The precise question presented is whether Carson, at the time of receiving his fatal injuries, was an officer of the corporation within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as it is conceded that he never elected to apply to the commission "to become entitled as a workman to the compensation benefits thereof". Having in mind the fact that the Workmen's Compensation Act was passed for the benefit of the laboring class and that it should be liberally construed to the end that it may effectuate its purpose ( Stacey v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 145 Or. 195 ( 26 P.2d 1092)), we believe it was never intended that an employee, being an officer of a corporation in name only and having no voice in determining the policy of the company, should be precluded from receiving benefits under the act. An officer of a corporation, within the meaning of the act, should at least have some financial interest in the company and have a voice in its management. If the evidence offered on behalf of the plaintiff be given full credit, Carson was, to all intents and purposes, an ordinary workman, dependent upon his weekly wage for his livelihood.