This fact is not disputed by appellee, and it has been established by the decisions of this court. See, St. Louis San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Brown, 62 Ark. 254, 35 S.W. 225; St. Louis I. M. S. R. Co. v. Haist 71 Ark. 258, 72 S.W. 893; Yockey v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 183 Ark. 601, 37 S.W.2d 694. II

Second, such as extension of the law of Kansas would undermine the long established employment at will doctrine. Cf. Railway Co. v. Brown, 80 Kan. 312, 102 P. 459 (1909) ("[I]n the absence of a contract of employment for a definite term the master may discharge the servant for any reason or for no reason, and that the servant may quit his employment for any reason or for no reason. Such action on the part of the employer or the employee, where no obligation is violated, is an essential element of liberty in action.").

In the instant case, the termination of appellant's employment (the result) was lawful; only the means was unlawful. Except for a statement from one case, Railway Co. v. Brown, 80 Kan. 312, 102 P. 459 (1909), to the effect that a civil conspiracy may occur when there are "unlawful means" to an end which is lawful, we have consistently held conspiracy turns on an illegal result rather than the means. See May v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 189 Kan. 419, 370 P.2d 390 (1962) (no civil conspiracy could exist to discharge plaintiff from his employment since the resulting discharge did not constitute a breach of the employment contract); Citizens State Bank v. Gilmore, 226 Kan. 662 (civil conspiracy existed where defendants conspired to sell diseased cattle in violation of Kansas statutes); Knight v. Neodesha Police Dept., 5 Kan. App. 2d 472, 620 P.2d 837 (1980) (civil conspiracy was actionable if plaintiff could prove the result of the conspiracy was an actionable tort).

"The rule is well established that the fact one purports to act as agent for another is not of itself sufficient evidence upon which to submit the question of agency to the jury. See Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Lamb, 28 Okla. 275, 114 P. 333; R. P. Smith Sons Co. v. Raines D. G. Co., 37 Okla. 39, 130 P. 133; St. L. S. F. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 3 Kan. App. 260, 45 P. 118; Sloan v. Sloan, 46 Or. 36, 78 P. 893. Under this rule the admission of the testimony of the plaintiff and G.W. Frazier with reference to the statements made by Levy constitutes error unless there is some other evidence which, independent of Levy's statement, would establish his authority.

The right of action to the plaintiff was transitory, and it is not a question whether the laws of the State of Arkansas have any extraterritorial force. In St. Louis San Francisco Railway Company v. Brown, 62 Ark. 254, 35 S.W. 225, it was held that a non-resident may sue a domestic corporation in the courts of this State on a transitory cause of action arising under a statute of another State, where such statute does not conflict with the public policy of this State; and the fact that there is a similar statute in this State is evidence that the statute in question is not against public policy. In St. Louis, Iron Mountain Southern Railway Company v. Haist, 71 Ark. 258, 72 S.W. 893, 100 Am. St. 65, it was held that a section of the Civil Code of Louisiana giving to a minor child the right to recover for the wrongful killing of its parents creates a cause of action of a transitory nature which is similar to that created by our statute and may be enforced in this State.

Moreover, we have early held that it is not against the public policy of this State to open her tribunals to foreign litigants where the controversy grows out of a transitory cause of action. In St. Louis San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Brown, 62 Ark. 254, at page 261, 35 S.W. 225, we said: "The common-law rule is that, where the right of action is transitory in its nature, courts everywhere, when the defendant may be lawfully summoned to appear therein, have jurisdiction; and, when the suit is governed by statute of the State in which the injury is committed, courts of another State having similar laws, or where it is not contrary to its public policy, will enforce such laws, by the rule of comity." Citing cases.

The rule is well established that the fact one purports to act as agent for another is not of itself sufficient evidence upon which to submit the question of agency to the jury. See Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Lamb, 28 Okla. 275, 114 P. 333; R. P. Smith Sons v. Raines, D. G. Co. 37 Okla. 39, 130 P. 133; St. L. S. F. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 3 Kan. App. 260, 45 P. 118; Sloan v. Sloan. 46 Or. 36, 78 P. 893. Under the rule announced, the admission of this evidence constitutes error, unless there is some evidence here, which, independent of the statement of Pendleton, would establish his authority.

It is elementary learning that at common law no recovery could be had for wrongful death. Bartlett v. C., R.I. P. Ry. Co., 21 Okla. 415, 96 P. 468; A., T. S. F. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 26 Kan. 443; City of Eureka v. Merrifield, 53 Kan. 794, 37 P. 113; Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754, 24 L.Ed. 580; Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 33 Sup. Ct. 192, 57 L.Ed. ___, decided January 20, 1913. The right was first given in England by Lord Campbell's act, passed in 1846.

We are not advised whether the courts have passed upon the constitutionality of said provision adopted in 1895, but presume it has not been held unconstitutional or else the editor of L.R.A. would have called attention to the fact. The Supreme Court of Kansas, passing upon a similar statute in the case of A., T. S. F. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 80 Kan. 312, 102 P. 459, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 247, 133 Am.St.Rep. 213, 18 Ann.Cas. 346, followed the Georgia case, and the court used the following language: "Again, is not the freedom to remain silent, to neither write nor publish anything on a certain subject, involved as an element in the guaranteed right to 'freely speak, write or publish their sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such rights'? It would seem that the liberty to remain silent is correlative to the freedom to speak.