See Md. Code, State Gov't § 10-222(h)(3)(iii)-(iv). Nonetheless, it is well settled that the procedure followed in administrative agencies usually is not as formal and strict as that of the courts. See Gorin v. Board of County Com'rs for Anne Arundel County, 244 Md. 106, 110, 223 A.2d 237 (1966); Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 249, 127 A. 850 (1925). As such, the rules of evidence are generally relaxed in administrative proceedings.

The admissibility of hearsay testimony in workmen's compensation cases has been considered by this Court on a number of prior occasions. See, e.g., Commercial Transfer v. Quasny, 245 Md. 572, 227 A.2d 20 (1967); Spence v. Steel Co., 173 Md. 539, 549, 197 A. 302 (1938); Horn Ice Cream Co. v. Yost, 164 Md. 24, 163 A. 823 (1933); GasEquipment Corp. v. Baldwin, 152 Md. 321, 326, 136 A. 644 (1927); Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 249, 127 A. 850 (1925). In Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey, supra, 147 Md. at 255, where, in upholding a lower court ruling that admitted statements which a deceased workman had made to his wife and his physicians to the effect that he had fallen and struck his side at a spot where a malignant growth later developed, the Court observed that the statements "refer[red] to a simple fact, and were such as to leave no room for substantial misunderstanding. . . ."

Id. at 194, 436 A.2d 525. As in Eichberg, the Court held in Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 249, 127 A. 850 (1925) that hearsay evidence could be credited in an administrative proceeding. A widow and certain doctors testified before the State Industrial Accident Commission concerning her deceased husband's description of the circumstances which led up to his death.

2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law § 382; 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies § 125. Hearsay evidence is not only admissible, it may serve as the sole basis for decision if it is credible and has sufficient probative force. Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 249; Commercial Transfer v. Quasny, 245 Md. 572. The Industrial Accident Commission in Mealey had relied on hearsay testimony that the deceased workman had fallen and struck his side on a wagon at a spot where his fatal malignant growth later developed, and this Court held it proper for the trial court to have admitted the testimony of various witnesses that the deceased had so told them as a basis for decision by the jury, saying:

Quasny died on Friday, January 11, at about 4:00 P.M. He had never been out of danger from the time of his arrival at the hospital. This Court, in a number of cases, has considered whether a hearsay statement as to the cause of an accident is admissible, under Section 11 of the Act, which provides that "the Commission shall not be bound by the usual common law or statutory rules of evidence or by any technical or formal rules of procedure * * *" Our review is limited to the questions raised in the appeal to the lower court permitted by the Act, but, as Chief Judge Bond said, for the Court, in Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 249, 254, 127 A. 850 (1925): "[I]t seems unquestionably true that the mere allowance of an appeal must intend a review of the decision of the commission with some advantages from the special training and methods of the judicial tribunal.

When so used, whether by an expert or a non-expert, the condition so described could be incorporated in a hypothetical question to be propounded to an expert. The case of Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 249 ( 127 A. 850), holds that the statements of a deceased workman made to his wife and to his physicians as to the happening of the accident, and the manner thereof, when that is all the evidence there is of such occurrence, justify the submission of the case to the jury. In view of the provision of the Oregon statute, however, to the effect that a case of this character shall be tried as other civil cases, we do not consider the Maryland case just cited as controlling.

In the following cases, the legislature had adopted a statute liberalizing the evidence rules in workmen's compensation cases but the court did not rely primarily on the statute. Baker v. Industrial Comm'n, 44 Ohio App. 539 ( 186 N.E. 10); Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 249 ( 127 A 850). Additional cases may be cited where the hearsay was admitted but without a showing of necessity.

Baltimore Philadelphia Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U.S. 408, 414, 52 S. Ct. 187, 189, 76 L.Ed. 366. E.g., Standard Oil Company v. Mealey, 147 Md. 249, 127 A. 850; Bresee v. Clark Equipment Company, 214 Mich. 235, 183 N.W. 19; Republic Iron Steel Company v. Reed, 223 Ala. 617, 137 So. 673. The evidence might have supported, but it did not require, a finding that the fatal trauma was caused by a boxing bout.

This Court has agreed with McCormick and, in compensation cases where hearsay came in because not objected to or because it was admitted over objection, has held such evidence, alone or in part, enough to sustain a jury finding on vital issues. In Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 249, 251, 255, the workman died of lympho-sarcoma claimed to have been superinduced by a fall against the delivery wagon he drove. There was no bruising or external mark and no original report of injury. The disease was incurable and swift in bringing about the inevitable end.

In making this ruling, we have given due regard to the increased leeway in the admissibility of evidence extended to the Commission by Sec. 10 of Art. 101 of the Code (1951). We recognize the courts must adjust themselves to the additional latitude stated in the statute; but, we reaffirm this Court's ruling in Standard Oil Co. v. Mealey, 147 Md. 249, 254, 127 A. 850, that this adaptation must, insofar as possible, avoid the abandonment of necessary cautions and safeguards. The only other ruling of the Court below that is attacked by the appellant is one relating to the charge given to the jury at the time of the trial.