Opinion
A130255 Super. Ct. No. RG09454659
08-23-2011
MAUREEN STAFFORD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
Maureen Stafford appeals from a judgment entered following a demurrer to her second amended complaint by defendant the Regents of the University of California (Regents). The court concluded Stafford's second amended complaint failed to state a cause of action because it exceeded the scope of leave to amend granted following the Regents' earlier demurrer. Stafford argues there was no limit on her leave to amend, and if there was, any limit was an abuse of discretion. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Stafford is a former employee of the University of California. She originally sued the Regents following the rejection of her claim seeking workers' compensation benefits for stress-related injuries. Her first amended complaint alleged that the Regents' claims adjuster and attorney presented falsified documentation concerning her claim to the workers' compensation judge and the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board. She claimed she was denied workers' compensation benefits due to the alleged fraud. The Regents demurred to the complaint.
The court sustained the demurrer on the ground that Stafford's complaint was "largely unintelligible," but provided Stafford general guidelines to assist her amendment to the extent she was "attempting to allege fraud." The court's minute order also advised Stafford to plead specific facts if she intended to plead a cause of action to appeal the ruling in her workers' compensation case.
Stafford's second amended complaint alleged breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Instead of challenging fraud in her workers' compensation case, this new complaint concerned Stafford's layoff from the university and the university's failure to rehire her when positions became available, in violation of the collective bargaining agreement between the Regents and university employees. The second amended complaint made no mention of either the facts or causes of action alleged in the first amended complaint. As a result of the alleged breaches, Stafford sought damages for loss of past, present, and future earnings, as well as benefits and attorney fees.
The Regents again demurred. The Regents argued that Stafford's second amended complaint exceeded the scope of leave to amend granted by the court, that as a public employee Stafford could not bring a claim for breach of contract or covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The trial court agreed that Stafford exceeded the scope of leave to amend granted following the Regents' initial demurrer, and again sustained the demurrer with leave to amend the complaint within the facts alleged in her first amended complaint. Stafford did not file a third amended complaint. The trial court entered judgment for the Regents and dismissed the case. Stafford timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
When we review a ruling on a demurrer, we treat all properly pleaded facts as true, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of facts or law. (Saks v. Damon Raike & Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 419, 426.) Unless a plaintiff can demonstrate that a complaint sets forth a cognizable claim for relief under any theory, we will uphold the trial court's decision to sustain a demurrer even if the ground relied upon by the trial court is untenable. (Ibid.)Here, we need not review the closer question regarding the scope of leave to amend granted to Stafford following the ruling on the demurrer to her first amended complaint because the demurrer was well taken for another reason. As a public employee, Stafford's employment rights arise from statute, not contract. Thus, Stafford can make no claim that her layoff from employment or the Regents refusal to rehire her breached any contract of employment or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Stafford alleged that she was hired as an administrative assistant in the university's engineering department in 1995. In 2003 she began to receive "arbitrary, unfounded, unwarranted and unjustified" employee performance evaluations. She was indefinitely laid off from her position in 2004, and contrary to her rights under the university's collective bargaining agreement with its employees, she was not considered for preferential rehire when positions became available in 2006. Stafford's second amended complaint alleges that she is a third party beneficiary of the collective bargaining agreement between the university and its employees, and that the Regents breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing when she was terminated in 2004 and breached the contract when the university did not rehire her in 2006.
As an employee of the University of California, Stafford's employment rights arose out of statute, not contract. (Kim v. Regents of the University of California (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 160, 164.) She could allege neither a cause of action for breach of contract nor breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Ibid.) The existence of the collective bargaining agreement between the university and its employees, and the rights afforded employees thereby, does not change matters.
A collective bargaining agreement is not a contract of employment between an employer and a single employee. (Levy v. Superior Court (1940) 15 Cal.2d 692, 697 (Levy).) "Rather it is an agreement between the union and employer laying down certain conditions of employment which, it is contemplated, are to be incorporated in the separate contracts of hiring with each employee." (MacKay v. Loew's, Inc. (9th Cir. 1950) 182 F.2d 170, 172 [citing Levy].)If Stafford were to make a claim for wrongful termination of employment that could be actionable under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, such a claim is typically subject to exhaustion of administrative remedies. (See Palmer v. Regents of the University of California (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 899, 905-906.) Stafford alleged no facts indicating any attempt to exhaust.
Moreover, the relationship between the university and its employees is governed, in part, by the provisions of the Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act (Gov. Code, § 3560 et seq.). The act "requires the university, as a higher education employer, to 'engage in meeting and conferring with the employee organization selected as exclusive representative of an appropriate unit on all matters within the scope of representation,' and Government Code section 3571, subdivision (c) makes it unlawful for the university to fail or refuse to do so. With respect to the university (and with certain exceptions not applicable here), ' "scope of representation" means, and is limited to, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment.' (Gov. Code, § 3562, subd. (r)(1).)" (California Faculty Assn. v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 609, 615.) But the terms and conditions of employment that may generally be redressed under the act are changes in university policy that have "a generalized effect or continuing impact" upon bargaining unit members and not isolated instances of breach of contract. (Ibid.)
Stafford did not allege that her termination or denial of rehire at the university was due to any change in policy affecting employees generally. Rather, she sought damages because her termination and the university's subsequent refusal to rehire her was arbitrary and in bad faith. She can present no cognizable claim for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing or as a third party beneficiary to enforce any university collective bargaining agreement with its employees.
Because the trial court properly granted the Regents demurrer to the second amended complaint for the reasons stated in this opinion, we will not and need not address Stafford's other claims of error.
DISPOSITION
Affirmed.
Siggins, J. We concur:
McGuiness, P.J.
Jenkins, J.