Staley v. State

14 Citing cases

  1. Goode v. Nobles

    271 Ga. 30 (Ga. 1999)   Cited 5 times

    " [Cit.]Staley v. State, 233 Ga. App. 597, 599 ( 505 S.E.2d 491) (1998). When the grace Colorado had granted Goode was extended to permit him to serve his period of probation in his home state, it required from him the reciprocal promise that he would return without protest to Colorado in the event he was summoned there.

  2. Polly v. State

    748 S.E.2d 696 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)

    Under Georgia law, a trial court has the power to modify or change the conditions of a defendant's probation at any time, provided the change or modification does not represent an increase in the defendant's sentence. See Staley v. State, 233 Ga.App. 597, 599, 505 S.E.2d 491 (1998); OCGA § 42–8–34(g). Polly asserts that the requirement he provide proof of the child support payments he made illegally increased his sentence, because it increased the monthly amount he was required to pay as a condition of his probation.

  3. Elsasser v. State

    A11A1774 (Ga. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2011)

    [Cit.]" Staley v. State, 233 Ga. App. 597, 598 ( 505 SE2d 491) (1998). Here, the trial court did not abuse that discretion since allowing Elsasser to pay the significant amount of restitution over the course of his probation was "a commonsense approach . . . in view of the [admittedly] limited resources of the defendant."

  4. Stephens v. State

    305 Ga. App. 339 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that trial court's sentence purporting to impose restrictions on defendant's parole usurped an exclusive power of the Board and was, thus, a nullity

    See State v. Collett, supra at 670-671.Staley v. State, 233 Ga. App. 597, 598-599 ( 505 SE2d 491) (1998). For example, there was evidence that Stephens had stayed out late or all night and came home intoxicated "many times," while intoxicated he had forced A.E. to have sexual intercourse with him and physically abused her younger brothers (Stephens's minor sons), that he had given A.E. rides to and from school, that he had touched A.E. inappropriately in the car and had sexual intercourse with her in his truck, and that police had seized his computer in search of "pictures" A.E. said he had taken.

  5. Mullens v. State

    289 Ga. App. 872 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 10 times

    In light of the evidence that (1) Mullens approached a minor girl and offered her candy, and (2) Mullens admitted having incidental contact with minors, we discern no manifest abuse of discretion. Staley v. State, 233 Ga. App. 597, 599 ( 505 SE2d 491) (1998). 2.

  6. Blake v. State

    272 Ga. App. 402 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 8 times
    Concluding that the binding precedent of Anthony controlled the methodology and outcome of the case and applying count-by-count approach

    Based on the above authority, we hold that Blake received a more severe sentence on Count 1 when he was resentenced from five years on probation to five years in prison. Compare Staley v. State, 233 Ga. App. 597, 599 ( 505 SE2d 491) (1998) (a change in the conditions of probation is not necessarily an increase in sentence). The State argues that under the reasoning of two cases from this Court, Blake did not receive a more severe sentence.

  7. Weaver v. State

    856 So. 2d 407 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 3 times

    As to the first issue, at least two other jurisdictions considering a similar issue did not appear to find an absolute constitutional bar to a modification of the terms of probation. Reyes v. State, 978 P.2d 635, 640 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999); Staley v. State, 505 S.E.2d 491, 493-94 (Ga.Ct.App. 1998). This Court, too, can envision circumstances where it would be entirely appropriate to alter the terms of probation or post-release supervision and we do not conclude that a blanket prohibition against any form of such post-sentence changes is required under the constitutional provisions asserted by Weaver in this appeal. One example might be where the terms of probation are tightened after an apparent probation violation that the trial court is concerned about but seeks to avoid the necessity of revoking the probation.

  8. Gould v. Patterson

    560 S.E.2d 37 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 9 times
    Finding no double jeopardy violation in modification of probation conditions to require the defendant to undergo and pay for sex offender treatment after the defendant completed his term of incarceration for child molestation and solicitation and began serving the probated portion of his sentence

    The purpose of the modification requiring sex offender treatment was clearly rehabilitative, so it cannot be construed to constitute the imposition of additional punishment or an impermissible increase in the sentence. Id.; Staley v. State, 233 Ga. App. 597, 598-601 ( 505 S.E.2d 491) (1998); England v. Newton, 238 Ga. 534 ( 233 S.E.2d 787) (1977); compare Harp v. State, 228 Ga. App. 473, 474-475 ( 491 S.E.2d 923) (1997); Harris v. State, 261 Ga. 859, 860-861 ( 413 S.E.2d 439) (1992). Moreover, due process did not require that Gould be afforded prior notice, a hearing, or counsel before the trial court modified the conditions of his probation.

  9. Huzzie v. State

    253 Ga. App. 225 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 6 times   1 Legal Analyses

    (Punctuation omitted.) Staley v. State, 233 Ga. App. 597, 599 ( 505 S.E.2d 491) (1998). To lessen the risk to society, the law provides for the sentencing court's continued jurisdiction over probationers.

  10. Glover v. State

    239 Ga. App. 155 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 4 times
    In Glover v. State, 239 Ga. App. 155, 158 (1) (521 S.E.2d 84) (1999) (Glover I), the Court of Appeals, relying upon this Court's decisions in Gearinger v. Lee, 266 Ga. 167 (465 S.E.2d 440 (1996) and Manville v. Hampton, 266 Ga. 857 (471 S.E.2d 872) (1996), held that the emphasized phrase was "meaningless, as § 42-8-34.

    (Citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) See also Staley v. State, 233 Ga. App. 597, 598 ( 505 S.E.2d 491) (1998) (OCGA § 17-10-1(a)(1) "has been construed to give sentencing judges broad discretion in fashioning appropriate conditions of probation, tailored to the individual defendant's circumstances as well as the interests of society and the victim"); Penaherrera v. State, 211 Ga. App. 162, 163(1) ( 438 S.E.2d 661) (1993) ("[a]ny `reasonable condition' may be imposed"); Ballenger v. State, 210 Ga. App. 627, 628(1) ( 436 S.E.2d 793) (1993). Following the Supreme Court's decisions in Gearinger and Manville, this Court, in two subsequent cases, has attempted to give meaning to § 42-8-34.