St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. N. Grain

44 Citing cases

  1. Triple U Enterprises v. New Hampshire Ins. Co.

    576 F. Supp. 798 (D.S.D. 1983)   Cited 11 times

    The questions involved in this case are matters to be determined by South Dakota law. St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co. v. Northern Grain Co., 365 F.2d 361, 368 (8th Cir. 1966). The Eighth Circuit has stated clearly that it is not this Court's task to "formulate the legal mind of the state, but merely to ascertain and apply it." Id., citing, Village of Brooten v. Cudahy Packing Co., 291 F.2d 284, 288 (8th Cir. 1961).

  2. Missouri Terrazzo Co. v. Iowa Nat. Mut. Ins. Co.

    740 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1984)   Cited 40 times
    Holding under Missouri law that the "your work" exclusion in a predecessor Insurance Services Office ("ISO") form "did not bar coverage for injury to property other than that of the insured"

    566 F. Supp. at 552. The cases Iowa National relies upon for its proposition that diminution in value cannot constitute "property damage," St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Northern Grain Co., 365 F.2d 361, 366 (8th Cir. 1966) (diminution in value of wheat crop caused by sale of wrong type of seed), and American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Trane Co., 544 F. Supp. 669, 687 (W.D.Wis. 1982) (diminished value of liquid natural gas plants, in the form of production shortfalls, caused by faulty heat exchangers), are inapposite. Here, the physical damage to tangible property, i.e., the physical deterioration of the floor, is manifest.

  3. Missouri Terrazzo v. Iowa Nat. Mut. Ins. Co.

    566 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Mo. 1983)   Cited 20 times
    Holding that the alleged negligent installation of and failure to test a concrete sub-bed and flooring constitute an occurrence

    Courts have interpreted and applied the term "accident" as used in general liability insurance policies broadly, and have declined to limit its meaning to an event which happened suddenly and violently. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company v. Northern Grain Company, 365 F.2d 361, 365 (8th Cir. 1966). The courts are practically agreed that the word "accident" means that which happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention or design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen.

  4. L. D. Schreiber Cheese Co. v. Std. Milk Co.

    457 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1972)   Cited 11 times
    In Schreiber, one or two vats of cheese became contaminated so that the cheese produced in those vats for that period was poisonous.

    There the plaintiff conceded that the damage involved was embraced within the exclusionary provision but claimed that provision ambiguous in reference to the term "products hazard" and policy definition of "operations." Home Indemnity in turn relied upon another Eighth Circuit case of St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co. v. Northern Grain, 365 F.2d 361 (8th Cir., 1966), which dealt with the substantive law of South Dakota. In St. Paul Fire the Court allowed recovery under a products hazard policy where the insured Grain Company mistakenly sold wheat seed that was less productive than the seed ordered.

  5. Western Cas. Sur. Co. v. Waisanen

    653 F. Supp. 825 (D.S.D. 1987)   Cited 11 times
    Applying South Dakota law on a duty to defend issue

    Since this is a diversity action it is the Court's duty to ascertain the law of the State of South Dakota and apply it to the facts of the case. St. Paul Fire Marine Insurance Co. v. Northern Grain Co., 365 F.2d 361, 368 (8th Cir., 1966) The applicable rule to be applied to the construction of insurance policies was set forth by the South Dakota Supreme Court in the case of Grandpre v. Northwestern National Life Insurance Company, 261 N.W.2d 804, 807 (S.D. 1977):

  6. American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Trane Co.

    544 F. Supp. 669 (W.D. Wis. 1982)   Cited 54 times
    Holding that under Wisconsin law, a follow form provision in St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company's policy did not incorporate the primary's duty to defend because the very next provision stated that St. Paul "at its own option, may, but is not required to, participate in the . . . defense of any claim"

    I agree with this formulation; further, I conclude that the complaining party is "injured" when the damage actually appears to that party. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire Marine Insurance Co. v. Northern Grain Co., 365 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1966) ("occurrence" determined at point when crop damage resulting from sale of improper seed appeared); Miller v. Lindgate Developers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 980 (E.D.Mo. 1967) ("occurrence" determined at point when damage to building from improper construction appeared). I conclude that this standard is what a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have believed to be the method of determining coverage.Ehlers v. Colonial Penn Insurance Co., 81 Wis.2d 64, 259 N.W.2d 718 (1977).

  7. Stauffer Chemical Co. v. Ins. Co. of No. Amer.

    372 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)   Cited 6 times

    In the instant case, it is clear that the alleged injury to and destruction of the claimants' potato seed pieces and potato crops constituted "injuries to or destruction of property" within the meaning of the very broad coverage afforded under Insuring Agreement II of this Blanket Liability Policy. See St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co. v. Northern Grain Co., 365 F.2d 361, 365-367 (8th Cir. 1966). It is further apparent that the injury to claimants' potato seed pieces and potato crops "unexpectedly and unintentionally" resulted from "a continuous or repeated exposure to conditions," thus constituting an "occurrence" within the meaning of paragraph D(c) of the policy. INA argues, however, that there was no "occurrence" because the "conditions" that caused the injury was not Stauffer's product, Captan 4 Flowable, which merely failed to prevent the "conditions" ("seed rot" and "damp off") that unexpectedly and unintentionally caused the injury. This contention must be rejected because there is nothing in the definition of the term "occurrence" nor is there language anywhere else in the policy, which prescribes what or who must cause the "conditions" which cause the injury to or destruction of property.

  8. Kyllo v. Northland Chemical Co.

    209 N.W.2d 629 (N.D. 1973)   Cited 25 times
    In Kyllo v. Northland Chemical Co., 209 N.W.2d 629 (N.D. 1973), the court held that exclusion (k) applied to eliminate coverage for damages in the amount of lost profits sought from the insured for the failure of its herbicide to control weeds.

    The type of insurance contract which we are considering here was rewritten prior to the accrual of the claim for relief herein in order to eliminate future decisions awarding coverage to insureds for products liability claims based on breach of warranty where no active malfunctioning of the product caused actual physical damage. Case holdings previous to the rewriting of this type of liability insurance policy reached conclusions contrary to the decision in the instant case. For example, in St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Northern Grain Co., 365 F.2d 361 (8 Cir. 1966), the insuring clause was substantially the same as that in the instant case, but exclusions such as Exclusion (h) in the case at bar were not present in the Northern Grain case. In the Northern Grain case, some farmers bought seed wheat from Northern Grain Company, which seed wheat proved to be the wrong type.

  9. Shields v. Hiram C. Gardner, Inc.

    92 Idaho 423 (Idaho 1968)   Cited 23 times
    In Shields, the seed in question never germinated, leading the court to conclude that it was only reasonable to expect that coverage was afforded against any liability arising out of an error in the chemical mixture of the seed which then failed to germinate in the fields of the buyer.

    (See Exclusions — Part I(f) (4) quoted in the majority opinion.) St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Northern Grain Co., 365 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1966); Bowman Steel Corp. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 364 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1966); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Fidelity and Cas. Co., 281 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1960); Geddes Smith, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 63 Cal.2d 602, 47 Cal.Rptr. 564, 407 P.2d 868 (1965). Appellant contends that the general policy condition, that it "applies to occurrences which arise within the United States of America, its territories or possessions, or Canada," is controlling.

  10. General Ins. Co. v. Gauger

    13 Wn. App. 928 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975)   Cited 15 times
    Finding that once the definition of property damage is satisfied, "any and all damages flowing therefrom and not expressly excluded from the policy are covered"

    (Italics ours.) This conclusion is further supported by Labberton v. General Cas. Co. of America, 53 Wn.2d 180, 332 P.2d 250 (1958); and St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co. v. Northern Grain Co., 365 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1966). Both of these cases endorse the principle that once the injury is covered by the policy, then the resulting damage is covered.