Stacy v. Ametek, Inc.

7 Citing cases

  1. Halleck v. Coastal Bldg. Maintenance Co.

    269 Ill. App. 3d 887 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)   Cited 38 times
    Holding that although exclusion of testimony was erroneous, it did not constitute reversible error as excluded testimony was cumulative of other evidence presented at trial

    ( Higginbottom, 232 Ill. App.3d at 257.) Courts have consistently found settlements in good faith where, as here, the plaintiff received a lump sum amount and a waiver of the employer's worker's compensation lien. ( E.g., Wilson, 131 Ill.2d at 319; Alvarez, 247 Ill. App.3d at 816; Stacy v. Ametek, Inc. (1990), 205 Ill. App.3d 58, 60-61.) The record in the present case establishes — and plaintiff admits in her brief — that in consideration of her acceptance of a $75,000 lump sum payment, Marshall Field agreed to waive its right of subrogation under section 5(b) of the Workers' Compensation Act. ( 820 ILCS 305/5(b) (West 1992).

  2. Alvarez v. Fred Hintze Construction

    247 Ill. App. 3d 811 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that a settlement is not unreasonable just because "the plaintiff's actual damages exceed the amount of the settlement" when the claim was for over $1 million and the settlement was for $400,000

    We disagree with the defendants' argument. Initially, we note that the Contribution Act allows a tortfeasor, who settles with a claimant in good faith, to be discharged from liability for contribution to any other tortfeasors. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 70, pars. 302(c), (d); Dixon v. Chicago North Western Transportation Co. (1992), 151 Ill.2d 108, 114, 601 N.E.2d 704, 706.) It has been uniformly held in Illinois that an employer from whom contribution is sought can make a good-faith settlement of a workers' compensation claim with its employee and thus be discharged from contribution liability to nonsettling defendants. Wilson v. Hoffman Group, Inc. (1989), 131 Ill.2d 308, 318-19, 546 N.E.2d 524, 529; Higginbottom v. Pillsbury Co. (1992), 232 Ill. App.3d 240, 247, 596 N.E.2d at 843, 848; Stacy v. Ametek, Inc. (1990), 205 Ill. App.3d 58, 60-61, 562 N.E.2d 1180, 1182; Banks v. R.D. Werner Co. (1990), 201 Ill. App.3d 762, 559 N.E.2d 217. • 1 Accordingly, we find that the dismissal of the defendants' third-party complaints against Alberico was perfectly permissible under the Contribution Act so long as the settlement was made in good faith.

  3. Gillon v. Eu Ting

    Civil Action No. 2:12-cv-07558 (DMC) (JBC) (D.N.J. Sep. 20, 2013)   Cited 1 times

    See Laser Tech., Inc. v. Tyson, Civ. No. 99-1994, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12261, at *19 n.17 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 2002) ("The settlement agreement necessarily implies a release of claims even though the 'Outline of Settlement' does not specifically state as much."); J.V. Distrib., Inc. v. Waber, Inc., Civ. No. 94-3053, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12202, at *24 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 1995) ("Where terms of a contract are otherwise sufficiently definite, the court may supply an omitted term, which is reasonably based on the contract as a whole."); Stacy v. Ametck, Inc., 562 N.E.2d 1180, 1182 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) ("Thus, it is the existence of a settlement agreement that is important here, not the execution of a written release. Stacy's acceptance of the settlement agreement amounted to an implied release and would be an affirmative defense in any action to impose additional liability upon Dow.").

  4. Adgooroo, LLC v. Jim Hechtman & the Hechtman Grp., Ltd.

    2016 Ill. App. 142531 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)

    Kalis v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 337 Ill. App. 3d 898, 900-01 (2003); F.H. Prince & Co. v. Towers Financial Corp., 275 Ill. App. 3d 792, 799 (1995); In re Estate of Herwig, 237 Ill. App. 3d 737, 741 (1992). It is not necessary that a person waiving a cause of action receive satisfaction in money. See, e.g., Wilson v. Hoffman Group, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 308, 321 (1989) (waiver of worker's compensation lien was held to constitute consideration); Stacy v. Ametek, Inc., 205 Ill. App. 3d 58, 61 (1990) (same). ¶ 36 Each side to the settlement received a benefit.

  5. LARD v. AM/FM OHIO

    901 N.E.2d 1006 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)   Cited 10 times
    In Lard, a stairwell pileup at a nightclub resulted in 22 wrongful death claims and more than 70 personal injury claims.

    The Contribution Act does not set forth a specific form that a release must take and does not even require the release to be in writing. Stacey v. Ametek, Inc., 205 Ill. App. 3d 58, 61 (1990) ("it is the existence of a settlement agreement that is important here, not the execution of a written release"). Plaintiffs' acceptance of the settlement agreement amounted to an implied release and would be an affirmative defense in any action to impose additional liability upon the settling defendants. The terms of the orders submitted by the plaintiffs and settling defendants and signed by the trial court on October 25, 2006, and May 24, 2007, were negotiated by the settling parties and entered into voluntarily.

  6. Lard v. AM/FM Ohio, Inc.

    387 Ill. App. 3d 915 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)   Cited 9 times
    Non-settling defendant "generally has a burden of proof" to establish that setoff is proper based on settlements by other defendants in the same case

    The Contribution Act does not set forth a specific form that a release must take and does not even require the release to be in writing. Stacey v. Ametek, Inc., 205 Ill. App. 3d 58, 61 (1990) ("it is the existence of a settlement agreement that is important here, not the execution of a written release"). Plaintiffs' acceptance of the settlement agreement amounted to an implied release and would be an affirmative defense in any action to impose additional liability upon the settling defendants. The terms of the orders submitted by the plaintiffs and settling defendants and signed by the trial court on October 25, 2006, and May 24, 2007, were negotiated by the settling parties and entered into voluntarily.

  7. Higginbottom v. Pillsbury Co.

    596 N.E.2d 843 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 17 times
    In Higginbottom, the plaintiff filed suit against the defendant for the negligent construction of a guardhouse in which he was injured while working as a security guard.

    The above italicized provision of the settlement agreement indicates, on its face, that there was consideration for the agreement and that the consideration was not illusory; plaintiff received $12,135 plus payment of future medical expenses, not to exceed $15,000 in total settlement of any and all present and future claims plaintiff may have against his employer as a result of this accident. Moreover, plaintiff's acceptance of the settlement agreement amounts to an implied release and would be an affirmative defense to any action to impose additional liability upon Yale. ( Stacy v. Ametek, Inc. (1990), 205 Ill. App.3d 58, 61, 562 N.E.2d 1180, 1182.) In addition, because Yale was potentially subject to liability in tort by its employee until the defense was established and thus was also subject to liability as a joint tortfeasor under the Contribution Act, the settlement was supported by consideration.