Opinion
Civil Action No. 1:96cv15-D-D
February 19, 1997
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently before the court is the motion of the defendant for the entry of summary judgment on its behalf, as well as its motion to strike the jury demand of the plaintiff in this cause. Finding that the motion for summary judgment is well taken, the court shall grant it. In that this matter shall be dismissed upon the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's jury demand shall be denied as moot.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is not to make credibility determinations, weigh evidence, or draw from the facts legitimate inferences for the movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Rather, the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Anderson. 477 U.S. at 255. The court's factual summary is so drafted.
The defendant True Temper Sports ("True Temper") hired the plaintiff Bobby L. Stafford sometime in 1990 as an employee in its Amory, Mississippi facility. Amid allegations of misconduct by Stafford and another employee, True Temper fired the plaintiff in February of 1995. Specifically, True Temper charged the plaintiff with manipulating factory machinery to reflect more time worked for the purpose of receiving unearned pay, in violation of company rules. After True Temper terminated the plaintiff's employment, the plaintiff sought unemployment benefits through the Mississippi Employment Security Commission ("MESC"). The course of proceedings before the MESC does not appear to be in dispute:
The claims examiner assigned to the Plaintiff's case initially disqualified him for benefits. Plaintiff appealed this determination, and a hearing was held before an appeals referee on April 28, 1995. At the conclusion of the hearing, the appeals referee reversed the finding of the claims examiner. However, a three member board of review concluded that Plaintiff had intentionally manipulated his minute meter and that such action showed an "intentional and willful disregard of the interest of [True Temper]." The Board of Review reinstated the decision of the claims examiner, disqualifying Plaintiff from unemployment benefits. Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Circuit Court of Lee County, Mississippi, which affirmed the decision of the Board of Review.
Defendant's Brief, p. 5 n. 1.
True Temper provides its employees health care benefits through CIGNA Healthcare, Connecticut General Life Insurance Company. During 1993, the plaintiff underwent heart surgery at substantial cost. Stafford's daughter Kimberly suffers from Gaucher's disease, and her medical expenses paid by CIGNA prior to Stafford's termination were quite substantial. Finally, at the time of termination, the plaintiff was three (3) weeks away from being vested in the company pension plan. The plaintiff filed this action alleging that the defendant True Temper terminated his employment in retaliation for his substantial medical expenses incurred through the company health care plan, and to prevent the vesting of his pension benefits. Further, the plaintiff made state law claims for defamation and the intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of the defendant's allegations of misconduct on the part of Mr. Stafford. This motion for summary judgment followed.
Discussion
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment carries the burden of demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is presented, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Brothers v. Klevenhagen. 28 F.3d 452, 455 (5th Cir. 1994). "Where the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Federal Sav. Loan Ins, v. Krail. 968 F.2d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 1992). The facts are reviewed drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. Matagorda County v. Russel Law. 19 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 1994).
Collateral Estoppel
Central to the arguments of True Temper in this cause are the findings of the MESC with regard to the plaintiff's claim for unemployment benefits after his termination. True Temper contends that "the fact that Plaintiff manipulated his minute meter has been conclusively resolved in True Temper's favor by the decision of the MESC, which was affirmed by the Lee County Circuit Court." Defendant's Rebuttal Memorandum, p. 12. The conclusive determination of this fact by the MESC, True Temper continues, necessitates a finding by this court that the plaintiff is incapable of prevailing on any of his claims.
It is true that under some circumstances, state administrative decisions can carry preclusive weight in a federal lawsuit. "[W]hen a state agency acting in a judicial capacity . . . resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, federal courts must give the agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the State's courts." University of Tennessee v. Elliott. 478 U.S. 788, 799, 92 L.Ed.2d 635, 646-47, 106 S.Ct. 3220 (1986) (citations omitted); see also Astoria F. S. L. Assn. v. Solimino. 501 U.S. 104, 107, 115 L.Ed.2d 96, 104, 111 S.Ct. 2166 (1991);United States v. Utah Constr. Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422, 86 S.Ct. 1545, 1560, 16 L.Ed.2d 642, 661 (1966). The Fifth Circuit has consistently applied this test to determine if preclusion is applicable. See, e.g., Riley v. Wooten. 999 F.2d 802, 805 (5th Cir. 1993); Frazier v. King, 873 F.2d 820, 825 (5th Cir. 1989); Castillo v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 725 F.2d 1012, 1014(5th Cir. 1984); Painters District Council No. 38 v. Edgewood Contracting Co. 416 F.2d 1081, 1084 (5th Cir. 1969).
However, an exception to this rule lies when Congress has manifested an intent, pursuant to a statutory scheme, that unreviewed state administrative decisions should carry no such preclusive effect as against claims arising under that scheme. See, e.g., Astoria. 501 U.S. at 114; 115 L.Ed.2d at 108 (State Human Rights Appeal Board decision carries no preclusive effect against ADEA claim);Elliott. 478 U.S. at 799, 92 L.Ed.2d at 646-47 (state administrative law judge's findings not given preclusive effect in Title VII action). Central to both Astoria and Elliot was the fact that Congress, in enacting discrimination legislation, created a federal administrative scheme to be followed before the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission ("EEOC").
[S]uch federal [administrative] proceedings would be strictly pro forma if state administrative findings were given preclusive effect. It goes without saying that complainants who succeed in state proceedings will not pursue suit in federal court . . . A complainant who looks to federal court after termination of state proceedings will therefore ordinarily do so only when the state agency has held against him. In such a case, however, the employer would likely enjoy an airtight defense of collateral estoppel if a state agency determination on the merits were given preclusive effect.Astoria. 501 U.S. at 111, 115 L.Ed.2d at 107. In such a context, the entire EEOC procedure would be ineffectual in ever performing its congressionally mandated functions. In contrast, ERISA is governed by no federal administrative scheme enforced by a federal agency equivalent to the EEOC, and therefore a crucial rationale for not giving state administrative decisions preclusive effect is absent in this case.
The plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to litigate his claims before the MESC, in light of the fact that he was able to present evidence before the MESC, be represented by counsel, and involve himself in a rather elaborate administrative appellate process. Decisions of the MESC are appealable through the Mississippi court system, and even have the potential of ultimate review by the United States Supreme Court. Miss. Code Ann. § 71-5-531 (1996 Supp.). Further, administrative factual determinations by Mississippi state agencies, including the MESC, are capable of carrying preclusive weight in the Mississippi courts. Miss. Code Ann. § 71-5-531 (1996 Supp.) ("In any judicial proceedings under this section, the findings of the board of review as to the facts, if supported by the evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the court shall be confined to questions of law.");Raju v. Rhodes. 7 F.3d 1210, 1215 (5th Cir. 1993);M.E.S.C. v. Philadelphia Mun. Sep. Sch. Dist., 437 So.2d 388, 395 (Miss. 1983); Miss. Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 394 So.2d 299, 301 (Miss. 1981).
Lastly, the court finds a more basic distinction. The situations inElliott and Astoria are inapposite from the case at bar because the plaintiff pursued an appeal of the MESC administrative decision in this case beyond the established administrative scheme to a Mississippi court. E.g., Astoria, 501 U.S. at 109, 115 L.Ed.2d at 105 ("We do not have before us the judgment of a state court. . . ."). The factual determinations in this case came not merely from a judicially unreviewed finding of a state administrative body, but rather emanate from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Lee County after an appeal of a state administrative decision. That Circuit Court judgment is entitled to "the same full faith and credit in every court of the United States . . . as [it has] by law or usage in the courts of such State," and therefore carries a preclusive effect with regard to factual issues before this court. 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
Now that the court has determined that collateral estoppel is available to be used by the defendant, the undersigned must determine if it does actually apply in this case. The application of a collateral estoppel effect of a prior judgment is contingent upon a showing of four factors under Mississippi law:
) a party must be seeking to relitigate a specific issue;
) that issue must have been already litigated in a prior action;
) that issue actually was determined in the prior lawsuit; and
) that determination of the issue was essential to the judgment of the prior action.E.g., Raju, 7 F.3d 1210; Evans v. Sharpley, 607 So.2d 1210, 1213 (Miss. 1992); Riley v. Mooreland, 537 So.2d 1348, 1353 (Miss. 1989). In this cause, the issues of whether:
1) the plaintiff actually manipulated his machine to falsely reflect additional time worked; and
2) that True Temper fired the plaintiff for this reason
meet these four requirements in this case. The plaintiff seeks to relitigate those issues before this court when the plaintiff has already had an adequate opportunity to litigate these issues and they were actually litigated, determined, and essential to the administrative and Circuit Court findings. The remaining question is the extent to which the collateral estoppel effect of these findings affects the plaintiff's claims in this case.
ERISA claims
The prima facie case
In order to prevail on his claim arising under § 510 of ERISA, Mr. Stafford must eventually establish a prima facie case that True Temper acted against him with a specific discriminatory intent to retaliate against him for exercising an ERISA right or to prevent the attainment of benefits to which he may have become entitled under the ERISA benefit plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1140; Rogers v. International Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 761 (5th Cir. 1996); Mines v. Mass. Mut. Life Co., 43 F.3d 207, 209 (5th Cir. 1995);McGann v. HH Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 402 (5th Cir. 1991);Carlos v. White Consol. Indust., Inc., 934 F. Supp. 227, 232 (W.D. Tex. 1996). As with most every action for discrimination under federal law, the plaintiff need only prove that the interference with ERISA rights was a motivating factor behind his discharge. Mr. Stafford is not required to prove that this was the only factor, but he must show that the loss of benefits was more than an incidental result of his discharge. Clark v. Coats Clark. Inc., 990 F.2d 1217, 1224 (11th Cir. 1993); Seaman v. Arvida Realty Sales, 985 F.2d 543, 545 (11th Cir. 1993); Carlos, 934 F. Supp. at 232. Again, as with all discrimination actions, the plaintiff's prima facie case may be established with circumstantial evidence.Carlos. 934 F. Supp. at 232.
In the case at bar, virtually the only evidence relative to the issue of whether True Temper terminated the plaintiff because his interest in the company pension plan would soon vest is the fact that he was terminated three weeks prior to the established date for vesting. True Temper argues that this fact is legally insufficient and that "no inference of specific intent can be drawn solely from the temporal proximity between the Plaintiff's discharge and the vesting of the pension." Defendant's Brief, p. 8. However, the case that True Temper cites for this proposition does not support such a strong contention:
Another of the plaintiff's contentions in the ERISA context is that he had submitted substantial medical expenses through True Temper's ERISA governed medical benefits plan. In light of the substantial expense in medical benefit payments associated with retaining him as an employee, he contends, True Temper terminated him. Beyond this bare allegation, there is no proof as to this claim. He has presented no evidence that the loss of medical benefits was anything more than an incidental loss of benefits associated with his discharge.
While [the] proximity [of discharge] to vesting may be enough to support the existence of a prima facie case, once the employer has presented a separate, legitimate reason for the discharge we do not believe that savings and proximity will always be enough to entitle plaintiff to a trial on [a 510] claim.Humphreys v. Bellaire Corp., 966 F.2d 1037, 1044 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Dister v. Continental Can Co., 859 F.2d 1108, 1117 n. 1 (3rd Cir. 1988)) (emphasis added). Further, this court has been presented with a similar argument before, and found it lacking:
Central to the argument of the defendant is that close temporal proximity of an adverse employment action to a protected activity of a plaintiff is necessarily insufficient to create a jury issue on the matter of discrimination. This is incorrect, for while temporal proximity is by no means conclusive, timing does indeed have the capability to establish both a causal connection and circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir. 1995) ("The timing of the adverse employment action can be a significant, although not necessarily determinative, factor."); Shirlev v. Chrysler First. Inc., 970 F.2d 39, 44 (5th Cir. 1992) ("The District Court properly weighed the lapse of time as one of the elements in the entire calculation of whether [the plaintiff] had shown a causal connection between the protected activity and the subsequent firing."); Hollis v. Johnston-Tombigbee Furniture Mfg. Co., Civil Action No. 1:93cv346 (N.D. Miss., Dec. 24, 1994) (Davidson, J.) (Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment) ("This court agrees that the timing itself is suspicious, and this alone is minimally sufficient for the purposes of the motion at bar to establish his prima facie case as to his claim of reprisal discrimination."); see also Donnellon v. Fruehauf Corp., 794 F.2d 598, 601 (11th Cir. 1986) ("The short period of time . . . between the filing of the discrimination complaint and the plaintiff's discharge belies any assertion by the defendant that the plaintiff failed to prove causation."); Matthews v. Dep't of Labor. 767 F. Supp. 1140, 1144 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (following Donnellon); Booth v. Birmingham News Co., 704 F. Supp. 213, 215-16 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (explaining Donnellon rule not conclusive because timing must be considered alongside other factors).Foster v. Benchcraft, Civil Action No. 1:95cv65-D-D (N.D. Miss.) (Davidson, J.) (Memorandum Opinion, p. 2). Likewise, the undersigned finds the contention unconvincing in this case. That temporal proximity may not be sufficient in every circumstance is not the same as saying that temporal proximity cannot be sufficient. In light of the facts and circumstances in this case, it is this court's opinion that the close timing between the plaintiff's termination and his anticipated time for vesting in pension benefits is sufficient circumstantial evidence of discrimination to meet his burden of proof to establish a prima facie case at this stage in the proceedings.
The proffered nondiscriminatory reason for discharge
Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden of production then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge. True Temper proffers as its reason in this case that the plaintiff intentionally manipulated work machinery to falsify his time records in order to improperly obtain more pay than he was entitled to receive. The court finds that this is a sufficient non-discriminatory reason for the plaintiff's discharge and that the defendant has met its burden in this regard.
Pretext
Now that True Temper has demonstrated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the plaintiff's discharge, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to show that True Temper's proffered reason is unworthy of credence and that a real motivating factor behind his termination was discrimination. True Temper contends that the preclusive findings from the MESC proceedings foreclose any argument on this issue. Defendant's Brief, p. 8 n. 5. However, there is no factual finding anywhere in the state administrative record or in the state court record that the manipulation of work machinery to falsify time records was the sole reason for the plaintiffs termination. The plaintiff need only prove that ERISA discrimination was a motivating factor; he is not required to show that it was the only motivating factor. Seaman. 985 F.2d at 545; Carlos. 934 F. Supp. at 231. The plaintiff is precluded in this claim only to the extent already noted — i.e., that he actually manipulated work machinery and was fired for that reason. However, the court does not find that these preclusive findings are without weight in evaluating the plaintiff's claim of ERISA discrimination. Their effect is relevant to the quantum of proof that the plaintiff must present to create a genuine issue of material fact as to any other motivation that True Temper might have had in his termination, namely that of ERISA discrimination.
In response to True Temper's assertion that they are entitled to employ collateral estoppel to bar relitigation of certain facts, the plaintiff argues that "[t]he reasons for Stafford's discharge were not fully litigated at the MESC hearing." This court agrees that the full panoply of reasons behind his termination was not at issue before the MESC. However, the questions of whether he violated work rules and was terminated, at least in part, for that violation were at issue. The plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate those issues before the MESC.
While this court finds that the temporal proximity of the plaintiff's termination to his potential vesting of pension benefits is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the undersigned does not find that this fact alone is enough to override True Temper's proffered legitimate reason for his termination and create an issue for the fact-finder in this cause. The plaintiff has presented no other evidence that could lead a reasonable fact finder to conclude that True Temper intentionally discriminated against him for the exercise of rights under ERISA or to prevent the accrual of right to which he would have become entitled under an ERISA plan.
Pendent state law claims
Defamation
The plaintiff's first pendent state law claim is that True Temper defamed him by publishing fabricated charges against him. "True Temper intentionally and maliciously terminated Stafford from his job by fabricating charges against him which they knew to be untrue and . . . True Temper further defamed Stafford at the grievance and arbitration hearings and before the MESC by repeating those charges, knowing the charges to be false." Plaintiffs Response Brief, p. 7. An essential element of his claim for defamation is that the allegations made against him were false.See, e.g., Roussel v. Roberts. 1996 WL 560319, *8 (Miss. Oct. 3, 1996); Blake v. Gannett Co., 529 So.2d 595, 603 (Miss. 1988); Fulton v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 498 So.2d 1215, 1217 (Miss. 1986). In this case, he charges that the false allegations are those charges made by True Temper that Mr. Stafford "had been cheating the company by deliberately causing the machine meter to run while Plaintiff was on his break period." Plaintiff's Complaint, ¶ VI. As Mr. Stafford is precluded from arguing the falsity of this claim, his defamation claim must fail as a matter of law.
Intentional infliction of emotional distress
Likewise, the court finds that the preclusive effect of the Circuit Court's judgment and the administrative findings mandate a finding by this court that the plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is legally unsupportable. In light of the fact that the plaintiff is prevented from arguing that he did not in fact commit the work-rule violations with which he was charged, the undersigned cannot say that the defendant's alleged conduct was "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency" and support a cause of action under this Mississippi tort.See, e.g., Leaf River Forest Prods, v. Ferguson. 662 So.2d 648, 658 (Miss. 1995); Peoples Bank Trust Co. v. Cermack. 658 So.2d 1352, 1365 (Miss. 1995); Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Devers. 405 So.2d 898, 900 (Miss. 1981).
III. Conclusion
This court finds that the factual findings of the MESC, as affirmed by the Lee County Circuit Court, are entitled to preclusive weight in this cause. In light of this fact, the plaintiff's pendent state law claims must fail as a matter of law. Further, the court finds that the plaintiff has presented insufficient evidence to convince a reasonable finder of fact that the defendant True Temper Sports discriminated against him in violation of ERISA. The motion of the defendant True Temper Sports for the entry of summary judgment on its behalf shall be granted, and this cause shall be dismissed.
A separate order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pursuant to a memorandum opinion issued this day, it is hereby ORDERED THAT:
) the motion of the defendant True Temper Sports for the entry of summary judgment on its behalf is hereby GRANTED;
) the plaintiff's claims in this cause are hereby DISMISSED;
) the motion of the defendant to strike the jury demand of the plaintiff in this cause is hereby DENIED AS MOOT.
) this case is CLOSED.
SO ORDERED.