Stafford v. Lebrun

Full title: TOWN OF STAFFORD v. ALBERT LEBRUN

Court: Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Tolland at Rockville

Date published: Apr 14, 2008

2008 Ct. Sup. 6405 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008)

Opinion

No. TTD CV07-5001811 S

April 14, 2008

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY (#120.00)

ANGELO L. DOS SANTOS, JUDGE.

The defendant, Albert Lebrun, seeks to disqualify from the instant matter the many judges who heard his cases over many years. They are: Judges Howard Scheinblum, William M. Shaughnessy, Jr., Richard M. Rittenband, Harry Hammer, Lawrence C. Klaczak, Terence A. Sullivan, Samuel J. Sferrazza, Kenneth L. Shluger, Jonathan J. Kaplan and Patricia Lilly Harleston. In essence, the defendant alleges, inter alia, collusion, violations of law and that the judges acted improperly in their determination of issues raised in each of the cases that were presented to them. The defendant's present effort is best summarized, however, as an effort to disqualify these judges because of their involvement in his previous matters and their rulings adverse to the defendant.

The matter was referred to this court because it had never previously interacted with the defendant, nor ruled in any of his matters. See Joyner v. Commissioner of Correction, 55 Conn.App. 602, 608 (1999); Szypula v. Szypula, 2 Conn.App. 650, 653 (1984). A hearing was scheduled and heard on April 7, 2008 to provide the defendant with the opportunity to present his claims. The defendant failed to present any evidence regarding his allegations. The defendant failed to testify, but made oral argument that the named judges be disqualified from his cases.

"An accusation of bias or prejudice against a judge . . . strikes at the very core of judicial integrity and tends to undermine public confidence in the established judiciary . . . Because such a charge implicates basic concepts of fair trial . . . and because [n]o more elementary statement concerning the judiciary can be made than that the conduct of the trial judge must be characterized by the highest degree of impartiality . . . Our Supreme Court has indicated that, where there is a factual dispute involved in a claim of judicial bias, an evidentiary hearing may be in order, and it has implied that such a hearing be before another judge.

"In Connecticut, the disqualification of judges is governed by General Statutes 51-39 and Canon 3C of the Code of Judicial Conduct . . . General Statutes 51-39, which deals with disqualification by reason of the judge's relationship with a specific party or potential interest in the outcome of the proceedings . . . is not involved in this [matter].

. . .

"[T]he procedure to be employed [for raising a claim of judicial disqualification] must take into account various principles which may, at times, compete with each other. Among these principles are: (1) that the integrity of the judicial system requires both the fact and the appearance of impartiality; . . . (2) that a party who has a good faith belief, grounded on facts, that a judge is biased is entitled to demonstrate that bias; and (3) that the due administration of justice requires that such a demonstration be based on more than opinion or conclusion." (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) Szypula v. Szypula, supra, 2 Conn.App. 653-55.

". . . It has long been settled that the bias or prejudice sufficient to result in a disqualification must stem from an extrajudicial [i.e., outside court or out-of-court] source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case . . . The question then becomes whether an objective observer reasonably would doubt the judge's impartiality given the circumstances . . . If an objective observer, in view of all of the facts would reasonably doubt the court's impartiality, the court's discretion would be abused if a motion to recuse were not granted . . ." (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) Joyner v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 55 Conn.App. 608-09.

In Joyner, the Appellate Court listed a "myriad" of cases in which judges' impartiality had not been shown to be sufficiently compromised to warrant recusal. Id., at 610-12. "Facts common to all of those cases upholding the denial of a motion to recuse are that the bias involved one of the parties or their present counsel, or a witness, rather than a potential or putative witness, and that even when the claim concerned an extrajudicial or ex parte event or situation related to the case pending before the trial court, recusal was not necessary unless, objectively, a reasonable person would view the failure to recuse as a strike at the core of judicial integrity that undermines public confidence in the judiciary." (Emphasis in original.) Id., at 612.¹

1 Several of the myriad of cases involve claims against judges based on their involvement in preceding proceedings or the tenor of interactions or rulings by judges vis-a-vis a litigant.

The defendant here was given the opportunity to present his case regarding his allegations against the named judges. He failed to present any evidence. It is a fundamental tenet that it is improper for a court to award relief in the absence of evidence substantiating a claim. If this were not true, relief would be granted on speculation and conjecture. Cf. Schmidt v. Schmidt, 180 Conn. 184, 190, 429 A.2d 470 (1980). Moreover, neither representations made by counsel or a pro se litigant,² nor unsupported conclusory allegations,³ are evidence and cannot be viewed as tending to prove allegations made by the defendant.

2 See, e.g., State v. Ross, 269 Conn. 213, 274, 849 A.2d 648 (2004) (en banc); Savage v. Savage, 25 Conn.App. 693, 696, 596 A.2d 23 (1991).

3 See, e.g., Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, 228 Conn. 158, 176, 635 A.2d 783 (1993); Angle v. Angle, 100 Conn.App. 763, 766 n. 4, 920 A.2d 1018 (2007).

Because no evidence was presented in support of the defendant's allegations, the court finds that the defendant has failed to move beyond the realm of speculation and conjecture and has not demonstrated that there is any merit whatsoever to his allegations. The court finds no factual or legal basis to disqualify the judges who have over time heard the defendant's cases from any future involvement in the instant matter. Here, there is no proof presented by the defendant that any judge was biased or appeared to be biased, or that anything extrajudicial affected a judge, that would call into question any of the judges' respective ability to impartially decide the case. The motion to disqualify is Denied.

It is so ordered.