But in the instant case there were special warnings. In St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Lewis (Tex.Civ.App.) 297 S.W. 896, there was evidence that the railroad had made no provision at the crossing for warning persons when a train was approaching, and there was a conflict as to whether a statute requiring the whistle to be blown and the locomotive bell to be rung had been complied with, and there was evidence that the train was traveling 25 or 30 miles per hour. The court held that under such circumstances the jury had a right to say whether those in charge of the train were guilty of negligence in operating it at that rate of speed.
11 Where the evidence shows that a crossing was much used by the public; that the view of the railroad track to the east to persons traveling south on the highway and approaching the crossing was obstructed by buildings until a point about 20 or 30 feet of the track is reached; that by reason of the surrounding conditions the crossing was more than usually dangerous and hazardous; that the railroad company ran its train at a high rate of speed over such crossing; that in view of all these conditions persons of ordinary care operating railroad trains under similar circumstances would have had a watchman or have maintained a wig-wag signal or some device to warn travelers of approaching trains, — raises a question for the jury. Smith v. Galveston-Houston Electric Ry. Co., supra; Tisdale v. Ry. Co., supra; St. L. S.W. Ry. Co. v. Lewis, 297 S.W. 896. Of course, the railroad company would not be required to maintain both a flagman and a wig-wag or some other device to warn travelers of approaching trains. The rule would be complied with if either means was sufficient to warn travelers of the dangers incident to the use of the crossing.
Louisiana Ry. Nav. Co. of Texas v. Loudermilk (Tex.Civ.App.) 12 S.W.2d 824; Louisiana Ry. Nav. Co. of Texas v. Cotton (Tex.Civ.App.) 1 S.W.2d 393; St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Lewis (Tex.Civ.App.) 297 S.W. 896; Id. (Tex.Com.App.) 5 S.W.2d 765; Texas N. O. Ry. Co. v. Cunningham (Tex.Civ.App.) 168 S.W. 428; Smith v. Galveston-Houston Electric Ry. Co. (Tex.Com.App.) 277 S.W. 103; Texas P. Ry. Co. v. Tucker, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 115, 106 S.W. 764; 52 C.J. p. 468, § 2041.
The jury found by the exercise of ordinary care appellee could not have discovered the approach of the train, and could not by the exercise of ordinary care have avoided the collision, which acquitted appellee of contributory negligence, and this disposes of all issues of contributory negligence, pleaded by appellant by a failure to use ordinary care to discover the approach of the train. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Lewis (Tex.Civ.App.) 297 S.W. 896. The jury was asked this question under special issue No. 3: