Stacy v. Van Buren

Full title: MARTHA STACY, PETITIONER, v. GINNY VAN BUREN, WARDEN, FMC-CARSWELL…

Court: United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Fort Worth Division

Date published: Feb 4, 2005

Civil Action No. 4:04-CV-0697-Y (N.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2005)

Opinion

Civil Action No. 4:04-CV-0697-Y.

February 4, 2005

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND NOTICE AND ORDER

CHARLES BLEIL, Magistrate Judge

This cause of action was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), as implemented by an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The findings, conclusions and recommendations of the United States Magistrate Judge are as follows:

I. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

A. NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a federal prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

B. PARTIES

Petitioner Martha Stacy, Reg. No. 91059-079, is a federal prisoner who was confined in the Federal Medical Center-Carswell (FMC-Carswell) in Fort Worth, Texas, at the time the petition was filed.¹ Respondent Ginny Van Buren is Warden of FMC-Carswell.

1 The Federal Bureau of Prisons Inmate Locator reflects Stacy's current location as New Orleans CCM, 501 Magazine Street, New Orleans, Louisiana 70113. U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons/Inmate Locator, available at http://www.bop.gov.

C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Stacy is serving 36 months' imprisonment for two 2002 criminal convictions in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. (Resp't Appendix at 6-8.) Her projected release date is April 26, 2005. ( Id. at 5.) On September 23, 2004, Stacy filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus in this division challenging the Bureau of Prison's denial of time credit for home detention. On December 20, 2004, Van Buren filed a response with supporting brief and documentary exhibits, to which Stacy has not timely replied.

D. EXHAUSTION

Van Buren asserts inter alia that the petition should be dismissed because Stacy has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Federal prisoners must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking habeas relief in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Fuller v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5^th Cir. 1994). Exceptions to the exhaustion requirement apply only in "extraordinary circumstances" when administrative remedies are unavailable or wholly inappropriate to the relief sought, or where the attempt to exhaust such remedies would itself be a patently futile course of action." Id.

Stacy admits that she did not pursue her administrative remedies and argues that she should not be required to do so because "administrative remedies are not available, nor pertinent to this writ." (Petition at 2.) Because Stacy is scheduled for release in less than three months, adherence to the exhaustion requirement in this case would serve no purpose other than delay. Thus, the court will address her claim on the merits.

E. DISCUSSION

Stacy contends that she is entitled to time credit for 36 months spent in home detention prior to her sentence commencing and that she was not informed that time spent in home confinement would not be credited against her sentence.² ( Id.) See 18 U.S.C. § 3585A(b). Stacy has not, however, demonstrated an adequate factual basis for her claim nor is she entitled to credit for any time spent in home confinement.³,⁴ See Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995);⁵ United States v. Cleto, 956 F.2d 83, 84-85 (5^th Cir. 1992).

2 18 U.S.C. § 3585, entitled "Calculation of a term of imprisonment," determines when a federal sentence of imprisonment commences and whether credit against that sentence must be granted for time spent in "official detention" before the sentence began. The Bureau of Prison's interpretation of "official detention" for purposes of the statute does not include time spent in home confinement. See Program Statement 5880.28(c), U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons/Freedom of Information Act/Policy/Bureau Program Statements (policies), available at http://www.bop.gov.

3 Stacy refers to an order by Judge Hinojosa that she be confined to home detention during certain relevant time periods, but she does not state the terms of her home confinement or provide a copy of the order, and a copy of the order is not available through the Southern District's PACER electronic document system. See PACER, Criminal Docket for Case No. 7:99-CR-0553. (Petition at 2.) Moreover, Al Munguia, a Supervisory Attorney at FMC-Carswell, reviewed Stacy's records and found nothing to indicate that she was sentenced to serve home confinement. (Resp't Appendix at 2.)

4 Most of the circuits to address the precise issue have concluded that home confinement is not "official detention" for purposes of the sentencing credit statute. See, e.g., United States v. Hager, 288 F.3d 136, 138-39 (4^th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 962 (2002) (providing home confinement is not "official detention" for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)); Cucciniello v. Keller, 137 F.3d 721, 722-25 (2^nd Cir. 1998) (same); Rodriguez v. Lamer, 60 F.3d 745, 747-48 (11^th Cir. 1995) (same); Edwards v. United States, 41 F.3d 154, 156-57 (3^rd Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1133 (1995) (same); Fraley v. U.S. Bur. of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924, 924-25 (9^th Cir. 1993) (same); Starchild v. Fed. Bur. of Prisons, 973 F.2d 610, 611 (8^th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. Becak, 954 F.2d 386, 387-88 (6^th Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 945 (1992) (same); United States v. Zackular, 945 F.2d 423, 425 (1^st Cir. 1991) (same).

5 Stacy's attempt to distinguish home confinement from a community treatment center, as was the case in Koray, is unpersuasive.

II. RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Stacy's petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied.

III. NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), each party to this action has the right to serve and file specific written objections in the United States District Court to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation within ten (10) days after the party has been served with a copy of this document. The court is extending the deadline within which to file specific written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation until February 25, 2005. The United States District Judge need only make a de novo determination of those portions of the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation to which specific objection is timely made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(B)(1). Failure to file by the date stated above a specific written objection to a proposed factual finding or legal conclusion will bar a party, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice, from attacking on appeal any such proposed factual finding or legal conclusion accepted by the United States District Judge. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5^th Cir. 1996) (en banc op. on reh'g); Carter v. Collins, 918 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5^th Cir. 1990).

IV. ORDER

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, it is ORDERED that each party is granted until February 25, 2005, to serve and file written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation. It is further ORDERED that if objections are filed and the opposing party chooses to file a response, a response shall be filed within seven (7) days of the filing date of the objections.

It is further ORDERED that the above-styled and numbered action, previously referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for findings, conclusions, and recommendation, be and hereby is returned to the docket of the United States District Judge.