Opinion
110,862.
02-06-2015
Christopher STABEL, Appellant, v. KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee.
J. Scott Koksal, of Linder, Marquez & Koksal, of Garden City, for appellant. John D. Shultz, of Legal Services Bureau, Kansas Department of Revenue, for appellee.
J. Scott Koksal, of Linder, Marquez & Koksal, of Garden City, for appellant.
John D. Shultz, of Legal Services Bureau, Kansas Department of Revenue, for appellee.
Before MALONE, C.J., BRUNS, J., and RICHARD B. WALKER, District Judge, assigned.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Christopher Stabel appeals the district court's decision upholding his driver's license suspension by the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDR). Stabel's only claim on appeal is that the investigating officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe he was operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol; thus, the officer had no statutory authority to request a breath test. For the reasons explained herein, we affirm the district court's judgment.
On May 26, 2012, at approximately 2:26 a.m., Deputy Danny Case of the Finney County Sheriff's Office responded to the report of an accident in Garden City, Kansas. When Case arrived on the scene, he saw a black vehicle that had hit a utility pole. There was extensive property damage to the pole and the vehicle, which was no longer drivable. When asked by Case, Stabel readily admitted that he had been driving the vehicle.
Stabel told Case that he did not need medical attention, and Case later testified that Stabel did not appear injured and was able to clearly communicate. At first, he denied drinking alcohol, but later admitted that he had consumed a couple of drinks. Stabel told Case that he was on his way home to Lakin, Kansas, when the accident occurred. When Case pointed out that the vehicle appeared to be heading in the opposite direction of Lakin, Stabel said that he had been following directions from his GPS device.
Case smelled a faint odor of alcoholic beverage on Stabel's breath and Stabel's eyes were bloodshot. Although Case noted in his investigative report that Stabel's speech was slurred, he clarified in later testimony that Stabel's speech was not “slurred”; rather, it was slower and more drawn out than usual. Case testified he had been trained that slower speech was an indicator of intoxication. Case did not ask Stabel to perform field sobriety tests. Instead, Case arrested Stabel and took him to the police station, where he called Corporal Scott Chalmers, who administered an Intoxilyzer breath test. The breath test result was .15, above the legal limit of .08. As a result, the KDR initiated proceedings to suspend Stabel's driver's license.
Stabel requested an administrative hearing, which was held on August 31, 2012. The administrative hearing notes and order reflect that Case and Chalmers testified and the administrative hearing officer considered whether Case had reasonable grounds to believe that Stabel was operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. After hearing the testimony, the hearing officer affirmed the suspension.
On September 14, 2012, Stabel filed a petition for judicial review. The district court held a hearing on June 4, 2013, at which Case was the sole witness. The sole issue before the district court was whether Case had reasonable grounds to believe Stabel had been operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or both.
On July 19, 2013, the district court issued its memorandum decision and order. The district court cited Poteet v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 43 Kan.App.2d 412, 233 P.3d 286 (2010), disapproved in part on other grounds by Sloop v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 296 Kan. 13, 290 P.3d 555 (2012), and interpreted that decision as holding that “the odor of alcohol and an accident were alone sufficient to suggest an impaired driver and did constitute reasonable grounds.” In light of Poteet, the district court found that Case had reasonable grounds to believe Stabel had been operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Thus, the district court upheld the suspension of Stabel's driving privileges. Stabel timely appealed the district court's judgment.
On appeal, Stabel claims the district court erred in finding that Case had reasonable grounds to believe Stabel had been operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. “[T]he determination of whether an officer has reasonable grounds for a particular action involves a mixed question of law and fact. In such cases, we must review the ultimate legal conclusion—whether reasonable grounds existed—independently, even though we must defer to the district court's factual findings. [Citation omitted.]” Poteet, 43 Kan.App.2d at 415. Moreover, as our Supreme Court has recognized, when there are no disputed facts, this court reviews a reasonable grounds decision de novo. See Swank v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 294 Kan. 871, 881, 281 P.3d 135 (2012).
K.S.A.2011 Supp. 8–1001(a), which was in effect at the time of this incident, provided that any person operating a vehicle within Kansas has consented to submit to testing of his or her bodily substances to determine the presence of alcohol or drugs. K.S.A.2011 Supp. 8–1001(b) continues, in pertinent part:
“A law enforcement officer shall request a person to submit to a test or tests deemed consented to under subsection (a): (1) If the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person was operating or attempting to operate a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both ...; and one of the following conditions exists: (A) The person has been arrested or otherwise taken into custody for any offense involving operation or attempted operation of a vehicle while under the influence or alcohol or drugs, or both [DUI], or [certain other offenses]; or (B) the person has been involved in a vehicle accident or collision resulting in property damage or personal injury other than serious injury.”
Relying primarily on Sloop, 296 Kan. 13, Stabel argues that “Kansas caselaw has held that if the evidence in the case is insufficient to establish probable cause to arrest defendant for a violation of 8–1567 then the arresting officer has no authority to request the defendant to take an evidentiary breath test pursuant to K.S.A. 8–1001.” In Sloop, a police officer decided to follow Sloop after the officer saw him make a left turn in his vehicle. Although Sloop committed no traffic violations, the officer followed because Sloop “was ‘sitting unusually close to his steering wheel’ and because he had been somewhat hesitant going into his turn....” 296 Kan. at 14. The officer followed Sloop for 8 to 10 blocks—during which Sloop committed no traffic infractions—then stopped Sloop because his tag light was out.
The officer later testified that Sloop smelled of alcohol, his eyes were watery and bloodshot, his speech was “ ‘impaired’ but not ‘slurred,’ “ and Sloop eventually admitted he had consumed “ ‘like one beer at a friend's house.’ “ 296 Kan. at 14–15. The officer conducted a horizontal nystagmus test and a preliminary breath test, after which he arrested Sloop and took him to the police station, where he administered field sobriety tests. The officer asked Sloop to take an evidentiary breath test, but Sloop refused. Based upon Sloop's refusal, the KDR suspended his driver's license. The district court upheld the suspension, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment.
On a petition for review before the Supreme Court, Sloop contended that because his arrest was unlawful, the officer had no authority to ask him to take the breath test. Our Supreme Court held that probable cause did not support the officer's warrantless arrest of Sloop; thus, the arrest was invalid, as was the breath test request based on that arrest. 296 Kan. at 20–23. Because the driver's license suspension was based upon refusing a test the officer had no authority to request, our Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and reinstated Sloop's driving privileges. 296 Kan. at 23–24.
Stabel argues that the facts in his case are similar to the facts in Sloop, but we note an important distinction between the two cases. In Sloop, our Supreme Court held there was no probable cause for the arrest and the arrest was a necessary condition for the officer to request a breath test. 296 Kan. at 20–23. Here, Stabel's arrest was not a necessary condition for Case to request a breath test. K.S.A.2011 Supp. 8–1001(b) provides that an officer shall request a breath test if the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person was operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and either (A) the person has been arrested or taken into custody for an offense involving DUI or (B) the person was involved in a vehicle accident resulting in property damage. Here, Stabel was involved in a vehicle accident or collision resulting in property damage which served as the basis for the test request; thus, the legality of his arrest was not in question.
Nevertheless, Stabel's primary argument is that Case did not have reasonable grounds to believe he was operating the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, as K.S.A.2011 Supp. 8–1001(b)(1) requires before an officer may request a breath test. Kansas courts have equated reasonable grounds with probable cause. See Swank, 294 Kan. at 881 ; Smith v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 291 Kan. 510, 515, 242 P.3d 1179 (2010). Evaluation of probable cause involves an examination of the totality of the circumstances to determine whether “the officer's knowledge of the surrounding facts and circumstances creates a reasonable belief that the defendant committed a specific crime.” 291 Kan. at 515. Our Supreme Court recently clarified that “ ‘[p]robable cause is the reasonable belief that a specific crime has been or is being committed and that the defendant committed the crime. [Citation omitted.]’ “ Sloop, 296 Kan. at 20.
In Sloop, the interaction occurred early in the morning, there was a strong odor of alcohol in the car and coming from Sloop, he had watery and bloodshot eyes, and he admitted that he consumed one beer; yet the officer saw no traffic infractions, Sloop's speech was impaired but not slurred, he did not fumble while producing his license, he did not stumble while walking, and the results of the preliminary breath test were not submitted into evidence. Our Supreme Court found that under these facts there was no probable cause for Sloop's arrest. 296 Kan. at 23.
Here, in the early morning hours, Stabel drove his vehicle into a pole, causing extensive damage. Case smelled alcohol on Stabel, saw that Stabel's eyes were bloodshot, and noticed that Stabel's speech was altered. Stabel initially denied drinking alcohol but later admitted that he had consumed a couple of drinks. Moreover, Stabel told Case that he was driving home, but it was uncontroverted that his vehicle was pointed in the opposite direction. Although the facts of the two cases are similar, there are at least two important facts in Stabel's case that did not exist in Sloop. First, Stabel drove his vehicle into a utility pole, causing extensive damage to the vehicle. Second, Stabel told Case that he was driving home to Lakin, but it was uncontroverted that his vehicle was pointed in the opposite direction. Although this case may present a close call, we conclude that all of these circumstances, considered together, are “ ‘ “sufficient ... to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that” ‘ “ Stabel had been driving under the influence of alcohol. See Sloop, 296 Kan. at 21.
In upholding the suspension of Stabel's driving privileges, the district court relied primarily on Poteet, 43 Kan.App.2d 412. In that case, a trooper arrived at the scene of an auto accident and saw a car on its passenger side that looked as though it had been driven through a field and a barbed-wire fence. Although the trooper had no direct contact with the driver, Doris Poteet, medical personnel informed the trooper that they had smelled alcohol on Poteet and that she had admitted to drinking alcohol. This court ultimately upheld the suspension of Poteet's driving privileges, finding that the circumstances of the car accident along with the odor of alcohol were sufficient to establish reasonable grounds for the officer to believe that Poteet was driving under the influence of alcohol. 43 Kan.App.2d at 416–17.
In determining that the trooper had reasonable grounds, the Poteet court used the standard that “[p]robable cause to arrest is reached when a reasonably prudent police officer would believe that guilt is ‘more than a mere possibility.’ [Citation omitted.]” 43 Kan.App.2d at 416. Our Supreme Court in Sloop disapproved of that standard. See 296 Kan. at 20–21. The Sloop court directs that “ ‘[p]robable cause is the reasonable belief that a specific crime has been or is being committed and that the defendant committed the crime. [Citation omitted.]’ “ 296 Kan. at 20. Thus, unlike the district court, we decline to rely solely on Poteet in upholding the suspension of Stabel's driving privileges.
In sum, we agree with the district court's conclusion that Case had reasonable grounds to believe that Stabel had operated a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Thus, Case was authorized to request Stabel to submit to a breath test. See K.S.A.2011 Supp. 8–1001(b). If a district court reaches the correct result, its decision will be upheld even though it relied upon the wrong ground or assigned erroneous reasons for its decision. See Hockett v. The Trees Oil Co., 292 Kan 213, 218, 251 P.3d 65 (2011). Based on the record, we conclude the district court did not err in upholding the suspension of Stabel's driving privileges.
Affirmed.