St. Louis S-W. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Samuels

11 Citing cases

  1. Montrose Oil Refining Co. v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co.

    25 F.2d 750 (N.D. Tex. 1927)   Cited 3 times
    In Montrose Oil Refining Co. v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. (D.C.) 25 F.2d 750, affirmed (C.C.A.) 25 F.2d 755, certiorari denied, 277 U.S. 598, 48 S.Ct. 560, 72 L.Ed. 1007, it was held that in determining whether a particular rate is reasonable or not, comparison of existing charges made under similar conditions may be made, especially where, as here, none of the rates are attacked as being confiscatory.

    This finding is sustained by the evidence hereinafter mentioned. That the through route and rate over it is applicable under similar circumstances to those presented in this case has been held by the Circuit Court of Appeals for this circuit in St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Samuels, 211 F. 588, where it was also held the act was violated by the failure of the carrier to apply the lower rate. By comparing the charges for similar service and under similar conditions with the rates demanded and collected from the plaintiff, the Commission found the latter to be violative of the act in the respects complained of to the extent they exceeded 15.5 cents, and substantially, that the damage to the plaintiff resulted in the failure of the defendants to establish through routes and just and reasonable charges as provided in the act.

  2. Henry v. Kirby Lbr. Co.

    110 Tex. 218 (Tex. 1919)   Cited 2 times

    The plaintiff, as a matter of law, in taking and remaining in the position on the back of the tender of the engine, where he was at the time he was injured, assumed the risk and danger of being injured by the logs on the car adjacent to the tender where he was sitting while said car was being coupled to others in the making up of the log train, and was thereby precluded from recovering. Lovett v. G.C. S.F. Ry. Co., 97 Tex. 437; Railway v. Mathis, 101 Tex. 342; Railway v. Samuels, 123 S.W. 122; Ford v. Railway Co., 124 S.W. 716; Railway v. Wall, 116 S.W. 1140; Railway v. Pfloeger, 96 S.W. 56; Railway v. Edwards, 93 S.W. 106; Railway v. Matthews, 100 Tex. 63; Railway v. Byrd, 115 S.W. 1163; Railway v. Schwendt, 72 P. 573; Consumers Cotton Oil Co. v. Jante, 80 S.W. 847; Railway Co. v. McCarthy, 64 Tex. 622; Railway Co. v. Bradford, 66 Tex. 732. Under the undisputed evidence in the case, the plaintiff, at the time when he received his injuries, was a trespasser upon the tender of the defendant's engine, and the defendant owed him no duty in respect to any of the matters complained of in his petition.

  3. Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co. v. Pitchford

    44 Okla. 197 (Okla. 1914)   Cited 43 times

    This was palpable error. Kenan v. Holloway, 16 Ala. 53, 50 Am. Dec. 162; Denver Tramway Co. v. Lassasso, 22 Colo. 444, 45 P. 409; Chicago, B. Q. R. Co. v. Housh, 12 Ill. App. 88; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. De Haas, 37 Ill. App. 195; Cole v. Searfoss, 49 Ind. App. 334, 97 N.E. 345; Murphy v. Chicago, R.I. P. R. Co., 38 Iowa, 539; McCormick v. Chicago, R.I. P. R. Co., 47 Iowa, 345; St. Louis S.W. R. Co. v. Samuels, 103 Tex. 54, 123 S.W. 121. What we have said is independent of the provision of section 6, art. 23, of our state Constitution, which ordains that the defense of contributory negligence shall, in all cases whatsoever, be a question of fact, and shall at all times be left to the jury.

  4. St. Louis, S. F. T. Ry. Co. v. Houze

    28 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930)   Cited 11 times

    And it is also held that the several acts may be grouped (St. Louis Southwestern v. Samuels, 103 Tex. 54, 123 S.W. 121) the court did neither in this case. By proper objections to special issue No. 1, or by requesting special issues presenting the defense of contributory negligence, appellant could have had the defect or omission in the court's charge reviewed upon appeal.

  5. Masterson v. Panhandle S. F. Ry. Co.

    193 S.W. 461 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917)

    In undertaking to drive under such conditions we think she was guilty, as found by the jury. St. L. S.W. Ry. Co. v. Samuels, 103 Tex. 54, 123 S.W. 121; Adams v. G. H. S. A. Ry. Co., 164 S.W. 853; T. N. O. Railway Co. v. McLeod, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 270, 131 S.W. 311; T. N. O. R. Co. v. Brouillette, 59 Tex. Civ. App. 337, 126 S.W. 287. The Judgment is affirmed.

  6. St. Louis S.W. Ry. of Texas v. Balthrop

    167 S.W. 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914)   Cited 13 times
    Holding railroad liable for injury resulting from active negligence where object was thrown from train injuring licensee

    Further, whether she was negligent in selecting the route she did was for the determination of the jury, from whose consideration the requested charge would not only have withdrawn that issue, but would have had the effect of instructing the jury that her presence on the pathway was in law contributory negligence precluding recovery. St. L. S.W. Ry. Co. v. Samuels, 103 Tex. 54, 123 S.W. 121. The third and fourth assignments criticise the court's action in refusing appellant's special charge, and in giving the main charge relating to the condition of appellant's tracks at the point where Mrs. Balthrop was injured.

  7. Paris G. N. R. Co. v. Germany

    158 S.W. 1037 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913)

    However negligent appellants may have been, appellee was not entitled to recover if he himself had been guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to cause the accident resulting in the injury he suffered. Railway Co. v. Samuels, 103 Tex. 54, 123 S.W. 123; Railway Co. v. Allbright, 7 Tex. Civ. App. 21, 26 S.W. 251. We do not think the error was cured by the instruction following the one set out, in which the court told the jury to find for appellant if they believed appellee was guilty of contributory negligence in the particulars recited in the instruction.

  8. St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Barrow

    153 S.W. 665 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912)

    Under the decisions appellant was entitled to have all the facts constituting contributory negligence which the evidence tended to prove submitted in a charge to the jury. Reference: Railway Co. v. Samuels, 103 Tex. 54, 123 S.W. 123; Railway Co. v. Johnson, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 495, 118 S.W. 1117. There was reversible error; therefore the motion is granted, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for another trial.

  9. Kansas City, M. O. Ry. Texas v. Meakin

    146 S.W. 1057 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912)   Cited 3 times

    F. W. Belt Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 125 S.W. 387. See, also, Railway Co. v. Samuels (Sup.) 123 S.W. 121; Railway Co. v. Haney, 94 S.W. 386; Railway Co. v. Addis, 142 S.W. 955. The practice with which we frequently meet of embodying in an independent special instruction every fact, independent though it be, constituting contributory negligence, is objectionable as having at least a tendency to magnify in the minds of the jury the importance of the defense by continual reiterations.

  10. Ft. Worth D.C. Ry. Co. v. Broomhead

    140 S.W. 820 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911)   Cited 16 times

    Knowledge of the deceased of the danger of using the path and of the existence of a safer one were questions for the jury. It is so held in Railway v. Samuels (Sup.) 123 S.W. 121, and, further, that the test would be the action of an ordinarily careful and prudent person under like circumstances. The rule applicable in such cases is thus stated in Railway v. Harris (Sup.) 128 S.W. 897: "If, as we have already said, the evidence actually adduced whether that of one or of both the parties admits of but one rational view, and that is that plaintiff has been guilty of contributory negligence, the court should end the case by deciding or instructing against him.