Stambaugh v. International Harvester Co.

19 Citing cases

  1. Gardner v. International Harvester Co.

    133 Ill. App. 3d 665 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)   Cited 2 times

    Both actions in this consolidated appeal are for damages for personal injuries inflicted upon plaintiffs as a result of a fuel fire allegedly caused by a defective product manufactured by defendant, International Harvester Company. The alleged defective product is a gas tank cap, and the manner in which the injuries allegedly occurred is similar to that involved in our case of Stambaugh v. International Harvester Co. (1982), 106 Ill. App.3d 1, 435 N.E.2d 729, rev'd (1984), 102 Ill.2d 250, 464 N.E.2d 1011. • 1 Plaintiff first maintains that the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Stambaugh is sufficiently distinguishable from the instant facts as not to require reversal; further, that plaintiffs have shown sufficient facts in addition to those present in Stambaugh that it appears defendant is indeed conducting its usual and customary business within St. Clair County.

  2. Stambaugh v. International Harvester Co.

    102 Ill. 2d 250 (Ill. 1984)   Cited 41 times
    Finding that the defendant was not doing business in a county for venue purposes where its sales in that county comprised 5/100 of 1% of its total sales volume

    The appellate court further reduced the punitive damages to $650,000 and affirmed the balance of the judgment. ( 106 Ill. App.3d 1.) We granted the defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 87 Ill.2d R. 315.

  3. Ellington v. Bilsel

    626 N.E.2d 386 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 12 times

    It is well established that "the determination of whether argument not objected to was so pervasive as to deny a party a fair trial is a matter of sound trial court discretion, and that determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent a `clear abuse of that discretion.'" ( Stambaugh v. International Harvester Co. (1982), 106 Ill. App.3d 1, 22, 435 N.E.2d 729, 745, rev'd on other grounds (1984), 102 Ill.2d 250, 464 N.E.2d 1011; see also Lewis, 217 Ill. App.3d at 119, 576 N.E.2d at 937; Carlasare v. Wilhelmi (1985), 134 Ill. App.3d 1, 7, 479 N.E.2d 1073, 1077; Greig v. Griffel (1977), 49 Ill. App.3d 829, 844, 364 N.E.2d 660, 671.) A reviewing court gives "considerable deference" to the trial court in determining whether a party was denied a fair trial due to improper closing argument because the trial court, having heard all of the comments and arguments, is in a superior position to assess the accuracy and prejudicial effect, if any, upon the jury of counsel's statements.

  4. Caponi v. Larry's 66

    236 Ill. App. 3d 660 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 50 times
    Finding testimony that a brake pedal "was all the way at the top and would not move down at all and that [the witness] had his foot on the brake pedal the entire time trying to depress it" was a judicial admission because it was an unequivocal statement and "the condition of the brake pedal before the collision was not an opinion, estimate, or inference, but rather was an observed fact solely within [the witness's] knowledge"

    Hanson, 100 Ill. App.2d at 348. In Stambaugh v. International Harvester Co. (1982), 106 Ill. App.3d 1, the plaintiff testified that the securely fastened gas cap on his farm tractor had blown off, which was corroborated by the testimony of other farmers but which all of the experts, including the plaintiff's own experts, testified was impossible if the cap was in fact securely fastened. ( Stambaugh, 106 Ill. App.3d at 19-20, rev'd on other grounds (1984), 102 Ill.2d 250.)

  5. Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Ins. Co.

    894 F.2d 1414 (5th Cir. 1990)   Cited 6 times

    The court could require that punitive damages be proportional to the actual damages in the lawsuit, with some adjustment made for particularly small amounts of damage. See, e.g., Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 665 F.2d 1367, 1377-78 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (extolling Texas' rule which then required proportionality) (per Johnson, J.); Stambaugh v. International Harvester, 106 Ill. App.3d 1, 61 Ill.Dec. 888, 435 N.E.2d 729 (1982) (rev'd on other grounds); Galindo v. Western States Collection Co., 82 N.M. 149, 477 P.2d 325, 331 (1970); Montgomery v. Tufford, 165 Colo. 18, 437 P.2d 36, 40 (1968). Any or all of these measures would minimize the temptation by juries to play Robin Hood, would introduce consistency in the amount of punishment inflicted, and would balance the need for ascertainable standards with a disincentive to engage in "bad faith" denial of claims.

  6. Puppe by Puppe v. A.C. and S., Inc.

    733 F. Supp. 1355 (D.N.D. 1990)   Cited 2 times

    If this Court is in this case presented by a punitive damage award which appears excessive, it will be reduced; the constitutional argument that excessive punitive damages awards violate due process need never be reached. Recent examples of trial or appellate courts striking awards for punitive damages in post verdict j.n.o.v. decisions include Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955 (N.D.Tex. 1978) ($10 million punitive damage award overturned by court); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal.App.3d 757, 174 Cal.Rptr. 348 (1981) (upheld trial court's reduction in punitive damage award from $125 million to $3.5 million); and Stambaugh v. Int'l Harvester, 106 Ill. App.3d 1, 61 Ill.Dec. 888, 435 N.E.2d 729 (1982) (reduced punitive damage award, which had already been reduced by trial court from $15 million to $7.5 million, to $65,000). C. Interests of Future Plaintiffs.

  7. Kingston v. Turner

    115 Ill. 2d 445 (Ill. 1987)   Cited 47 times
    In Kingston, the supreme court held it possible for the jury to find that an individual was intoxicated at the time of the accident, but that his intoxication was not caused by either of the two bars where he drank, when no clear evidence was presented proving that he drank more than negligible amounts of beer at either bar.

    Having correctly instructed the jury, it is not error for the trial judge to leave standing the original instructions. (See Stambaugh v. International Harvester Co. (1982), 106 Ill. App.3d 1, 23-24.) However, the trial court's discretion gives way to a duty to respond where the original instructions are incomplete and the jurors are clearly confused.

  8. Keeven v. City of Highland

    689 N.E.2d 658 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)   Cited 1 times

    That is the role of the fact-finder. Stambaugh v. International Harvester Co., 106 Ill. App.3d 1, 19, 435 N.E.2d 729, 743 (1982) ("the evidence created a question for the [fact-finder] to resolve"), rev'd on other grounds, 102 Ill.2d 250, 464 N.E.2d 1011 (1984). Keeven had the burden of proof to carry by a preponderance of the evidence, which he failed to do.

  9. SK Hand Tool Corp. v. Dresser Industries, Inc.

    284 Ill. App. 3d 417 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)   Cited 33 times
    Rejecting expert testimony valuing a division of a business because it was based on an hypothetical assumption “not supported by the evidence”

    The supreme court has either upheld or rejected such awards in their entirety. But it has never done what the trial court did here. Defendant does cite two cases in which Illinois appellate courts have reduced jury verdicts: Stambaugh v. International Harvester Co., 106 Ill. App.3d 1, 435 N.E.2d 729 (1982), and Brown v. Farkas, 158 Ill. App.3d 772, 511 N.E.2d 1143 (1987). Both are appellate verdicts giving no reason whatever for the "judicial" action taken.

  10. Gardner v. Navistar Int'l Transportation Corp.

    213 Ill. App. 3d 242 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 122 times
    Stating that litigants should not be permitted to stand mute, lose a motion, and then gather new material to show the court erred in its ruling

    After a hearing, the trial court granted defendant's motion, and held, as a matter of law, that (1) defendant owed no duty to Gardner, and (2) the statute of repose barred plaintiff's strict liability claims. In June 1990, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration under section 2-1203 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2-1203) to which she attached an affidavit from her attorney, Bruce N. Cook. Four photocopied exhibits were attached to the affidavit: (1) testimony given by William E. Trump in a similar case (see Stambaugh v. International Harvester Co. (1982), 106 Ill. App.3d 1, 13, 435 N.E.2d 729, 739 (discussing the testimony of Trump, "a retired John Deere Company engineer")); (2) a safety warning issued by IH in August 1980 concerning its triple-baffled gas cap; (3) an internal IH memo to regional managers concerning the "serious hazard of fuel-related fires," dated August 14, 1980; and (4) trial testimony given by Donald Creighton, an engineering professor at the University of Missouri, given in another trial against defendant alleging a similar cause of action. The trial court held that because Cook's affidavit did not conform to Supreme Court Rule 191 (see 134 Ill.2d R. 191), it would not be considered.