ELDRIDGE, Judge. This court remanded Security Life Insurance Company v. Clark, 255 Ga. App. 14 ( 566 S.E.2d 2) (2002). On remand, the trial court re-entered judgment as directed by this court against both Security Life and its supersedeas surety and co-defendant, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company and pared away the punitive damages and the jury award of attorney fees and litigation costs.
In fact it appears that, under Georgia law, mental distress damages may be recovered whenever pain and suffering is caused by a "wanton, voluntary or intentional act the natural result of which is the causation of mental suffering and wounded feelings." St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Clark, 255 Ga. App. 14, 21 (2002) (quoting Tuggle v. Wilson, 248 Ga. 335, 337(2), 282 S.E.2d 110 (1981)); Clark v. West, 196 Ga. App. 456, 395 S.E.2d 884 (1990). Such damages may be proven by showing that the plaintiff has suffered mental anguish - in the form of depression, irritability, anger, anxiety, worry, sadness, or aggravation of a pre-existing condition — as a result of a defendant's intentional or fraudulent conduct.
When an award of expenses of litigation and attorney fees is factually supportable, the amount of the award is limited to "the amount of attorney fees attributable solely to the claim in which [plaintiffs] prevailed. . . ." United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Peacock, 267 Ga. 145, 147 (2) ( 475 SE2d 601) (1996); St. Paul Fire c. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 255 Ga. App. 14 (5) (a) ( 566 SE2d 2) (2002). The trial court directed verdicts in favor of the County on all of plaintiff Charles Wester's claims and on all plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages, as well as on all plaintiffs' claims for damages based on inverse condemnation and nuisance.
As the surety on SLIC's appeal bond in its efforts to contest its liability to the plaintiffs, the insureds under the policy issued pursuant to the forgery, St. Paul Fire Marine Insurance Company (SPFM) paid to the plaintiffs the amount of the most recent judgment rendered by the trial court and was substituted for them on appeal. See Security Life Ins. Co. v. Clark, 229 Ga. App. 593 ( 494 SE2d 388) (1997) ( Security I); Clark v. Security Life Ins. Co., 270 Ga. 165 ( 509 SE2d 602) (1998) ( Security II); Security Life Ins. Co. v. Clark, 239 Ga. App. 690 ( 521 SE2d 434) (1999) ( Security III); Security Life Ins. Co. v. Clark, 273 Ga. 44 ( 535 SE2d 234) (2000) ( Security IV); Security Life Ins. Co. v. Clark, 249 Ga. App. 18 ( 547 SE2d 691) (2001) ( Security V); St. Paul Fire c. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 255 Ga. App. 14 ( 566 SE2d 2) (2002) ( Security VI). 1. The UDIA is a statutory means by which an injured party may demand an amount of unliquidated damages from the tortfeasor prior to litigation and, should the tortfeasor decline to meet the injured party's demand, receive damages in the form of pre-judgment interest if "the judgment is for an amount not less than the amount demanded."
Stevens v. Wakefield, 163 Ga. App. 40 ( 292 SE2d 516) (1982). See also St. Paul Fire c. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 255 Ga. App. 14, 19 (2) (c) ( 566 SE2d 2) (2002) (en banc). We address the remaining enumerations below, namely, whether the trial court erred (1) in concluding that the liability insurance policy issued to Jeff Akhtar did not exclude from coverage the Rosses' claim predicated on the shooting of Ronald Ross and (2) in calculating post-judgment interest.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Clark , 255 Ga. App. 14, 23 (4), 566 S.E.2d 2 (2002). Having determined that it is necessary to vacate the award of damages for breach of contract in the amount of $378,630, we now remand the case for a new trial on the issue of breach of contract damages.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Clark, 255 Ga.App. 14, 24(5)(a), 566 S.E.2d 2 (2002). Again, because the use of a general verdict form does not disclose the jury's underlying factual findings, and because the evidence was sufficient under Camp's claim of fraudulent transfer under OCGA § 18–2–74(a)(1), see Division 1, supra, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find bad faith.
Moreover, where a party successfully pursues inconsistent remedies, he or she “is only required to make an election prior to judgment if inconsistent verdicts are rendered.” (Citations omitted.) St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Clark, 255 Ga.App. 14, 17(1), 566 S.E.2d 2 (2002) (citations omitted). See also OCGA § 9–2–4 (“A plaintiff may pursue any number of consistent or inconsistent remedies against the same person or different persons until he shall obtain a satisfaction from some of them.”); Marvin Nix Dev. Co., 302 Ga.App. at 568, 692 S.E.2d 23. It follows that the fact that GCB lost its claim on the Arlington Note and Tucker guaranties as a result of failing to provide the notice required by the UCC does not constitute an election of remedies.
[Cit.]" St Paul Fire c. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 255 Ga. App. 14, 24 ( 566 SE2d 2) (2002). See also Greenway, 280 Ga. at 655 (3).
Therefore, this enumerated error is without merit. 255 Ga. App. 14 ( 566 SE2d 2) (2002) (subsequent history omitted). See also Plane v. Uniforce MIS Svcs. of Ga., 232 Ga. App. 757, 761 (2) ( 503 SE2d 621) (1998).