" [Cit.]Staley v. State, 233 Ga. App. 597, 599 ( 505 S.E.2d 491) (1998). When the grace Colorado had granted Goode was extended to permit him to serve his period of probation in his home state, it required from him the reciprocal promise that he would return without protest to Colorado in the event he was summoned there.
Under Georgia law, a trial court has the power to modify or change the conditions of a defendant's probation at any time, provided the change or modification does not represent an increase in the defendant's sentence. See Staley v. State, 233 Ga.App. 597, 599, 505 S.E.2d 491 (1998); OCGA § 42–8–34(g). Polly asserts that the requirement he provide proof of the child support payments he made illegally increased his sentence, because it increased the monthly amount he was required to pay as a condition of his probation.
[Cit.]" Staley v. State, 233 Ga. App. 597, 598 ( 505 SE2d 491) (1998). Here, the trial court did not abuse that discretion since allowing Elsasser to pay the significant amount of restitution over the course of his probation was "a commonsense approach . . . in view of the [admittedly] limited resources of the defendant."
See State v. Collett, supra at 670-671.Staley v. State, 233 Ga. App. 597, 598-599 ( 505 SE2d 491) (1998). For example, there was evidence that Stephens had stayed out late or all night and came home intoxicated "many times," while intoxicated he had forced A.E. to have sexual intercourse with him and physically abused her younger brothers (Stephens's minor sons), that he had given A.E. rides to and from school, that he had touched A.E. inappropriately in the car and had sexual intercourse with her in his truck, and that police had seized his computer in search of "pictures" A.E. said he had taken.
In light of the evidence that (1) Mullens approached a minor girl and offered her candy, and (2) Mullens admitted having incidental contact with minors, we discern no manifest abuse of discretion. Staley v. State, 233 Ga. App. 597, 599 ( 505 SE2d 491) (1998). 2.
Based on the above authority, we hold that Blake received a more severe sentence on Count 1 when he was resentenced from five years on probation to five years in prison. Compare Staley v. State, 233 Ga. App. 597, 599 ( 505 SE2d 491) (1998) (a change in the conditions of probation is not necessarily an increase in sentence). The State argues that under the reasoning of two cases from this Court, Blake did not receive a more severe sentence.
As to the first issue, at least two other jurisdictions considering a similar issue did not appear to find an absolute constitutional bar to a modification of the terms of probation. Reyes v. State, 978 P.2d 635, 640 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999); Staley v. State, 505 S.E.2d 491, 493-94 (Ga.Ct.App. 1998). This Court, too, can envision circumstances where it would be entirely appropriate to alter the terms of probation or post-release supervision and we do not conclude that a blanket prohibition against any form of such post-sentence changes is required under the constitutional provisions asserted by Weaver in this appeal. One example might be where the terms of probation are tightened after an apparent probation violation that the trial court is concerned about but seeks to avoid the necessity of revoking the probation.
The purpose of the modification requiring sex offender treatment was clearly rehabilitative, so it cannot be construed to constitute the imposition of additional punishment or an impermissible increase in the sentence. Id.; Staley v. State, 233 Ga. App. 597, 598-601 ( 505 S.E.2d 491) (1998); England v. Newton, 238 Ga. 534 ( 233 S.E.2d 787) (1977); compare Harp v. State, 228 Ga. App. 473, 474-475 ( 491 S.E.2d 923) (1997); Harris v. State, 261 Ga. 859, 860-861 ( 413 S.E.2d 439) (1992). Moreover, due process did not require that Gould be afforded prior notice, a hearing, or counsel before the trial court modified the conditions of his probation.
(Punctuation omitted.) Staley v. State, 233 Ga. App. 597, 599 ( 505 S.E.2d 491) (1998). To lessen the risk to society, the law provides for the sentencing court's continued jurisdiction over probationers.
(Citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) See also Staley v. State, 233 Ga. App. 597, 598 ( 505 S.E.2d 491) (1998) (OCGA § 17-10-1(a)(1) "has been construed to give sentencing judges broad discretion in fashioning appropriate conditions of probation, tailored to the individual defendant's circumstances as well as the interests of society and the victim"); Penaherrera v. State, 211 Ga. App. 162, 163(1) ( 438 S.E.2d 661) (1993) ("[a]ny `reasonable condition' may be imposed"); Ballenger v. State, 210 Ga. App. 627, 628(1) ( 436 S.E.2d 793) (1993). Following the Supreme Court's decisions in Gearinger and Manville, this Court, in two subsequent cases, has attempted to give meaning to § 42-8-34.