Regarding the timing of the EEOC's issuance of Plaintiff's Right-to-Sue letter, it appears that courts have been divided on the validity of 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2) since its creation in 1977, and the power it confers upon the EEOC to issue “early” Right-to-Sue letters-keeping in mind that the EEOC is mandated to investigate all claims of employment discrimination and eliminate unlawful employment practices where appropriate. Stafford v. Sealright, Inc., 100 F.Supp.2d 137, 138-39 (N.D.N.Y. 2000); see also Marston v. AT&T Corp., 210 F.R.D. 573, 57475 (E.D. Va. 2002). The Fourth Circuit has not ruled on the matter.

However, the Court notes that there is a growing body of decisions amongst our sister courts finding right-to-sue letters invalid where "no meaningful investigation of plaintiffs' claims was conducted, and no serious attempt to resolve the dispute was undertaken prior to initiating an action in federal court" under circumstances similar to the instant action. Stetz, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 124 (finding a right-to-sue letter issued 21 days after filing of charges was invalid); see also Stafford, 100 F. Supp. 2d 137, 137 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (notice issued 16 days after filing of charge was invalid); Deas, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 465 (right-to-sue letter issued seven days after filing of charges was invalid); Rodriguez, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 112 (right-to-sue letter issued 39 days after filing of charges was invalid). Plaintiff argues that the EEOC's September 14, 2018 dismissal of Gibb's Supplemental Charge provides an independent basis for exhaustion and renders Defendant's motion to dismiss moot. (Pl.

In the present case, I join those other courts that have considered the matter and have found Congress' intent in § 2000e-5 is clear—the EEOC has control over charges of discrimination for 180 days, and not a day less. See Stafford v. Sealright, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 137, 139 n.2 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (collecting cases); Martini v. Fannie Mae, 178 F.3d 1336, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Meredith v. Nat'l Business College Corp., Case No. 97-0331, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12677, at *7-8 (W.D. Va. July 28, 1997); Nomtoya v. Valencia County, 872 F. Supp. 904, 906 (D.N.M. 1994); New York v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 675, 680 (W.D.N.Y. 1984); Mills v. Jefferson Bank East, 559 F. Supp. 34, 35 (D. Colo. 1983); Spencer v. Banco Real, S.A., 87 F.R.D. 739 (1980); Loney v. Carr-Lowrey Glass Co., 458 F. Supp. 1080, 1081 (D. Md. 1978); Budreck v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 407 F. Supp. 635, 639 (N.D. Cal. 1976); see also Moteles v. Univ. of Pennsylvania, 730 F.2d 913, 916-18 (3rd Cir. 1984). But see Sims v. Trus Joist MacMillan, 22 F.3d 1059, 1061 (11th Cir. 1994); Brown v. Puget Sound Elec. Apprenticeship & Training Trust, 732 F.2d 726, 729 (9th Cir. 1984); Marston v. AT&T Corp., 210 F.R.D. 573, 576-77 (E.D. Va. 2002) (declining to dismiss a complaint following EEOC's issuance of early right-to-sue noti

The district courts within the Second Circuit have disagreed about the consequences of early right-to-sue letters. Compare McGrath v. Nassau Health Care Corp., 217 F. Supp. 2d 319, 325-27 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that issuance of premature right-to-sue letter did not warrant dismissal of Title VII claim), with Stafford v. Sealright, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 137, 139-40 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that failure of EEOC to wait 180 days before issuing right-to-sue letter precluded the plaintiff's lawsuit). The courts dismissing cases brought under early right-to-sue letters have found that "Congress contemplated that investigation and conciliation efforts on the part of the EEOC . . . [are] an integral part of the Title VII remedy, and that the EEOC is, therefore, required to make some effort at investigating a charge and conducting some conciliation between employer and employee during the 180-day period."

N.Y. 2000) (Trager, J.) (upholding suits commenced under early right-to-sue letters); Rodriguez v. Connection Tech., 65 F. Supp.2d 107, 110 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (Spatt, J.) (striking suits commenced under early right-to-sue letters). Compare Hussein, 2000 WL 776920, at *4 n. 4 (permitting suits commenced after early right-to-sue letter was issued) and Hellgren v. Bell Atl. Corp., No. 99 Civ. 11937, 2000 WL 726496, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2000) (concluding same), and Huang v. Gruner + Jahr United States Publ'g., No. 99 CIV. 5058, 2000 WL 640660, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2000) (finding same), and Parker v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 97 F. Supp.2d 437, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding same), and Commodari v. Long Island Univ., 89 F. Supp.2d 353, 382 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding same), and Kahn v. Objective Solutions, Int'l, 86 F. Supp.2d 377, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (permitting same), and Palumbo v. Lufthansa German Airlines, No. 98 Civ. 5005, 1999 WL 540446, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 1999) (allowing same) with Stafford v. Sealright, Inc., 100 F. Supp.2d 137, 139 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that issuance of early right-to-sue letter violates 180-day waiting provision), and Rodriguez v. Connection Tech., 65 F. Supp.2d 107, 110 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding same), and Stetz v. Reeher Enters., 70 F. Supp.2d 119, 124 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (following same). Courts in this circuit that have declined to entertain early right-to-sue letter cases argue that "Congress contemplated that investigation and conciliation efforts on the part of the EEOC . . . [are] an integral part of the Title VII remedy, and that the EEOC is, therefore, required to make some effort at investigating a charge and conducting some conciliation between employer and employee during the 180-day period after the filing of a charge of discrimination."