Stack v. Mason

6 Citing cases

  1. Stack v. Mason & Assocs.

    552 U.S. 1142 (2008)

    Peter G. STACK, et ux., petitioners, v. MASON & ASSOCIATES, et al.Case below, 245 Fed.Appx. 920. *1078 Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied.

  2. Demetrius Yvonne Parks v. Ala. Bd. of Pharmacy

    CASE NO. 2:20-CV-304-KFP (M.D. Ala. Jun. 22, 2021)

    Although Rooker-Feldman may generally not apply where a plaintiff did not have a reasonable opportunity to raise her federal claim in state proceedings, see Casale, 558 F.3d at 1260, the Eleventh Circuit has nevertheless applied Rooker-Feldman when a plaintiff's federal claim amounts to nothing more than "an invitation for the district court to review judgments entered against [her] by . . . state courts." Stack v. Mason & Assocs., 245 F. App'x 920, 923-24 (11th Cir. 2007). In Stack, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's antitrust claims under Rooker-Feldman.

  3. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust v. Boone

    No. 2:16-cv-0660 JAM GGH PS (E.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2016)

    Accordingly, to the extent Harris' removal is an attempt to have this Court review, reverse, or invalidate the state court's writ of possession, it must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Stack v. Mason & Assocs., 245 F. App'x 920, 923-24 (11th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (unpublished).Furthermore, while defendants may seek to raise counterclaims based on federal law in response to plaintiff's foreclosure/unlawful detainer claim, any counterclaim based on federal law must generally be raised in the state court action and does not provide a basis for removal. "[A] federal counterclaim, even when compulsory, does not establish 'arising under' jurisdiction."

  4. Henggeler v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

    Case No. 5:10-cv-535-Oc-10TBS (M.D. Fla. Sep. 19, 2011)

    Under these circumstances, the Court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction under Rooker/Feldman. See Parker v. Potter, 368 Fed. Appx. 945, 2010 WL 892846 (11th Cir. Mar. 15, 2010); Velardo v. Fremont Investment & Loan, 298 Fed. Appx. 890, 2008 WL 4768850 (11th Cir. Nov. 3, 2008); Stack v. Mason & Associates, 245 Fed. Appx. 920, 2007 WL 2415177 (11th Cir. Aug. 24, 2007); Harper v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 138 Fed. Appx. 130, 2005 WL 954331 (11th Cir. April 25, 2005); Aboyade-Cole Bey v. BankAtlantic, No. 6:09-cv-1572-Orl-31GJK, 2010 WL 3069102 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2010).

  5. Stephens v. Seidman

    Case No. 5:11-cv-16-Oc-10KRS (M.D. Fla. Jul. 26, 2011)   Cited 1 times
    Denying a temporary restraining order because, "[a]lthough the [p]laintiff has couched several of her claims as violations of federal law, what she is really asking is for this [c]ourt to review a final state court judgment."

    As such, the Plaintiff's Complaint is without a doubt an invitation to review a judgment against the Plaintiff by a Florida state court. Regardless of the language used, there can be no other conclusion in this case that the Plaintiff is requesting this Court to impermissibly interfere in state court proceedings. See Stack v. Mason Associates, 245 Fed. Appx. 920, 2007 WL 2415177 (11th Cir. Aug. 24, 2007) (holding that RICO conspiracy violations, Sherman Antitrust Act violations, and common law fraud claims, all of which related to a state court foreclosure proceeding, were barred under Rooker-Feldman). See also Aboyade-Cole Bey v. BankAtlantic, No. 6:09-cv-1572-Orl-31GJK, 2010 WL 3069102 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2010).

  6. Wade v. Gaither

    623 F. Supp. 2d 1277 (D. Utah 2009)   Cited 4 times
    Finding that two or three instances of extortion over a period of nearly twelve months sufficient to establish continuity

    The Court notes as well that there is at least some precedent suggesting, albeit in dicta largely unrelated to ยง 1951, that an attorney-client fee arrangement could be considered extortionate. See Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 360 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing fee limitations in veterans claims cases which were "designed to protect the veteran from extortion or improvident bargains with unscrupulous lawyers."); see also Taylor v. Bemiss, 110 U.S. 42, 45 (1884) (where it can be shown that a contingent fee arrangement, for example, is obtained "by any undue influence of the attorney over the client, or by any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is clearly excessive, so as to amount to extortion, the court will in a proper case protect the party aggrieved."); c.f. Stack v. Mason Assoc., 245 Fed. Appx. 920, 923-24; 2007 WL 2415177, at *2 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirming district court's dismissal of a RICO suit alleging extortion by plaintiff's former defense attorneys due to "unreasonably high costs and fees" because a state court had already reviewed the fees charged and found them reasonable). In considering the factual allegations at issue here, the Court cannot say that it "appears to a certainty that the plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim."