in causing the injurious effect. Standard Oil Co. v. Harris, 120 Ga. App. 768, 774 (5) (172 SE2d 344) (1969) (citations and emphasis omitted). It follows that
(Citations omitted.) Standard Oil Co. v. Harris, 120 Ga. App. 768, 774 (5) ( 172 SE2d 344) (1969). Said in a different way, "[o]ne is bound to anticipate and provide against what usually happens and what is likely to happen; but it would impose too heavy a responsibility to hold him bound in like manner to guard against what is unusual and unlikely to happen, or what is only remotely and slightly probable."
This Court then held as follows: "Ordinarily, `one who is familiar with the premises cannot rely for recovery upon the negligence of the defendant in failing to correct a patent defect where such party had equal means with the defendant of discovering it or equal knowledge of its existence.' Barrow v. James, 107 Ga. App. 377, 378 ( 130 S.E.2d 352). See also Gibson v. Consolidated Credit Corp., 110 Ga. App. 170, 173 ( 138 S.E.2d 77) quoting 20 RCL 56, ยง 52; Standard Oil Co. v. Harris, 120 Ga. App. 768(4) (172 S.E.2d 344). However, this rule does not hold where the circumstances are such as to excuse the plaintiff from exercising the degree of care otherwise required.
Burton later defined "precipitating cause" as meaning the "trigger mechanism" of Brian's death. As such, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the altercation was not the proximate or efficient cause (i.e. the one that necessarily set the other causes in operation) of Brian's death. See Standard Oil Co. v. Harris, 120 Ga. App. 768, 771 ( 172 S.E.2d 344) (1969). We also cannot conclude as a matter of law that Gray and Kerr's failure to immediately intervene and render aid to Brian was not a contributing proximate cause of death.
Melvin's separation from his biological mother Jodie was not caused by Williams' surrendering him for adoption or by state adoption workers placing him with the Moores, as opposed to a white couple had it been determined that he was not biracial. "`The proximate cause is the efficient cause, the one that necessarily sets the other causes in operation...' [Cits.]" Standard Oil Co. v. Harris, 120 Ga. App. 768, 771 (3) ( 172 S.E.2d 344) (1969). Plaintiffs charge defendants with negligence in failing to ascertain that Barnes was not Melvin's father.
See Kenny v. M M Supermarket, 183 Ga. App. 225, 226 ( 358 S.E.2d 641). Proof that an injury may have resulted from an unusual incident in a store is not sufficient to establish liability on the part of the proprietor. Standard Oil Co. v. Harris, 120 Ga. App. 768 ( 172 S.E.2d 344). Although expressed in the context of a slip and fall case, the principle restated in Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 622 ( 272 S.E.2d 327) is also applicable here: The dangerous instrumentality must have been known to the proprietor and unknown to the invitee before the invitee can recover. See also Pound v. Augusta National, 158 Ga. App. 166 ( 279 S.E.2d 342).