Regardless of whether the dealer's employee was acting within or outside the scope of employment, nothing in the statute could be construed to trigger its operation where the dealer's car was being driven by the dealer's employee. Standard Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 182 Ga. App. 842, 844 ( 357 S.E.2d 295) (1987). "[W]here the language of an Act is plain and unequivocal, judicial construction is not only unnecessary but is forbidden."
"`In statutory construction, "`(i)t is fundamental that the determining factor is the intent of the legislature and we look first to the words of the statute to determine what that intent was and if those words be plain and unambiguous and the intent may be clearly gathered therefrom, we need look no further in determining what that intent was.' (Cit.) In fact, `where the language of an Act is plain and unequivocal, judicial construction is not only unnecessary but is forbidden. (Cit.)' (Cit.)" Williamson v. Lucas, 171 Ga. App. 695, 697 ( 320 S.E.2d 800) (1984).' Standard Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 182 Ga. App. 842, 843 ( 357 S.E.2d 295) (1987)." Indus. Indem. Co. v. Walck, 192 Ga. App. 754, 756 ( 386 S.E.2d 521). Moreover, "`where possible, "effect is to be given to all the words of a statute.
In fact, "where the language of an Act is plain and unequivocal, judicial construction is not only unnecessary but is forbidden. (Cit.)" (Cit.)' Williamson v. Lucas, 171 Ga. App. 695, 697 ( 320 S.E.2d 800) (1984)." Standard Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 182 Ga. App. 842, 843 ( 357 S.E.2d 295) (1987). There was no error.