Opinion
No. CV05 400 48 90
January 2, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This matter was tried to the court on the plaintiff's two-count complaint. Count One sounds in unjust enrichment and Count Two seeks the establishment of a constructive trust.
The plaintiff, Ralph Stancil, is seeking compensation for work he performed in the defendant, Estelle M. Kuhlor's home at 199 Pleasantview Avenue in the City of Bridgeport, during the time he resided in the home. He claims that his remodeling and upgrading work increased the value of the home, thereby conferring a benefit upon the defendant by which she was unjustly enriched at his expense.
To prevail under the theory of unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must establish three essential elements. These elements are as follows:
1. A benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff;
2. An appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and
3. The acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment of its value. Cecio Bros., Inc. v. Greenwich, 156 Conn. 561 (1968); Kane v. Kane, 4 Conn.Sup. 262, 263 (1936).
The subject property was purchased by the defendant on February 17, 1995 for the total price of $73,500. Title was taken in her name alone. Despite the plaintiff's claims to the contrary, the evidence satisfies the court that the defendant provided all the funds for the purchase price and closing costs from personal funds and mortgage financing (Defendant Exhibits B, C E). The evidence is also clear that the plaintiff at no time prior to or after the closing, expected to have his name on the title deed.
It is noted by the court, that the plaintiff and the defendant had an acquaintainship which spanned some thirty years. It could best be described as an on-again, off-again relationship. The defendant had married and divorced on two occasions and had relocated out of the area on more than one occasion. She appeared to maintain her independence during her single state, and while their relationship did become intimate, she always maintained her own living arrangements with her daughter, and the plaintiff did not move in with her until such time as she purchased the subject property. It appears from the testimony that marriage was not a serious consideration, not even during the nine-year period that the plaintiff took up residence in the Pleasantview Avenue home.
As indicated, the plaintiff did move into the home shortly after the closing and began performing remodeling work. He claims to have spent countless hours refinishing the basement, remodeling the kitchen, rebuilding the outdoor deck, painting bedrooms, installing a fence, replacing screen doors and numerous other smaller undertakings. He acknowledged that he had no expectation of payment at the time he performed the work, but did expect to reside there and share in the enjoyment of his work. He first considered compensation for his claimed improvements when the defendant informed him of her intention to sell and relocate to Atlanta and asked him to move out when he refused to also go to Atlanta. This change in circumstance prompted the plaintiff to file a lis pendens on the property and ultimately resulted in this trial.
The defendant does not challenge the fact that the plaintiff did undertake work within the house, but describes the work as substandard and unprofessional, and in most instances, unfinished. She maintained, contrary to plaintiff's claim, that the deck was not completely rebuilt but required only the replacement of some of the floor boards. Her brother, James, Wilson, testified and corroborated her assessment of the extent of the plaintiff's work on the deck. She and her daughter, Francine Kuhlor, testified that as relates to the basement, the plaintiff had and exercised almost exclusive use of that area and that he had the only key to the door entry to the basement. The defendant testified that the work was not as extensive as the plaintiff claimed, but consisted merely of sheet rocking, that the shower was open and not completed and the toilet was unusable. She also described the workmanship in the kitchen to be unprofessional, such as to cause her to be unpleased with the quality of the work.
In short, she claimed that in almost every instance, the plaintiff's efforts did not increase the value of her home to any appreciable degree and that in any event, the work was done gratuitously, without expectation of payment and that he shared in the use and enjoyment of any and all aspects of the home while he resided there.
The plaintiff claims that in many instances he paid for the materials and supplies used. He, however, produced no evidence of such expenditures, claiming that he paid in cash. The plaintiff countered that she paid for all materials and the court finds her testimony to be more credible.
The plaintiff attempted to show the value of his work by estimating the number of hours he spent on the various projects. He also indicated that he would normally charge $20 per hour for his work. However, when testifying as to the value of his work, his figures were often inconsistent and unreconcilable. As an example, he testified that his labor on the basement project was worth approximately $24,000. He based this on the fact that he spent three hours a night for a full month to complete the job. Crediting the plaintiff with three hours work for the full thirty days in a month, the total number of hours worked would amount to ninety hours. At $20 per hour, his labor charge would amount to $1,800, an incredible difference of $22,200. Even utilizing an hourly rate of $62 per hour, which he suggested he would have charged for the kitchen project, that would amount to a total of only $5,580. These inconsistencies persisted throughout his entire testimony as relating to each of the claimed projects he undertook. In short, the plaintiff produced no credible evidence by virtue of his own testimony that meets his burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence the value of any improvement his labor conferred upon the premises at 199 Pleasantview Avenue.
He offered no credible evidence from any other source as to any increase in value to the property resulting from his claimed improvements. The only additional evidence produced that would be relevant to this issue was an appraisal report prepared by Daniel Conte of the Huntington Appraisal Company. Mr. Conte did not testify in court however. The report reveals that an appraisal figure of $190,000 was arrived at for the land and building at the 199 Pleasantview Avenue property site as of October 25, 2005. The court in reviewing the report, notes that in arriving at this figure, the appraiser utilized the comparable sales approach and a review of the City of Bridgeport's assessor's records, but made only an exterior inspection from the street (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 at page 5). This fact is repeated several times on page 7 of the exhibit, under "Explanatory Notes"; i.e., that no interior inspection was made.
The court, therefore, cannot credit this report as any evidence that the plaintiff's claimed improvements played any part in the appraisal value placed on the property by the Huntington Appraisal Company. There is nothing therein that would suggest that the value placed on the property was the result of any other explanation other than the general increase in real estate values in that area from the values that existed nine to ten years prior. There is nothing to suggest that the appraisal figure would have been different or valued less had no improvements at all been made.
Therefore the court concludes as to Count One, that the plaintiff failed in his proof that a benefit was conferred upon the defendant to his detriment so as to entitle him to compensation. Accordingly, judgment on the first count is entered in favor of the defendant.
In the second count, the plaintiff seeks a ruling from the court declaring that the plaintiff has an interest in the subject property which is being held in a constructive trust for him, by the defendant.
The court, in Stoneawaye Properties, Inc. v. O'Brien, 94 Conn.App. 170, 175, 176, stated as follows: "A constructive trust arises contrary to intention and in invitum, against one who, by fraud, actual or constructive, by duress or abuse of confidence, by commission of wrong, or by any form of unconscionable conduct, artifice, concealment, or questionable means, or who in any way against equity and good conscience, either has obtained or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, hold and enjoy . . . A constructive trust arises . . . when a person who holds title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cadle Co. v. Gabel, 69 Conn.App. 279, 288 (2002). "The issue raised by a claim for a constructive trust is, in essence, whether a party has committed actual or constructive fraud or whether he or she has been unjustly enriched." Id., 295.
The Court rejects the claim of constructive trust sought in the second count, as the plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that any duty was owed to him by the defendant relating to the subject property, or that a fiduciary or special relationship existed between them, or that the plaintiff was the victim of any fraud or unconscionable conduct on the part of the defendant, or, as determined in Count One, that the defendant was unjustly enriched to the detriment of the plaintiff.
Judgment may enter in favor of the defendant on the Second Count.
In summary, the Court finds the issues in favor of the defendant on both counts in the complaint and judgment may enter accordingly.