Such an application, which rests within the trial court's sound discretion ( see Manchester Tech. v Hansen, 6 AD3d at 807; Frank v Martuge, 285 AD2d 938, 940), must include the names and addresses of each witness, a specific fact-based summary of the proposed testimony and how that testimony is relevant to the issues to be resolved at trial ( see State of New York v Quintal, Inc., 79 AD3d 1357, 1357). In addition, it should include an assertion attributed to the witness that he or she is willing to testify, and describe the difficulties that will necessarily be encountered by the witness if venue is not changed ( see State of New York v Slezak Petroleum Prods., Inc., 78 AD3d 1288, 1289-1290; Stainbrook v Colleges of Senecas, 237 AD2d 865; Andros v Roderick, 162 AD2d 813, 814). Here, we agree with Supreme Court that defendant failed to make such a showing.

This representation is ostensibly not contested since defendants have limited their argument on appeal to a discretionary change of venue (see CPLR 510 [3]) and no longer argue a change as of right (see CPLR 510 [1]). A party seeking a discretionary change of venue pursuant to CPLR 510(3) bears the burden of demonstrating that a change is appropriate and, generally, must support the application with detailed relevant information establishing that the convenience of the nonparty witnesses would be enhanced by the change (see Stainbrook v. Colleges of the Senecas, 237 A.D.2d 865 ; O'Brien v. Vassar Bros. Hosp., 207 A.D.2d 169; Andros v. Roderick, 162 A.D.2d 813). Here, the parties do not contest that the incident occurred outside of New York State, and plaintiff has established that he resided in New York County when the action was commenced.

CPLR 510 (3) provides for a discretionary change of venue where "the convenience of material witnesses and the ends of justice will be promoted by the change". The proponent of such a motion bears the burden of proof and must "supply the names, addresses and occupations of the witnesses whose convenience [it] claims will be affected, indicate that the prospective witnesses have been contacted and are willing to testify on [its] behalf and specify the substance of each witness's testimony, which must be necessary and material" (Andros v. Roderick, 162 A.D.2d 813, 814;see, Stainbrook v. Colleges of the Senecas, 237 A.D.2d 865; Stoyer v. Feeney, 165 A.D.2d 946). Based upon our review of defendant's motion papers, we find that these requirements have not been satisfied.

Equally clear, however, is that finality required for judicial resolution by Article 78 proceedings does not occur until the decision maker has arrived at a definite position on an issue that inflicts actual, concrete injury. (Town of Coeymans v. City of Albany, 237 AD2d 865 [3d Dept 1997]) It is this position on which respondent's statute of limitations argument falls. The language of the August 25th resolution references the Village Board's approval of the Modified Disciplinary Settlement Agreement as accurately reflecting the "proposed modifications identified in the June 19, 2017 Resolution" and authorizes the Mayor to sign it.

The party seeking the change of venue bears the burden of proof (Andros v Roderick, 162 AD 2d 813 [3d Dept 1990]) and must identify, among other things, the witnesses and the substance of their testimony (Frontier Ins. Co. v Big Apple Roofing Co., Inc., 50 AD3d 1239 [3d Dept 2008]; Stainbrook v Colleges of the Senecas, 237 AD2d 865 [3d Dept 1997]). In this case, claimant has not identified any potential witnesses or the substance of their purported testimony.

Convenience to material witnesses (CPLR 510[3]) A motion to change venue to promote the convenience of material witnesses and the ends of justice requires a detailed evidentiary showing that "the convenience of nonparty witnesses would in fact be served by the granting of such relief" (Jacobs v Banks Shapiro Gettinger Waldinger & Brennan, LLP, 9 AD3d 299, 299 [1st Dept 2004], citing O'Brien v Vassar Brothers Hospital, 207 AD2d 169, 622 NYS2d 284 [2d Dept 1995]; see also Alexander, Practice Commentaries, CPLR 510:3 [McKinney's 2016], citing Stainbrook vColleges of Senecas, 237 AD2d 865, 656 NYS2d 946 [3d Dept 1997]; Rochester Drug Co-Operative, Inc. vMarcott Pharmacy North Corp., 15 AD3d 899, 789 NYS2d 779 [4th Dept 2005]). That evidentiary showing must include "the names, addresses and occupations of the prospective witnesses, must disclose the facts to which the proposed witnesses will testify at the trial, must show that the proposed witnesses are, in fact, willing to testify and must show how the proposed witnesses would be inconvenienced in the event that a change of venue is not granted" (Jacobs, 9 AD3d at 299; but see Soufan v Argo Pneumatic Co., 170 AD2d289, 566 NYS2d 17 [1st Dept 1991] [affidavits from witnesses themselves are not required, and movant may provide the necessary information through sworn averments about the witnesses]).

CPLR § 510(3) provides that the Court may change the place of trial of an action where the convenience of material witnesses and the ends of justice will be promoted by the change. The party seeking the change of venue bears the burden of proof (see Andros v Roderick, 162 AD2d 813 [3d Dept 1990]) and must identify, among other things, the witnesses and the substance of their testimony (Liere v State of New York, 123 AD3d 1323 [3d Dept 2014]; Cavazzini v Viennas, 82 AD3d 1343 [3d Dept 2011]; Mroz v Ace Auto Body & Towing, 307 AD2d 403 [3d Dept 2003]; Stainbrook v Colleges of the Senecas, 237 AD2d 865 [3d Dept 1997]). Claimant has not identified any potential witnesses or the substance of their purported testimony.

The claim alleges that claimant's property was lost upon his transfer from Upstate CF to Greene CF, and that he filed an administrative inmate property claim at Greene CF, and thus the trial of this claim would typically be conducted either in Franklin County at Upstate CF or in Greene County at Greene CF. Claimant appears to request that the trial be held in the county of his incarceration for his convenience, but his failure to present any proof or make any argument in support of changing the place of the trial is fatal to his motion (see Stainbrook v Colleges of Senecas, 237 AD2d 865 [3d Dept 1997]). Accordingly, claimant's motion will be denied.

CPLR ?? 510(3) provides that the Court may change the place of trial of an action where the convenience of material witnesses and the ends of justice will be promoted by the change. The party seeking the change of venue bears the burden of proof (see Andros v Roderick, 162 AD2d 813 [3d Dept 1990]) and must identify, among other things, the witnesses and the substance of their testimony (Liere v State of New York, 123 AD3d 1323 [3d Dept 2014]; Cavazzini v Viennas, 82 AD3d 1343 [3d Dept 2011]; Mroz v Ace Auto Body & Towing, 307 AD2d 403 [3d Dept 2003]; Stainbrook v Colleges of the Senecas, 237 AD2d 865 [3d Dept 1997]). Claimant has not identified any potential witnesses or the substance of their purported testimony.

The party seeking the change of venue bears the burden of proof (see Andros v Roderick, 162 AD2d 813 [3d Dept 1990]) and must identify, among other things, the witnesses and the substance of their testimony (Cavazzini v Viennas, 82 AD3d 1343 [3d Dept 2011]; Mroz v Ace Auto Body & Towing, 307 AD2d 403 [3d Dept 2003]; Stainbrook v Colleges of the Senecas, 237 AD2d 865 [3d Dept 1997]). Claimant has not indicated if he intends to offer the testimony of any witnesses other than his own.