Opinion
3:23-cv-00132-MMD-CSD
06-23-2023
HADARI STALLWORTH, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF NEVADA NDOC, et al., Defendants.
SCREENING ORDER
MIRANDA M. DU, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I. SUMMARY
Pro se Plaintiff Hadari Stallworth, who is incarcerated in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (“NDOC”), has submitted a civil rights complaint (“Complaint”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and has filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 1-1.) The matter of the filing fee will be temporarily deferred. The Court now screens Plaintiff's civil rights complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
II. SCREENING STANDARD
Federal courts must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which an incarcerated person seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings, however, must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
In addition to the screening requirements under § 1915A, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a federal court must dismiss an incarcerated person's claim if “the allegation of poverty is untrue” or if the action “is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the Court applies the same standard under § 1915 when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or an amended complaint. When a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).
Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper only if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him or her to relief. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999). In making this determination, the Court takes as true all allegations of material fact stated in the complaint, and the Court construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). Allegations of a Pro se complainant are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). While the standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. See id.
Additionally, a reviewing court should “begin by identifying pleadings [allegations] that, because they are no more than mere conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported with factual allegations.” Id. “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
Finally, all or part of a complaint filed by an incarcerated person may be dismissed sua sponte if that person's claims lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable (e.g., claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations (e.g., fantastic or delusional scenarios). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); see also McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).
III. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT
In his Complaint, Plaintiff sues multiple Defendants for events that took place while Plaintiff was incarcerated at High Desert State Prison (“HDSP”) and Ely State Prison (“ESP”). (ECF No. 1-1 at 1.) Plaintiff sues Defendants State of Nevada NDOC; CERT Officers C. Rigney, M. Pickens, and Brown; Warden T. Cooke; and Does. (Id. at 1-3.) Plaintiff brings three claims and seeks monetary and injunctive relief. (Id. at 11, 14.)
The Court dismisses Defendant State of Nevada NDOC with prejudice from the case as amendment would be futile. See Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Co-op., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that “[t]he Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against an unconsenting state” and that “[t]he Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar covers suits naming state agencies and departments as defendants, and applies whether the relief sought is legal or equitable in nature”); see also Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (holding that states are not persons for purposes of § 1983); see NRS § 41.031(3) (stating that the State of Nevada does not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity). The Ninth Circuit has explicitly held that 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the supplemental jurisdiction statute, “does not abrogate state sovereign immunity for supplemental state law claims.” Stanley v. Trustees of California State Univ., 433 F.3d 1129, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2006).
Kevin Lee Kennedy helped Plaintiff prepare the Complaint. (ECF No. 1-1 at 14.)
Plaintiff alleges the following. On December 6, 2021, Plaintiff was housed at HDSP intake when CERT officers responded. (Id. at 4.) Doe CERT officers immediately took Plaintiff “down hard” and handcuffed Plaintiff “extremely tight without double-locking.” (Id.) Doe officers “yanked” Plaintiff up by his cuffs and shackles and carried Plaintiff by the chains of the restraints to the infirmary. (Id.) After they reached the infirmary, Doe CERT officers punched, kicked, and knee dropped onto Plaintiff's back and neck. (Id.) Plaintiff fell unconscious twice. (Id.) One of the Doe officers kneeled on Plaintiff's back with all his weight and prevented Plaintiff from drawing breath. (Id.)
Doe CERT officers then strapped Plaintiff “very tightly” into a restraint chair and cut off blood flow to Plaintiff's extremities. (Id. at 5.) Doe CERT officers put Plaintiff on an emergency transport to ESP without any medical treatment. (Id.) While stopped at a gas station, Doe CERT officer ordered Plaintiff to move to the rear seat, fastened Plaintiff's seatbelt, and punched Plaintiff several times in the stomach and ribs while calling Plaintiff “a punk ass bitch” and other names. (Id.) Plaintiff arrived at ESP hours later with numerous wrist and ankle lacerations and bruises. (Id.)
Upon arrival to ESP, Plaintiff did not receive any medical treatment. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff also did not pursue any complaints or grievances because he did not want to create any further issues with the ESP staff because he had “previous troubles” at ESP. (Id.) Due to the previous troubles, Plaintiff feared writing any initial grievances. (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiff heard comments from prison officials that reminded Plaintiff that he “better keep his mouth shut.” (Id. at 9.)
On March 15, 2022, CERT officer Brown and other officers arrived to extract Plaintiff from his cell for an alleged suicide watch. (Id. at 7.) The officers caused more injuries to Plaintiff's body. (Id.) After the extraction, Plaintiff's shoulder injury worsened. (Id.) Plaintiff now suffers from a circling pain in his joint area from the “usual knee drops.” (Id.) After returning from a hospital visit on this day, Rigney and Pickens used “a skillful arm joint dislocation” and kneed Plaintiff in the elbow area and tugged his joint out of placement. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff immediately cried out in pain. (Id.) Plaintiff never received treatment for these injuries. (Id.)
On October 3, 2022, CERT officers Rigney and Pickens arrived at Plaintiff's cell in gear. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff asked to be placed in the shower and speak to a higher-ranking officer to address the ongoing issues with cell searches, property destruction, targeting, and to avoid the “punishment cell” that had no electricity, was “very cold,” and where officers deprived inmates of food. (Id.) After Plaintiff's request, Pickens used a wrist lock maneuver to inflict pain on Plaintiff after Plaintiff was already in handcuffs and leg restraints. (Id. at 8.)
Although Plaintiff initially did not file grievances about his HDSP beatings at ESP, Plaintiff started writing grievances after he noticed that ESP officers had a personal issue against Plaintiff. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff started writing kites and grievances about the lack of medical treatment for his ongoing injuries and pain. (Id.) Additionally, during the “shakedowns,” officers destroyed Plaintiff's property. (Id.)
After Plaintiff started filing grievances, more ESP employees disliked Plaintiff. (Id. at 10.) Garcia, Davis, Noreaga, Rigney, Pickens, Horsley, and Romero confiscated his religious materials, placed a “red box” on Plaintiff's cell door without cause, took Plaintiff's property, and conducted constant cell searches. (Id.) In response, Associate Warden Cooke returned Plaintiff's grievances as improperly filed. (Id. at 10, 13.)
Dr. Hanf and Dr. Hicks made false accusations that Plaintiff abused and hoarded medication which prevented Plaintiff from receiving pain medication for ongoing issues. (Id. at 12.)
Plaintiff brings claims for Eighth Amendment excessive force (claim 1), Fourteenth Amendment equal protection violations (claim 1), First Amendment retaliation (claim 2), Fourteenth Amendment due process (claim 2), Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs (claim 3), and negligence (claim 3). (Id. at 4, 6, 9, 11.)
A. Excessive Force (Claim 1)
When a prison official stands accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment, the question turns on whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,6-7 (1992) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986)). In determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it may also be proper to consider factors such as the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Although an inmate need not have suffered serious injury to bring an excessive force claim against a prison official, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force. Id. at 9-10.
The Court finds that Plaintiff states colorable excessive force claims for the incidents on December 6, 2021, March 15, 2022, and October 3, 2022. Based on the allegations, on December 6, 2021, Doe HDSP CERT officers repeatedly punched, kicked, and knee dropped Plaintiff while he was restrained causing multiple injuries and loss of consciousness. This portion of the claim will proceed against Doe HDSP CERT officers when Plaintiff learns their identities.
Although the use of “Doe” to identify a defendant is not favored, flexibility is allowed in some cases where the identity of the parties will not be known prior to filing a complaint but can subsequently be determined through discovery. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). If the true identity of any of the Doe Defendants comes to light during discovery, Plaintiff may move to substitute the true names of Doe Defendants to assert claims against the Doe Defendants at that time.
Based on the allegations, on March 15, 2022, Brown, Rigney, and Pickens conducted knee drops and dislocated Plaintiff's elbow worsening Plaintiff's injuries. The Court will permit this portion of the claim to proceed against Defendants Brown, Rigney, and Pickens. Additionally, based on the October 3, 2022, allegations, Pickens purposely inflicted pain through a wrist locking maneuver after Plaintiff was already restrained. This portion of the claim will proceed against Defendant Pickens.
B. Equal Protection (Claim 1)
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is essentially a direction that all similarly situated persons be treated equally under the law. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). In order to state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that defendants acted with the intent and purpose to discriminate against him based upon membership in a protected class, or that defendants purposefully treated him differently than similarly situated individuals without any rational basis for the disparate treatment. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
The Court dismisses the equal protection claim without prejudice with leave to amend. There are no allegations in the Complaint to support an equal protection claim.
C. Retaliation (Claim 2)
Prisoners have a First Amendment right to file prison grievances and to pursue civil rights litigation in the courts. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005). “Without those bedrock constitutional guarantees, inmates would be left with no viable mechanism to remedy prison injustices. And because purely retaliatory actions taken against a prisoner for having exercised those rights necessarily undermine those protections, such actions violate the Constitution quite apart from any underlying misconduct they are designed to shield.” Id.
To state a viable First Amendment retaliation claim in the prison context, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) [a]n assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Id. at 567-68. Total chilling is not required; it is enough if an official's acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities. Id. at 568-69. A plaintiff who fails to allege a chilling effect may still state a claim if he alleges that he suffered some other harm that is more than minimal. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012).
Based on the allegations, when Plaintiff asked to speak to a higher-ranking officer to address issues with cell searches, property destruction, and punishment cells, Pickens inflicted unnecessary pain on Plaintiff. Additionally, after Plaintiff started filing grievances, Garcia, Davis, Noreaga, Rigney, Pickens, Horsley, and Romero started to confiscate his religious and personal property, conduct numerous cell searches, and designated Plaintiff a “red box,” which presumably is looked upon negatively. Based on the allegations, Plaintiff grieved to Cooke about these issues, but she did not do anything to stop her officers' actions. See Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a supervisor who is informed of an alleged constitutional violation, e.g., pursuant to reviewing an inmate's administrative grievance, may be liable if he failed to remedy it). For screening purposes, Plaintiff states a colorable retaliation claim against Defendants Garcia, Davis, Noreaga, Rigney, Pickens, Horsley, Romero, and Cooke.
The Court interprets the allegations as identifying Garcia, Davis, Noreaga, Horsley, and Romero as defendants in this case.
D. Due Process (Claim 2)
The Court interprets Plaintiff's allegations as attempting to sue Cooke for how she responded to Plaintiff's grievances. However, prisoners have no stand-alone due process rights related to the administrative grievance process. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that a state's unpublished policy statements establishing a grievance procedure do not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that there is no liberty interest in the processing of appeals because there is no liberty interest entitling inmates to a specific grievance process). As such, the Court dismisses this claim with prejudice as amendment would be futile.
E. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs (Claim 3)
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment and “embodies ‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.'” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when he acts with “deliberate indifference” to the serious medical needs of an inmate. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). “To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective standard-that the deprivation was serious enough to constitute cruel and unusual punishment-and a subjective standard-deliberate indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled on other grounds by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2014).
To establish the first prong, “the plaintiff must show a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). To satisfy the deliberate indifference prong, a plaintiff must show: “(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Id. “Indifference may appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). When a prisoner alleges that delay of medical treatment evinces deliberate indifference, the prisoner must show that the delay led to further injury. See Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that “mere delay of surgery, without more, is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate medical indifference”).
The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state any colorable deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claims but grants Plaintiff leave to amend. Although Plaintiff acknowledges that he was injured during these events, he does not identify who he asked for medical help and who refused to give him treatment. At one point, Plaintiff acknowledges that he did not file any grievances or kites about the beatings as not to cause any trouble. But it is unclear to the Court whether this also means that Plaintiff did not seek medical treatment. At some point, Plaintiff states that he started to kite and grieve about his lack of medical treatment but does not provide details of when he sought help, who he contacted, the responses, and what injuries he was seeking treatment for. Additionally, Plaintiff's vague statements about false accusations of hoarding medication is insufficient to state a colorable Eighth Amendment claim. The Court dismisses this claim without prejudice with leave to amend.
F. Negligence (Claim 3)
“A claim for negligence in Nevada requires that the plaintiff satisfy four elements: (1) an existing duty of care, (2) breach, (3) legal causation, and (4) damages.” Turner v. Mandalay Sports Entm't, LLC, 180 P.3d 1172, 1175 (Nev. 2008). The Court dismisses the state law negligence claim without prejudice with leave to amend, if Plaintiff can plead true facts to support such a claim. There are no allegations in the Complaint to support a negligence claim.
G. Leave to Amend
Although the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend, it does not grant Plaintiff leave to amend in any way that he sees fit. Plaintiff has leave to amend to allege additional true facts to show Fourteenth Amendment equal protection violations (claim 1), Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs (claim 3), and state law negligence (claim 3). The Court does not give Plaintiff leave to assert new claims.
If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he is advised that an amended complaint replaces the Complaint, so the amended complaint must be complete in itself. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that “[t]he fact that a party was named in the original complaint is irrelevant; an amended pleading supersedes the original”); see also Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that for claims dismissed with prejudice, a plaintiff is not required to reallege such claims in a subsequent amended complaint to preserve them for appeal). This means that the amended complaint must contain all facts and claims and identify all defendants that he intends to sue, including the claims found colorable in this order. He must file the amended complaint on this Court's approved prisoner-civil-rights form, and it must be entitled “First Amended Complaint.” Plaintiff must follow the instructions on the form. He need not and should not allege very many facts in the “nature of the case” section of the form. Rather, in each claim, he should allege facts sufficient to show what each defendant did to violate his civil rights. He must file the amended complaint within 30 days from the date of this order. If Plaintiff chooses not to file an amended complaint curing the stated deficiencies, this action will proceed only on the Eighth Amendment excessive force claim (claim 1) against Defendants Brown, Rigney, Pickens, and Doe HDSP CERT officers when Plaintiff learns their identities and on the First Amendment retaliation claim (claim 2) against Defendants Garcia, Davis, Noreaga, Rigney, Pickens, Horsley, Romero, and Cooke.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is therefore ordered that a decision on the application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) is deferred.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of Court file the Complaint and Exhibits (ECF Nos. 1-1, 1-2).
It is further ordered that the Clerk of Court add Garcia, Davis, Noreaga, Horsley, and Romero to the docket sheet as defendants in this case.
It is further ordered that the Eighth Amendment excessive force claim (claim 1) will proceed against Defendants Brown, Rigney, Pickens, and Doe HDSP CERT officers when Plaintiff learns their identities.
It is further ordered that the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim (claim 1) is dismissed without prejudice with leave to amend.
It is further ordered that the First Amendment retaliation claim (claim 2) will proceed against Defendants Garcia, Davis, Noreaga, Rigney, Pickens, Horsley, Romero, and Cooke.
It is further ordered that the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim (claim 2) is dismissed with prejudice as amendment would be futile.
It is further ordered that the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim (claim 3) is dismissed without prejudice with leave to amend.
It is further ordered that the state law negligence claim (claim 3) is dismissed without prejudice with leave to amend.
It is further ordered that Defendant State of Nevada NDOC is dismissed with prejudice from the case as amendment would be futile.
It is further ordered that, if Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies of his Complaint, as outlined in this order, Plaintiff will file the amended complaint on or before 30 days from the date of this order.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of Court will send to Plaintiff the approved form for filing a § 1983 complaint, instructions for the same, and a copy of his original Complaint and Exhibits (ECF Nos. 1-1, 1-2). If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he should use the approved form and he will write the words “First Amended” above the words “Civil Rights Complaint” in the caption.
It is further ordered that, if Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, the Court will screen the amended complaint in a separate screening order. The screening process will take several months.
It is further ordered that, if Plaintiff chooses not to file an amended complaint curing the stated deficiencies of the Complaint, this action will proceed immediately and only on the Eighth Amendment excessive force claim (claim 1) against Defendants Brown, Rigney, Pickens, and Doe HDSP CERT officers when Plaintiff learns their identities and on the First Amendment retaliation claim (claim 2) against Defendants Garcia, Davis, Noreaga, Rigney, Pickens, Horsley, Romero, and Cooke.