Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
PROCEEDINGS in mandate after referral to a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. San Diego County Super. Ct. No. NJ13305, Michael J. Imhoff, Commissioner.
HALLER, Acting P. J.
Stacie T. seeks writ review of juvenile court orders terminating reunification services and setting a permanency plan selection and implementation hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 for her daughter, Angelina T. We deny the petition.
Unless otherwise indicated, further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Stacie T. is the mother of Angelina T., born February 2006. When Angelina was born, hospital personnel were concerned about Stacie's mental health and her inability or unwillingness to provide information about the whereabouts of her three other children. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) subsequently learned that the State of Florida had terminated Stacie's parental rights to her other children after she was unable to reunify with them. Stacie then moved to California while pregnant with Angelina to avoid further involvement with Florida child protective services.
Angelina's father (Stacie's husband) was deported and did not participate in the dependency proceedings.
On March 1, 2006, the Agency filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (b) alleging Stacie could not provide regular care for Angelina. Based on reports and court documents received from a Florida county Department of Children and Families, the petition alleged Stacie had bipolar disorder, borderline personality disorder and low intellectual functioning, and her parental rights to three older children were terminated in September 2005. The Agency asked the court to bypass reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
On April 5, 2006, the court sustained the section 300 petition and ordered the Agency to submit a plan of family reunification services. The court directed Stacie to complete psychological and medication evaluations. The initial case plan required Stacie to participate in court-ordered evaluations, general counseling, parenting education, supervised visitation, and a domestic violence prevention plan.
Steven T. Griggs, Ph.D., conducted a psychological evaluation of Stacie. Dr. Griggs concluded that Stacie had an adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, learning disorder, low average or borderline intellectual functioning, cerebral palsy in partial remission, morbid obesity, and a problematic family history. Of these, Stacie's low intellectual functioning was the biggest concern. Dr. Griggs opined that Stacie "will likely always need some sort of supervision with her children." He believed Stacie would be able to demonstrate minor improvements in behavior over time but did not foresee any major improvement in her innate abilities.
During the first six-month review period, the Agency reported that it provided case management services, referrals for parenting classes, domestic violence group therapy, a psychological evaluation, individual therapy and visitation services to Stacie. Stacie had supervised visits with Angelina three to four hours each week. Fred Alpern, Ph.D., was Stacie's therapist. Dr. Alpern counseled Stacie on improving her parenting, coping and relational skills. By September 2006 Dr. Alpern believed Stacie had demonstrated sufficient "emotional stability and parental awareness . . . to warrant cautiously beginning unsupervised visits with her daughter Angelina."
On November 14, 2006, at the six-month review hearing, the court found that Stacie made moderate progress with her case plan. The court directed the Agency to implement weekly unsupervised visits, initially in a therapeutic setting with Dr. Alpern, and then to expand visitation as appropriate.
In May 2007 the Agency reported that Stacie was in physical compliance with all components of the case plan but the Agency found it difficult to measure Stacie's understanding of what she had learned. Because of scheduling difficulties, unsupervised visitation did not begin until mid-December 2006 and did not occur on a regular weekly basis until February 2007. By the 12-month hearing, Stacie had unsupervised visits with Angelina four hours each week, in addition to twice weekly supervised visits. The court found that Stacie was making progress and extended reunification services to August 28, the 18-month review date.
In August 2007 the Agency reported that Stacie had unsupervised visitation with Angelina 10 hours each week. Additional in-home services were provided by the Intensive Family Preservation Program (IFPP), Public Health Nurse (PHN) and Community Services to Family (CFS). In its report, the Agency detailed problems that had occurred during visitation throughout the case. The Agency concluded that Stacie was unable to adequately care for Angelina for more than a few hours without supervision, and recommended the court terminate reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
On September 27, 2007, the Agency filed a section 388 petition requesting the court change its prior visitation order to allow only supervised visitation between Stacie and Angelina. The Agency alleged: Stacie was exposing Angelina to individuals in her home who had not been cleared by the Agency; in September Stacie fed Angelina yogurt that had an expiration date of April 13, 2007; and Stacie gave Tylenol and Motrin to Angelina when Angelina did not have a fever. The court found that the section 388 petition stated a prima facie case, ordered supervised and liberal visitation, and set the matter for hearing.
A combined hearing on the Agency's section 388 petition and the 18-month review hearing was held on December 7, 10, and 18, 2007, and January 14 and 16, 2008. The court received in evidence the Agency's reports of June 29, September 12, October 5, 2006 and April 5, May 25, August 28, and September 27, 2007, and exhibits. The court heard testimony from Dr. Alpern, social worker Mercedes Gonzales-San Pedro, CFS parent educator Kerrie Nolasco, the foster mother, Stacie, and two of Stacie's friends.
We summarize only the evidence relevant to the issue raised in this appellate proceeding—whether reasonable services were provided to Stacie.
Dr. Alpern testified he provided therapeutic services to Stacie from March 20, 2006, to date, with two significant two-month interruptions in services caused by payment problems. Dr. Alpern opined that in-home support services were helpful and perhaps essential for Stacie. Stacie had an I.Q. of 83. Although the range for a diagnosis for borderline intellectual functioning was between 70 and 84, based on his observations, Dr. Alpern believed Stacie functioned at the "bottom level of the normative range of intelligence." Stacie had shown the capacity to live on her own, hold down a job and perform other life responsibilities. Dr. Alpern opined that with enough support and learning, Stacie would "eventually" be able to parent Angelina. Dr. Alpern opposed Angelina's immediate return to Stacie's custody.
Social worker Gonzales-San Pedro testified IFPP and PHN in-home services began in July or August 2007. Implementation of in-home services was delayed by Stacie's concerns that in-home services would reduce her time with Angelina. IFPP terminated its services to Stacie because IFPP protocol did not permit it to provide in-home services unless the child would be returned home within 60 days. For the same reason, PHN no longer provided in-home services. In August Gonzales-San Pedro arranged for CFS to provide in-home teaching and parenting support to Stacie. Gonzales-San Pedro was not aware of any additional services the Agency could have provided to help Stacie improve her parenting skills.
Kerrie Nolasco was the CFS parent educator. Nolasco received a referral from the Agency on August 16 to provide in-home parenting skills, nutrition and child safety services to Stacie. Parenting skills included communication and discipline, child development and self-esteem. Nolasco had had six sessions with Stacie.
Stacie testified that she benefitted from services and was willing to continue services. In Florida, she participated in three years of counseling, parenting classes and visits. Stacie did everything social services asked her to do.
The court found that returning Angelina to Stacie's custody would be detrimental to the child. Stacie needed to find suitable housing and to improve her judgment and understanding of child development. The court opined that the case was a difficult one. The court noted that Stacie was proactive, well-intentioned and steadfast in her love for Angelina, and determined that Stacie was capable of learning to parent over time. However, her understanding of parenting was not sufficiently ingrained to support progressive improvements in her judgment. Stacie followed through with services but her progress was "incremental."
The court found by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable services were provided to prevent or eliminate the need for Angelina's removal from parental custody. The court noted there was a delay in providing in-home services to Stacie but in general the services were timely. In making its finding of reasonable services, the court considered that in-home services had been in place since August and the case was now five months past the 18-month hearing date. The court denied the Agency's section 388 petition for supervised visitation, terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
Stacie petitions for review of the court's orders under California Rules of Court, rule 8.452. This court issued an order to show cause, the Agency responded, and the parties waived oral argument.
DISCUSSION
I Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding Reasonable Services Were Offered or Provided to Stacie
A
Stacie contends the court erred when it terminated reunification services and set a permanency plan hearing under section 366.26. She asserts the services provided by the Agency were not reasonably structured to help her become an effective parent; rather the Agency assumed Stacie was incompetent and unreasonably delayed implementing unsupervised visitation and in-home services. Stacie argues that if the Agency had provided unsupervised visitation and in-home support services earlier in the proceedings, and housing and financial assistance, she would have been able to reunify with Angelina at the 18-month review hearing.
The Agency contends substantial evidence supports the court's finding that reasonable services were offered or provided to Stacie. Stacie was provided services for almost 23 months. The services reasonably addressed the concerns identified by the social worker and by Dr. Griggs at the beginning of the proceedings. The Agency argues there is no evidence to support Stacie's argument that she would have been able to resume custody of Angelina had additional services been offered.
B
Family reunification services play a crucial role in dependency proceedings. (In re Alanna A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 555, 563; In re Joshua M. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 458.) The purpose of the reunification plan is "to overcome the problem that led to removal in the first place." (Blanca P. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1738, 1748.) Any reunification plan must take into account the special needs of a parent who is physically disabled, developmentally delayed or mentally ill. (See In re Elizabeth R. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th at 1774, 1792 (Elizabeth R.); In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545-546; In re Victoria M. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1317, 1320.) If reasonable services are not provided to the family, the court is required to continue the case for the period of time permitted by statute. (§ 366.21, subds. (e), (g)(1).)
To support a finding of reasonable services, "the record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult . . . ." (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414.) "The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances." (In re Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547.)
When a finding that reunification services were adequate is challenged on review, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's order, drawing every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in favor of the prevailing party. (Melinda K. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1158; In re Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 545.) Even if there is no substantial conflict in the evidence, we must nevertheless draw all legitimate inferences in support of the findings of the juvenile court. (Melinda K. v. Superior Court, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 1158.)
C
Stacie asserts the Agency did not correctly identify the problems that led to the loss of custody and as a result did not timely provide reasonable visitation and in-home services. We disagree. The record shows that during the first six-month period, reunification services were reasonably focused on evaluating and improving Stacie's parenting skills. Stacy began participating in individual therapy in March 2006, before the jurisdiction hearing. In June Dr. Griggs recommended that visitation remain supervised due to Stacie's cognitive deficits. He estimated Stacie's chronological age equivalency at 13 years, three months. In September Dr. Alpern opined that the court could "cautiously" implement unsupervised visitation. In view of Dr. Grigg's recommendations and Angelina's infancy, the Agency did not act unreasonably when it maintained supervised visitation until the six-month review hearing.
At the six-month review hearing, the court directed the Agency to implement unsupervised visits in a therapeutic setting. The Agency was not able to immediately implement unsupervised visitation because Dr. Alpern was on vacation. After four therapeutic visits with Dr. Alpern, the Agency expanded Stacie's unsupervised visitation with Angelina to four hours each week. Thus, the record shows the Agency reasonably complied with the court's order for unsupervised visitation.
The Agency noted problems with Stacie's care of Angelina during unsupervised visits. During the first unsupervised visit outside a therapeutic setting, Stacie fed Angelina bananas, baby food, soup, ham, baby food desserts and a bottle within a relatively short period of time. When the foster mother arrived, Angelina was screaming hysterically and Stacie was still trying to give her a bottle. When she returned to the foster home, Angelina vomited and had diarrhea. On another visit, the foster mother told Stacie that Angelina had bronchitis and asked her to keep Angelina warm and stay indoors. Stacie took Angelina outside in blustery weather. Angelina's symptoms worsened, necessitating an emergency medical visit. Under the circumstances, the Agency acted reasonably when it did not expand unsupervised visitation.
At the May 2007 12-month hearing, the court authorized the Agency to implement overnight visits and asked the Agency to utilize the services of the PHN in connection with overnights. The Agency made a referral to IFPP in July. After a case consultation, the Agency decided to "do a .26 at the next court hearing" and denied the request for IFPP funding. The social worker then implemented in-home services with PHN and CFS. By August 2007 the Agency had expanded Stacie's unsupervised visitation to 10 hours each week.
The Agency continued to note problems during visitation. During two of the visits, Stacie did not feed Angelina a meal and Angelina was hungry after the visits. On another visit, Stacie gave Angelina doses of Tylenol and Motrin even though Angelina was not ill and did not have a fever. The social worker believed Stacie was unable to safely parent Angelina for more than a few hours without supervision. In September Stacie fed Angelina yogurt that had an April expiration date. The PHN advised this could have caused Angelina to have food poisoning or diarrhea. Pending hearing on the Agency's section 388 petition, the court then imposed liberal, supervised visitation. In November Stacie refused the Agency's offer to increase supervised visits, stating that she would rather not have additional visitation than risk negative reports about her interactions with Angelina. The Agency continued to provide individual therapy and CFS in-home services to Stacie. These services were ongoing in January 2008.
Stacie also asserts services were deficient because the Agency did not assist her with housing and finances. The record shows that Stacie was able to hold a job and support herself. With respect to housing, Stacie relied on roommates to help meet her expenses. This situation was an ongoing source of frustration for her. In early 2007 social worker Gonzales-San Pedro referred Stacie to Community Housing Works and other community housing resources for information about low-income housing. CFS provider Nolasco was able to provide resource referrals for low-income housing to Stacie but she was not advised that Stacie was having difficulty maintaining housing. Stacie looked into the financial and housing resources that were available if Angelina was returned to her care.
The record indicates the Agency reasonably responded to Stacie's concerns about her housing situation. Stacie was able to investigate available resources. Nolasco was prepared to assist her if asked. Further, even if Stacie had improved her housing and financial circumstances, she would not have been able to reunify with Angelina without demonstrating competent parenting skills and judgment. Thus, the Agency reasonably emphasized the importance of parenting services, and its referrals for housing support were reasonable under the circumstances. (In re Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547.)
Our review of the record shows that from March 2006 to January 2008 Agency provided Stacie with services reasonably designed to identify and remedy the problems that led to Angelina's placement in foster care. (See In re Riva M., supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 414.) These services included a psychological evaluation, individual therapy, parenting classes, a domestic violence plan, visitation assistance and in-home services. Services were reasonably designed to improve Stacie's parenting skills so that she could safely parent Angelina. (Ibid.) Stacie also acknowledged she had participated in similar services in Florida. Although the Agency disagreed with Dr. Alpern's recommendations for increased unsupervised and overnight visits, it implemented court orders for expanded visitation while safeguarding Angelina's needs for competent and safe parenting.
The Agency is not required to provide "the best [services] that might be provided in an ideal world." (In re Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547.) We note the court found that implementation of in-home services was delayed. There were two significant interruptions in therapy caused by administrative problems. Stacie's mistrust of the Agency also impeded services on occasion. On review, the Agency acknowledges the services Stacie received may not have been "perfect." (Ibid.)
Despite these imperfections, the record shows that the Agency made a good faith effort to identify and address Stacie's problems, maintained consistent contact with Stacie throughout the proceedings, offered visitation consistent with Angelina's age-appropriate needs, and provided ongoing and generally timely services from March 2006 to January 2008. (In re Riva M., supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 414.) Despite Stacie's consistent and determined efforts, she was unable to demonstrate more than a minimal understanding of parenting. Substantial evidence supports the court's finding the services offered or provided to Stacie were reasonable under the circumstances. (In re Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547.)
II The Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion When it Did Not Continue the Case Past the 18-Month Review Date
When a parent has extraordinary special needs or has been prevented from participating in reunification services by extraordinary circumstances involving "some external factor," the court may continue services past the 18-month review date. (Denny H. v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1510-1511; Elizabeth R., supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1789-1796; In re Daniel G. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1205; In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1763, 1774-1775.) Here, Stacie contends the court erred when it did not extend services past the 18-month hearing date. The Agency disagrees.
In its thoughtful and well-reasoned remarks, the court stated that it did not believe Stacie's circumstances were similar to the mentally ill, hospitalized parent in Elizabeth R. However, assuming Elizabeth R. applied, the court explained that it would not have exercised its discretion to continue reunification services in view of Stacie's insufficient progress, Angelina's age and needs, and the extended length of the reunification period, then approaching the 23-month date. (See § 366.22, subd. (a); 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) [when a child has been in foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months, the State shall file a petition to terminate parental rights].)
We conclude that the court correctly determined that Elizabeth R. did not apply. Stacie was not prevented from participating in reunification services by any external factor, and in fact continued to receive services for almost five months after the 18-month review date. There was no evidence to support a finding that Stacie was on the verge of reunification; Dr. Alpern believed Stacie would "eventually" be capable of parenting with continued services. (See In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310 ["Childhood does not wait for the parent to become adequate"].) An extension of services was not warranted. (Denny H. v. Superior Court, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1510-1511; In re Brequia Y. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1060, 1067-1068.) The court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to extend services.
DISPOSITION
The petition is denied.
WE CONCUR: McDONALD, J., AARON, J.