Opinion
Case No. 99 C 1995
February 22, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The Plaintiff, Edward Stallings, seeks judicial review pursuant to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g), of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Social Security Income. Plaintiff moves this Court for summary judgment reversing the Commissioner's decision denying her claim for such benefits, or, in the alternative, an order remanding the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings. The Commissioner has filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment in his favor. For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's motion is granted and Plaintiff's motions are denied.
Procedural History
On April 11, 1996, Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") (R. at 89-90.) and on April 25, 1996 filed an application for Supplemental Social Security Income ("SSI"), (R. at 197-203.), alleging that he became disabled on June 1, 1995. He described his disability as joint swelling, shortness of breath, limping, and alcoholism. (R. at 101.) The applications were denied on August 26, 1996 (R. at 78-81, 205-208.), and, pursuant to Plaintiff's Request for Reconsideration, the applications were again denied on December 6, 1996. (R. at 84-86, 210-212.)
On January 27, 1997, Plaintiff filed a Request for Hearing (R. at 87.), and on May 28, 1997 a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") John L. Mondi. (R. at 34-75.) On October 16, 1997, the ALJ issued his decision, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled because he could still perform a full range of light work. (R. at 19-24.) On December 11, 1998, Plaintiff filed a Request for Review of the ALJ's decision with the Commissioner's Appeals Council. (R. at 14.) On May 26, 1998, Plaintiff submitted argument and additional evidence to the Appeals Council. (R. at 11-13, 224.) On January 28, 1999, the Appeals Council considered the decision of the ALJ, as well as the additional evidence, and found no basis for changing the ALJ's decision. (R. at 6.) Therefore, the Appeals Council denied the Plaintiff's request for review and affirmed the ALJ's decision, which stands as the Commissioner's final decision. (R. at 6-7.)
Factual Background
A. Plaintiff's Testimony
At the hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff testified that he was then 52 years old, having been born on February 10, 1945, and that he had more than two years of college education. (R. at 39.) Plaintiff worked at Borg Warner for twenty-eight years as a supervisor, associate engineer, and formulator (R. at 39-40). Plaintiff testified that, after losing his license for a D.U.I. in 1994, he would walk to work, which was a distance of approximately one mile. (R. at 49.) Plaintiff performed his job, which required prolonged walking, standing, and lifting up to 100 pounds, with no problems. (R. at 57-62.) Plaintiff was terminated from this position in February of 1995 and testified that, prior to his termination, he had no difficulties doing his work. (R. at 42.) Although Plaintiff claimed to be disabled on June 1, 1995, he looked for work up until September of 1995, while collecting unemployment, until his pain prohibited him from getting around. (R. at 40.)
In describing his symptoms and their affects to the ALJ, Plaintiff testified that he could stand only for maybe an hour and then his legs, knees, and ankles began to swell. (R. at 43.) He noticed the swelling as early as June of 1995. (R. at 43.) Plaintiff testified that he could walk two to three blocks before feeling discomfort, at which point he had to sit down. (R. at 44.) Plaintiff testified that he had difficulty climbing a flight of stairs, bending, stooping and squatting, but no problems sitting. (R. at 43-44, 52.) Plaintiff further testified that he had cramping in his hands, which affected the amount of weight he could lift, as well as tremors in his hands that affected his ability to write. (R. at 43-44, 56.), Plaintiff testified that he took prescription Motrin to ease the pain related to his symptoms, and that he used a cane most of the time to assist in walking. (R. at 46.) Plaintiff testified that the breathing difficulties he had when he left Borg Warner dissipated. (R. at 43.) Finally, Plaintiff testified that he entered into an alcohol treatment program in 1994, but that his drinking never affected his job. (R. at 43.) Plaintiff testified that he drank up to one or two drinks a week and that he had been a heavier drinker in the past. (R. at 43-44.)
Plaintiff testified that his current daily activities include painting around the house, cleaning the yard, and vacuuming. (R. at 48.) He testified that he could pursue each of these activities for approximately half an hour and then he has to sit down for approximately forty-five minutes to an hour. (R. at 48.) Plaintiff further testified that in the winter time he is less able to stand than in the summer time. (R. at 53.) He testified that he no longer goes fishing and hunting due to his physical limitations. (R. at 53.)
B. Medical Records
On May 21, 1996, Dr. John W. O'Donnell, a psychiatrist, gave Plaintiff a psychiatric evaluation for the Bureau of Disability Determination Services. (R. at 155.) Dr. O'Donnell stated that the Plaintiff complained of swollen joints, especially in his knees, wrists and ankles, as well as shortness of breath, all of which began in June of 1995 and was getting worse. CR. at 155.) Plaintiff told Dr. O'Donnell that he drank almost every day, averaging two to three shots a day, and that he felt he was an alcoholic. (R. at 155.) Dr. O'Donnell diagnosed Plaintiff with alcohol dependence, shortness of breath, and arthritis, noting a limp in his left leg. (R. 155, 160.)
the May 28, 1997 hearing, Plaintiff testified that although he had drank heavily in the past, he had decreased his alcohol intake to only one or two drinks per week. (R. at 43-44.) His alcohol consumption had never affected his ability to work. (R. at 44.)
On May 22, 1996, Dr. Conrad May saw Plaintiff for his complaints of shortness of breath. (R. at 162.) Plaintiff also complained of knee and ankle pain and swelling. (R. at 162.) Dr. May noted no atrophy of the joints and no structural changes. (R. at 162.) He did, however, note that the left knee had some joint effusion. (R. at 162.)
On August 6, 1996, Dr. Dean Thomas Velis performed an Internal Medicine Consultative Examination of Plaintiff for the Bureau of Disability Determination Services. (R. at 163.) Plaintiff complained of arthritis of the knees, wrist, and ankles, edema, tenderness and warmth since June of 1995. (R. at 163.) Dr. Velis noted that Plaintiff was able to bear his own weight, although favoring his right lower extremity, and that his hand grip was unimpaired bilaterally. (R. at 165.) Dr. Velis observed edema, tenderness, and warmth of the right knee, as well as marked crepitus. (R. at 165.) Dr. Velis's clinical impression was that Plaintiff had arthritis affecting both knees, both wrists and both ankles, the left side being the most critically affected. (R. at 165.) Dr. Velis further stated that the plaintiff had a longstanding history of alcohol abuse, at one time drinking up to a pint per day. (R. at 165.)
On May 27, 1997, the day before the hearing, Plaintiff visited the VA hospital with complaints of pain and cramping in his legs, ankles, knees, and hands. (R. at 182.) The VA doctor diagnosed Plaintiff with arthralgia and ordered a rheumatology consult. (R. at 182.) Plaintiff also visited the Cook County Hospital on that same date, complaining of the same problems. (R. at 183.) The Cook County Hospital physician diagnosed Plaintiff with arthritis of the knees and ankle. (R. at 184.)
On August 12, 1997, Dr. Leonard K. Smith performed an evaluation of Plaintiff for the Bureau of Disability Determination Services. (R. at 185.) Plaintiff complained of swelling of both hands and pain in his left knee, as well as swelling of the ankles. (R. at 185.) Multiple roentgenograms revealed minor degenerative changes of the right ankle, an essentially normal right hand, and mild degenerative changes in the left knee, with no evidence of effusion. (R. at 185-86.) Dr. Smith noted a slight swelling of the left knee and loss of the hollow landmarks. (R. at 186.) He also noted that the examination of both hands revealed tremor at rest bilaterally and a mild weakness of grasp bilaterally. (R. at 186.) Dr. Smith stated that Plaintiff was able to ambulate without assistive devices. (R. at 187.) Dr. Smith reported that Plaintiff had no limitation of sitting, lifting or carrying and that he could stand six to eight hours, conditioned on changing his position every one to two hours, although he noted that additional tests could shed some light on Plaintiff's complaints. (R. at 187-188.)
Finally, a Magnetic Resonance Imaging ("MRI") of Plaintiff's left knee on December 8, 1997 at the Hines VA Hospital revealed findings consistent with joint effusion and a horizontal tear of the medial meniscus. (R. at 224.) The cruciate ligaments, collateral ligaments, and patellar tendon all appeared normal. (R. at 224.)
C. The ALJ's Findings
In his decision, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 1, 1995, when he alleged he first became disabled. (R. at 20.) In analysis of all of the cited medical records, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had impairments, in combination, that were severe, including degenerative osteoarthritis, multiple joint arthralgias, and a long history of alcohol dependence. (R. at 20.) The ALJ held, however, that Plaintiff's impairments do not meet the requirements established in the Listing of Impairments in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4. (R. at 20.) The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had a functional capacity to perform a full range of light work on a sustained basis. (R. at 20.) He noted that Plaintiff was able to lift at least 20 pounds and to sit, stand, and walk for six to eight hours. (R. at 22.)
The ALJ noted that the Vocational Expert testified that a hypothetical person with Plaintiff's work experience and the residual functional capacity for light work, with only occasional climbing, kneeling, stooping, crawling, crouching, and balance could transfer such skills to operating machinery such as a punch press, with such positions numbering 7,000 to 9,000 in the Chicago Metropolitan Area. (R. at 21.) The Vocational Expert further testified that, with additional mental limitations, the number of jobs for that hypothetical person would be reduced to 3,000 to 4,000. (R. at 21.) The ALJ noted that none of the hypotheticals assessed by the Vocational Expert reflected Plaintiff's hand tremors. (R. at 22.) However, the ALJ stated that the only reasonable etiology for the tremor's would have been the claimant's ongoing alcoholism, therefore precluding a finding of disability. (R. at 22.) The Vocational Expert believed that no jobs existed which could be performed by Plaintiff if the ALJ were to fully credit all of Plaintiff's testimony at the hearing regarding his pain and physical limitations. (R. at 70.)
The ALJ stated that Plaintiff had a long history of alcoholism, with drinking beginning at the age of 16. (R. at 21.) The ALJ, however, found the testimony of Plaintiff regarding his alcohol consumption, symptoms, and their functional affect not credible due to inconsistencies with the objective findings and the medical records. (R. at 21-22.) The ALJ specifically noted the inconsistencies in the records regarding alcohol usage in May of 1996, in which the representation of moderate use is reported in contrast with earlier reports of two to three shots to a pint of alcohol per day. (R. at 22.) The ALJ further found that Plaintiff's alleged symptoms and complaints of pain were disproportionate to his daily activities, use of medications, and pursuit of treatment. (R. at 22.)
The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was unable to return to his past work as a formulator, associate engineer, and supervisor, because they were heavy jobs. (R. at 22.) The ALJ further noted that the record was persuasive that a significant number of light jobs exist in the national economy to which Plaintiff could successfully adjust. (R. at 22-23.) After carefully considering all of the evidence presented, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. at 19.)
Standard of Review
In reviewing the Commissioner's decision (here the ALJ's), the court may not decide facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner. Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994). Rather, the court must accept findings of fact that are supported by "substantial evidence," 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988), where substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Herron, 19 F.3d at 333 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).) The ALJ must consider all relevant evidence and may not select and discuss only that evidence which favors his ultimate conclusion. Id. Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ, the responsibility for determining whether a claimant is disabled falls upon the Commissioner (or ALJ), not the courts. Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 1990). See also Stuckey v. Sullivan, 881 F.2d 506, 509 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that the ALJ has the authority to assess medical evidence and give greater weight to that which he finds more credible). An administrative law judge has broad discretion to make credibility determinations, and a reviewing court may not disturb these determinations as long as they find some support in the record and are not patently wrong. Prak v. Chater, 892 F. Supp. 1081, 1086 (N.D. Ill. 1995). See also Erhart v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 969 F.2d 534, 538 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that a reviewing court is limited to determining whether the Commissioner's final decision is supported by substantial evidence and based upon proper legal criteria)
This does not mean that the Commissioner (or the ALJ) is entitled to unlimited judicial deference, however. In addition to relying on substantial evidence, the ALJ must articulate his analysis at some minimal level and state his reasons for accepting or rejecting "entire lines of evidence," although he need not evaluate in writing every piece of evidence in the record. Herron, 19 F.3d at 333. See Young v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 957 F.2d 386, 292 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that the ALJ must articulate his reasons for rejecting evidence "within reasonable limits" in order for meaningful appellate review); see also Guercio v. Shalala, No. 93 C 323, 1994 WU 66102, at *9 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (stating that the ALJ need not spell out every step in his reasoning, provided he has given sufficient direction that the full course of his decision may be discerned), citing Brown v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 342, 346 (7th Cir. 1988).
The Social Security regulations prescribe a sequential five-part test for determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 and § 416.920 (1999). The ALJ must consider sequentially: (1) whether the claimant is presently unemployed; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals any impairment listed in the regulations as being so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity; (4) whether the claimant is unable to perform/ his past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is unable to perform any other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Campbell v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 1993). Once the claimant has satisfied the first two steps, he will automatically be found disabled if he suffers from a listed impairment. Id. If the claimant does not have a listed impairment, but cannot return to his former work, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform some other job in the economy. Id. A finding of disability requires an affirmative answer at either step three or step five. Young, 957 F.2d at 389. A negative answer at any step (other than step 3) precludes a finding of disability. Id.
Analysis
Plaintiff asserts that the Appeals Council committed error in denying his request for review of the ALJ's decision with the new and material evidence from the Hines VA Hospital and the MRI. (Pl.'s Mot. for Remand at 9.) In its denial of the request for review, the Appeals Council stated that it considered the additional evidence presented by Plaintiff, but concluded that the additional evidence did not provide a basis for a change in the ALJ's decision. (R. at 6.) The Appeals Council, therefore, denied the request for review and specifically noted that the ALJ's decision would stand as the final decision of the Commissioner. (R. at 6.)
Plaintiff contends that the Appeals Council, in denying his request for review of the ALJ's decision, committed an error of law. With his request for review pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.970 (b) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.1470 (b), Plaintiff submitted to the Appeals Council medical evidence from the Hines VA Hospital covering the period June 30, 1997 through December 8, 1997, including MRI results evidencing a horizontal tear in the medial meniscus of the left knee and joint effusion. (R. at 213-224) In his Motion for Remand, Plaintiff contends, pursuant to Sentence 6 of 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g), that even if the ALJ was justified in finding Plaintiff's impairment not severe enough to be disabling, based on the evidence that was before him, this additional evidence is new and material and should prompt a remand. The Commissioner, however, argues that the evidence is not new and material and that the Plaintiff has not demonstrated good cause. (Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Commissioner's Mot. for Summ. J. at 8-9.)
Sentence 6 of the statute allows the Court to remand, without ruling on the merits, if new and material evidence is submitted, and the claimant shows good cause for failing to submit the new evidence during the administrative proceedings. 20 U.S.C. § 405 (g). In 1980, Congress amended § 405(g) to add a materiality requirement. Booz v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 734 F.2d 1378, 1380 (9th Cir. 1983). The purpose of the amendment was partially to limit the court's ability to remand cases for consideration of new evidence. Id.
New evidence is evidence not in existence or available to the claimant at the time of the administrative proceeding. Sample v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1138, 1143 (7th Cir. 1993). New evidence is material for purposes of § 405(g) if there is a reasonable possibility that it would change the outcome of the ALJ's decision. Nelson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 503, 506 (7th Cir. 1988)
The Court's review of whether the Appeals Council committed an error of law in applying this regulation is de novo. Perkins v. Chater, 107 F.3d 1290, 1294 (7th Cir. 1997) citing Eads v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health and Human Services, 983 F.2d 815, 817 (7th Cir. 1993). In the absence of any such error, however, the Appeals Council's decision whether to review is discretionary and unreviewable. Damato v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 982, 988 (7th Cir. 1992). The ALJ's decision then becomes the final decision reviewed under § 405(g) Perkins, 107 F.3d at 1294.
Here, the Appeals Council acknowledged its obligation to consider new and material evidence submitted with the request for review and to grant the request if the new and material evidence, along with the other evidence of record, convinced it that the ALJ erred. (R. at 6.) Implicit in the Appeals Council's failure to grant review then is a finding that the "new" evidence was not "material." The Court cannot conclude that the Appeals Council's refusal to grant the request for review, which is discretionary, rested on a mistake of law. Eads, 983 F.2d at 817, citing Nelson, 855 F.2d at 503. Because of several noted inconsistencies and contradictions in Plaintiff's testimony and lack of medical records, the Court does not find that, had the new evidence been submitted to the ALJ, he would more than likely have reached a different conclusion.
Plaintiff readily admitted that the Administrative Record before the ALJ was sparse. (Pl.'s Mot. for Remand at 8.) At the time the ALJ made his decision, the only evidence as to the Claimant's physical problems in the file consisted of a consultative internal medicine exam, an exam at the VA Hospital, an exam at Cook County Hospital, and a consultative exam by Dr. Leonard Smith. (Pl.'s Mot. For Remand at 8-9.) The significant portion of evidence of Plaintiff's claimed disability consisted of his own allegations of pain and physical limitations.
Indeed, Plaintiff testified that he had no medical problems that affected his ability to work when he was terminated in 1995, and that he had visited the VA Hospital only once, in August, 1996 (R. at 54-55). Then, on May 27, 1997, the day before the hearing, he visited both the VA Hospital and Cook County Hospital (R. at 47, 182-183)
The ALJ, having analyzed the medical evidence and Plaintiff's testimony concerning his symptoms and physical affects, found that his testimony was not credible. (R. at 22.) He concluded that Plaintiff could engage in at least a full range of light work on a sustained basis. (R. at 22.) The Court's review of the medical records reveals that the ALJ's determination in this regard is supported by substantial evidence.
On May 21, 1996, the medical report of Dr. O'Donnell reflect that the patient had arthritis and a limp in his left knee. On May 22, 1996, Dr. May noted no atrophy of the joints and no structural changes. (R. at 162.) He did, however, note that the left knee had some joint effusion. (R. at 162.) On August 6, 1996, Dr. Velis's clinical impression was that Plaintiff had arthritis affecting both knees, both wrists and both ankles, the left side being the most critically affected. (R. at 165.) Nine months later, on May 27, 1997, the VA Hospital physician diagnosed Plaintiff with arthralgia. On the same day, the Cook County Hospital diagnosed Plaintiff with arthritis of the knee and ankle. Finally, the roentgenograms performed by Dr. Smith revealed only minor degenerative changes in Plaintiff's joints. Dr. Smith noted that Plaintiff could stand for six to eight hours, conditioned on change of position every one to two hours. Plaintiff pursued no other more aggressive medical treatment, including different medication, M.R.I. or surgery until after the ALJ's hearing.
Furthermore, Plaintiff testified that, prior to his termination from Borg Warner, and only four months prior to his alleged date of disability, he had no problems performing his job as a supervisor, which admittedly consisted of prolonged standing and walking. Plaintiff also testified that, after losing his license, he had no problems with transportation to and from work because he walked, which was approximately one mile from his home. This testimony, along with the lack of medical records showing any type of serious medical condition, substantially support the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff was not disabled.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the Commissioner's finding that Plaintiff was not disabled is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment be, and the same hereby is, granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motions for Summary Judgment or Remand be, and the same hereby are, denied.