Opinion
Action No. 01-2281
November 21, 2002
MINUTE ENTRY
On August 2, 2002, the plaintiff, Elizabeth D. St. Pierre, filed a Motion to Compel Discovery (doc. # 32) requesting that the defendant, Yamaha Corporation ("Yamaha"), be required to produce several relevant documents. Yamaha opposes the motion.
I. Background
The plaintiff, Elizabeth St. Pierre has filed the instant suit seeking to recover for the wrongful death of Rodney St. Pierre, Jr. While swimming and playing in a rubber dinghy moored to a buoy in the waters off Silver Sands of Grand Cayman, Cayman Islands, on July 26, 2000, Rodney St. Pierre Jr. was struck and killed by a Yamaha WaveRunner operated by a minor, Alexandra Maingot.
The plaintiff filed suit against Yamaha Corporation, Brett Holzle, who allowed Alexandra Maingot to operate the WaveRunner, and Trevor and Cindy Maingot as the natural tutors of Alexandra Maingot. Brett Holzle and Trevor and Cindy Maingot were dismissed following a settlement.
The plaintiff filed the instant motion requesting that Yamaha produce several relevant documents, including: documents produced at the corporate deposition of Yamaha on January 18-19, 2002; promotional materials regarding the XL-700 Yamaha Personal Watercraft; reports prepared by Kevin Breen; and Yamaha financial reports with respect to Yamaha personal watercraft. A hearing on the motion was held with oral arguments on August 14, 2002.
During the hearing, the plaintiffs motion was granted in part, denied in part, and deferred in part. The undersigned granted the request to the extent the plaintiff sought promotional materials and documents produced at the corporate deposition of Yamaha.
Rec. Doc. No. 34.
However, the undersigned deferred a ruling as to the plaintiffs request for reports prepared by Kevin Breen and ordered Yamaha to provide the Court with a catalog of the studies conducted by Breen which relate to the throttle system of Yamaha's WaveRunner. The Court also deferred a ruling as to the plaintiffs request for information pertaining to Yamaha's financial reports. The Court ordered the parties to submit briefs addressing the issue of whether the plaintiff is required to have sought to recover punitive damages before such documents may be produced. The parties complied with the Court's Orders. II Analysis A. Kevin Breen Documents
Rec. Doc. Nos. 35, 36.
The plaintiff seeks to obtain all reports related to personal watercraft prepared by Breen, or his companies, for Yamaha. The plaintiff contends that Breen has been identified as an expert by Yamaha and that Breen has been asked to study and test alternative safety devices for Yamaha's WaveRunner.
In its memorandum in opposition to the plaintiffs Motion to Compel Yamaha claimed that it had not determined whether Breen will be used as a witness. Yamaha contended that because it was uncertain as to whether Breen will be used as a witness, the plaintiffs request was premature and irrelevant.
However, following the August 14, 2002, hearing, Yamaha named Breen as a witness. Yamaha also submitted a letter to the Court indicating that Breen may have provided expert reports in several closed cases but under Yamaha's document retention policy, only the initial pleadings and the closing documents are available. Thus, Yamaha contends that it does not have any expert reports prepared by Breen for any closed cases.
Rec. Doc. No. 41.
Given the frequency with which Yamaha is involved in litigation, the Court finds that Yamaha has access to prior reports of Breen through the expert witness. Yamaha is therefore ordered to produce any reports related to Yamaha's personal watercraft prepared by Breen within 5 days of this order.
B. Financial Reports
The plaintiff has requested that Yamaha produce financial documentation which will show the profitability of Yamaha's personal watercraft line of products. The plaintiff contends that i is entitled to such information because she has a claim for punitive damages under maritime law She also contends that she is entitled to the information because Yamaha has raised a "lack of feasibility" defense to her claim that alternative safety devices should have been installed to make the Yamaha personal watercraft safer.
Yarnaha defended against this claim by stating that "any alternative design under La.R.S. 9:2800.56(1) was not feasible, in light of the then-existing reasonably available scientific and technological knowledge or then existing economic practicality." Rec. Doc. No. 4, Answer of Yamaha, Fifth Defense, p. 3.
Yamaha, however, contends that information related to its profitability is not discoverable because there is no punitive damage claim available to the plaintiff under Louisiana product liability law. Yamaha also contends that the facts as pled in the Complaint do not support maritime jurisdiction. It further contends that the plaintiffs complaint fails to comply with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in that it does not put Yamaha on notice that it is subject to punitive damages. Finally, Yamaha contends that as it is the plaintiff's burden to establish the costs of a proposed alternative design, its corporate economic information is not relevant.
The Court notes that the plaintiffs complaint specifically alleges maritime jurisdiction pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 1333.
1. Pleading Requirements
Rule 9(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[W]hen items of special damage are claimed, they shall be specifically stated." NTBS Storage and Retrieval, Inc. v. Kardex Systems, Inc., 2001 WL 238110, *1 (N.D.Tex. 2001). Some courts have held that punitive damages fall within the category of "special damages," and must be pleaded specially under Rule 9(g). Southern Pacific Transportation, Co. v. Builders Transport, Inc., 1993 WL 232058, *4 (E.D.La. 1993) (citing Comeau v. Rupp, 762 F. Supp. 1434, 1449 (D.Kan. 1991)). Other courts, however, have held that punitive damages are not special damages, and need not be specially stated as required by Rule 9(g). Maglione v. Cottrell, Inc., 2001 WL 946189, *2 (N.D.III. 2001); Southern Pacfic, 1993 WL at *4; see Dow v. Edwards and Kelcey, Inc., 1998 WL 531838, *4 (E.D.Penn. 1998).
The term "special damages" is not defined in the federal rules of civil procedure, but it has been construed to mean "those elements of damages that are the natural, but not the necessary, consequence of defendant's conduct, and usually stem from the particular circumstances of the case." NTBS Storage, 2001 WL at *1 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1310 at 700 (2d ed. 1990)). "Unlike compensatory or actual damages," which are designed to make the plaintiff whole, punitive or exemplary damages are based upon an entirely different public policy consideration — that of punishing the defendant or of setting an example for similar wrongdoers. . . Southern Pacific, 1993 WL at *4 (citing Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed.), p. 390). Thus, Punitive damages are simply not special damages, and need not be stated specifically under Rule 9(g). Id.
Nevertheless, Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that "a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain," inter alia, "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" and "a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks." In order to comply with this rule, the complaint need not contain the words punitive or "exemplary," or refer to the statute under which such damages are sought, but need only allege facts sufficient to put the other party on notice of a claim for punitive damages. Id.
An award of punitive damages "should be reserved for willful wrongdoing or reckless indifference to the plaintiffs known rights." See e.g. id.; Boykin v. Golden Rule Insurance Company, 1988 WL 107363, *4 (N.D.Ill. 1988) (discussing punitive damages in context of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim). Here, the plaintiff has alleged, in part, that "Yamaha knew or should have known that the wave runners that it manufactured and sold. . . . were likely to injure persons using them . . . ." She also alleges that "Yamaha . . . negligently and carelessly manufactured, designed, inspected, and distributed and sold the wave runner . . . ." She has failed, however, to allege either that Yamaha acted with reckless indifference or willful wrong doing. A claim for punitive damages is alleged against Alexandra and Holzle. The Court finds that the plaintiff s allegations fail to comply with Rule 8(a)'s requirement that she provide notice to Yamaha that she is asserting a claim for punitive damages.
The plaintiff's Complaint alleges that the damages sustained by the plaintiff were caused, inter alia by the gross, wanton and reckless negligence, (or in the alternative ordinary negligence), or fault of Alexandra and/or Holzle . . . See Rec. Doc. No. 1, Complaint, ¶ 17.
As the Court has determined that the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages may not proceed forward, it will now determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to discover information regarding Yamaha's financial condition based on Yamaha's defense of lack of feasibility.
Although it is not necessary to address the issue, the Court notes that the plaintiff claims that she is entitled to punitive damages under maritime law. However, because the accident at issue occurred in the Cayman Island, a British protectorate, maritime jurisdiction does not apply. "A party seeking to invoke federal admiralty jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1) over a tort claim must satisfy conditions both of location and of connection with maritime activity." Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527 (1995). Federal maritime jurisdiction applies to the navigable waters of the United States and the "high seas", but does not extend into the territorial waters of other nations. See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 205 (1971) (maritime law governs only those torts occurring on the navigable waters of the United States); Dunham v. Hotelera Canco S.A., 933 F. Supp. 543 547 (E.D.Va. 1996) (finding that admiralty jurisdiction was not proper where tort occurred in territorial waters of Mexico), and Sharma v. Skaarup Ship Management Corp., 699 F. Supp. 440, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (no federal admiralty jurisdiction where tort occurred in waters of British Columbia), aff'd, 916 F.2d 820 (2d Cir. 1990) (issue not reached), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 907, 111 S.Ct. 1109, 113 L.Ed.2d 218. (1991).
2. Lack of Feasibility
The plaintiff contends that it is entitled to Yamaha's financial information because Yamaha has raised the defense of "lack of economic feasibility." The plaintiff claims that without information relating to Yamaha's cost and profitability of its WaveRunner, she cannot rebut Yamaha's claim that alternative designs were not feasible. She also contends that Yamaha's financial condition is relevant to her failure to warn claim. The Court, however, disagrees.
The parties submit their analysis pursuant to the Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA), La. R.S. § 9:2800.56. The LPLA states in pertinent part:
A product is unreasonably dangerous in design if, at the time the product left its manufacturer's control: (1) There existed an alternative design for the product that was capable of preventing the claimant's damages; and (2) The likelihood that the product's design would cause the claimant's damage and the gravity of that damage outweighed the burden on the manufacturer of adopting such alternative design and the adverse effect, if any, of such alternative design on the utility of the product.
La. R.S. § 9:2800.56. Thus, a plaintiff in an action under defective design has the burden to show that there existed an alternative design that would have prevented her damage while the defendant may use the unfeasibility of the alternative design as a defense. See Johnson v. T.L. James Comp., Inc., 809 So.2d 287, 291 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2001).
The plaintiff also claims that Yamaha is liable for its failure to provide adequate warnings. A claim premised on a failure to warn requires that the plaintiff prove that the device's inadequate warning rendered the device "unreasonably dangerous." Under La. R.S. § 9:2800.57, a product is unreasonably dangerous "if, at the time the product left its manufacturer's control, the product possessed a characteristic that may cause damage and the manufacturer failed to use reasonable care to provide an adequate warning of such characteristic and its danger to users and handlers of the product." La. R.S. § 9:2800.57(A).
The LPLA defines an "adequate warning" as: a warning or instruction that would lead an ordinary reasonable user or handler of a product to contemplate the danger in using or handling the product and either to decline to use or handle the product or, if possible, to use or handle the product in such a manner as to avoid the damage for which the claim is made. La. R.S. § 9:2800.53(9). An essential element of plaintiff's failure to warn claim is that there be some reasonable connection between the manufacturer's omission and the damage which plaintiff suffered. Delery v. Prudential Ins. Co., 643 So.2d 807, 814 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 648 So.2d 393 (La. 1994). In determining whether a warning is adequate, the trier of fact undergoes a balancing test, including the following considerations: the severity of the danger, the likelihood that the warning will catch the attention of those who will foreseeably use the product and convey the nature of the danger to them, the intensity and the form of the warning, and the cost of improving the strength or mode of the warning. Bloxom v. Bloxom, 512 So.2d 839, 844 (La. 1987).
The plaintiff contends that Yamaha's defense of economic feasibility should allow him to obtain the financial documents of Yamaha as the costs of alternative designs should be considered. She also contends that Yamaha's profits, revenues, and expenses are relevant to her failure to provide adequate warning claim. However, the plaintiff has cited no authority, and the Court is not aware of any authority, that supports these proposition.
The authority cited by the plaintiff only discusses the costs associated with providing alternative designs and adequate warnings. See 63 Am. Jur.2d § 1101 (citing Lopez v. Chicago Bridge Iron Co., 546 So.2d 291 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1989)); Bloxom, 512 So.2d at 844. Thus, the only relevant consideration is the cost of the WaveRunner as designed, the costs of the plaintiff's alternative design and costs of providing adequate warnings. This information may be obtained without granting the plaintiff access to Yamaha's financial records. Therefore, the plaintiff is not entitled to discover Yamaha's financial information. Accordingly,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion to Compel (Doc. # 32) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:
1) GRANTED as to the Kevin Breen reports. Yamaha is ordered to produce this information within five days from the date of this Order.
2) DENIED as to the request that Yamaha produce financial documentation which showing the profitability of Yamaha's personal watercraft line of products.