Crosby held that the identity of a decoy was not privileged and must be revealed, and in Hodges v. State, 98 Ga. App. 97, 105 ( 104 S.E.2d 704) (1958), the identity of an informer was held to be absolutely privileged. These absolute rules had generally been followed ( Pass v. State, 227 Ga. 730 (4) ( 182 S.E.2d 779) (1971); Morgan v. State, 211 Ga. 172, 177 ( 84 S.E.2d 365) (1954); Stanford v. State, 134 Ga. App. 61 (1) ( 213 S.E.2d 519) (1975); Thomas v. State, 134 Ga. App. 18 (1) ( 213 S.E.2d 129) (1975); Welch v. State, 130 Ga. App. 18, 19 (3) ( 202 S.E.2d 223) (1973); Morrison v. State, 129 Ga. App. 558 (5) ( 200 S.E.2d 286) (1973); Butler v. State, 127 Ga. App. 539 (2) ( 194 S.E.2d 261) (1972); Staggers v. State, 101 Ga. App. 463, 465 ( 114 S.E.2d 142) (1960); Smallwood v. State, 95 Ga. App. 766 (1) ( 98 S.E.2d 602) (1957); Roddenberry v. State, 90 Ga. App. 66 ( 82 S.E.2d 40) (1954)), until the United States Supreme Court held, in a case involving a decoy, that the due process concept of fundamental fairness required that the public interest in protecting the flow of information to law enforcement officials be balanced against the right of the accused to a full and fair opportunity to defend himself. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 ( 77 S.C. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639) (1956).

3. As his third claimed error, Scudiere enumerates the trial court's failure without a request to charge on the subject of admissions and confessions with respect to his remarks to his cellmate Carothers. In the absence of a request to charge no error occurred, whether these remarks be considered a mere admission ( Norrell v. State, 116 Ga. App. 479 (2) ( 157 S.E.2d 784)), or as a confession ( Story v. State, 145 Ga. 43 (2) ( 88 S.E. 548); Staggers v. State, 101 Ga. App. 463, 464, 465 ( 114 S.E.2d 142); Keen v. State, 43 Ga. App. 331 (3) ( 158 S.E. 611); Chapman v. State, 28 Ga. App. 107 (2) ( 110 S.E. 332); Washington v. State, 24 Ga. App. 65 (3 a) ( 100 S.E. 31)). 4. Fourth, Scudiere enumerates error in the trial court's allowing Carother's testimony of his "confession" to be presented to the jury without a voluntariness hearing claimed to be required by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 ( 84 SC 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908); Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 ( 88 SC 523, 19 L.Ed.2d 634); and Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538 ( 87 SC 639, 17 L.Ed.2d 593). This contention cannot succeed because not only is there no claim by Scudiere that his statements to Carothers were in any way involuntary, but on this record no colorable claim of involuntariness seems feasible.

1. Appellant admits that he refused to identify the informer but contends that because of public policy he was not required to do so and that there was therefore no authority for his discharge which, under Deason v. DeKalb County Merit System Council, 110 Ga. App. 244 ( 138 S.E.2d 183), must be held to be arbitrary, indiscriminate and void. While as a general rule the government may be privileged to refuse to make public the identity of informers who furnish information relating to violations of law (see Code § 38-1102; Morgan v. State, 211 Ga. 172 ( 84 S.E.2d 365); Anderson v. State, 72 Ga. App. 487 ( 34 S.E.2d 110); Crosby v. State, 90 Ga. App. 63 ( 82 S.E.2d 38); Roddenberry v. State, 90 Ga. App. 66 ( 82 S.E.2d 40); Hodges v. State, 98 Ga. App. 97 (7) ( 104 S.E.2d 704) (rev'd on other grounds, 214 Ga. 614 ( 106 S.E.2d 795); Staggers v. State, 101 Ga. App. 463, 465 (5) ( 114 S.E.2d 142); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 ( 87 SC 1056, 18 L.Ed.2d 62); 8 Wigmore, Evidence 761, § 2374 (McNaughton rev. 1961); 58 AmJur, Witnesses § 534 (1967 Cum. Supp.); Annot., 76 ALR2d 262), we have been cited no authority to sustain the proposition that a police officer is privileged to refuse to disclose the identity of an informer to his superior officers in the internal workings of the department. If the purpose of the privilege is to protect the public interest in effective law enforcement (see Roviaro v. U.S., 353 U.S. 53 77 SC 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639; People v. McShann, 50 Cal.2d 802 ( 330 P.2d 33); State v. Hardy (Fla.App.), 114 So.2d 344), or, as Wigmore suggests, if it applies "wherever the situation is one where without this encouragement the citizens who have special information of a violation of law might be deterred otherwise from voluntarily reporting it to the appropriate official" (8 Wigmore, supra, at 768), the record fails to demonstrate any need for