Opinion
Index No. 007372/2023
07-24-2023
In the Matter of the Application of ST. JOSEPH'S HOSPITAL HEALTH CENTER, Petitioner, v. FRANK M., Respondent.
COSTELLO, COONEY & FEARON, LLP, Robert W. Connolly, Esq., Counsel for Petitioner, 211 W. Jefferson St., Ste. 1, Syracuse, New York 13202 ELIZABETH S. FORTINO, DIRECTOR, MENTAL HYGIENE LEGAL SERVICES, Emily M. North, Esq., Principal Attorney, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, Counsel for Respondent, 224 Harrison St., Ste. 502, Syracuse, New York 13202
COSTELLO, COONEY & FEARON, LLP, Robert W. Connolly, Esq., Counsel for Petitioner, 211 W. Jefferson St., Ste. 1, Syracuse, New York 13202
ELIZABETH S. FORTINO, DIRECTOR, MENTAL HYGIENE LEGAL SERVICES, Emily M. North, Esq., Principal Attorney, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, Counsel for Respondent, 224 Harrison St., Ste. 502, Syracuse, New York 13202
Kevin P. Kuehner, J. Currently before the Court, in this proceeding brought pursuant to Article 9 of the Mental Hygiene Law, which seeks court authorization to involuntarily retain Respondent, Frank M., for psychiatric care, is a motion filed by Respondent seeking an Order directing that the proceedings in this matter be conducted in-person. Specifically, Respondent requests that the Court, Petitioner, and any witnesses all participate in-person in the courtroom, as opposed to two-way video conference. (NYSECF Nos. 4-6). Petitioner has opposed Respondent's application. (NYSCEF Nos. 8-9).
The Court notes that Mental Hygiene Legal Services has brought identical applications in two other matters brought pursuant to Article 9 of the M.H.L., which are currently pending before the Court (see NYSCEF Nos.: 007374/2023 and 007373/2023).
After carefully considering the parties’ respective submissions and having heard and duly considered argument from counsel on July 19, 2023, Respondent's motion is granted for the reasons set forth below.
I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
The State of New York—along with the rest of the world—is emerging from the greatest social and governmental response to a public health crisis in living memory: the COVID-19 pandemic. During the sudden onset of the pandemic in March of 2020, society was forced to adapt to a new normal, including, among other things, business closures, masking requirements, and the concept of "social distancing." Though most federal and state courts initially closed their doors to prevent the spread of COVID-19, the New York State Court System turned to short- and long-term solutions to ensure that the public continued to have access to our justice system. One such solution—embraced by nearly every court system in the country—was the implementation of virtual, or remote, proceedings held on online platforms.
(Hon. Craig J. Doran, Chair, Pandemic Practices Working Group of the Commission to Reimagine the Future of New York's Courts, New York Courts’ Response to the Pandemic: Observations, Perspectives, and Recommendations , at p. 8 [Jan. 25, 2023], available at https://www.nycourts.gov/LegacyPDFS/press/pdfs/NYCourtsPandemicPracticesReport.pdf] [last accessed July 20, 2023]).
Indeed, in relation to Mental Hygiene Law ("MHL") proceedings in New York State Supreme Court, Administrative Order ("AO") 144/21 was issued on May 11, 2021, which directed as follows:
To the fullest extent possible, Mental Hygiene Law proceedings in which a petitioner or other necessary party is confined to a hospital or other medical facility — including but not limited to hearings pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law §§ 9.31 and 9.39 addressing patient retention or release, and the involuntary
administration of medication — shall be conducted by means of remote audiovisual technology or telephone or when appropriate and in the discretion of the presiding judge by appearing in courtrooms, in hospitals or in hospital courtrooms. In no event will participants be penalized if compliance with the usual timetable for such proceedings is delayed for reasons relating to the coronavirus health emergency.
AO/144/21 (Fmr. C.A.J. Marks) (NYSCEF No. 6 [Resp. Ex. 2]).
Pursuant to this AO, dozens—if not hundreds—of MHL proceedings were successfully conducted virtually in the Fifth Judicial District. Utilizing this format, the assigned Justice typically presided remotely from either a courtroom or chambers while counsel was also remote from their respective offices. The respondent, along with any witnesses, also testified remotely, often from the same room at the hospital. Thereafter, on February 22, 2022, the Administrative Judge of the New York State Supreme Court, Fifth Judicial District—recognizing the fluid and changing nature of the pandemic—issued a Memorandum, which states, in pertinent part, that matters covered by Administrative Order AO/144/21 "may be heard In-Person, Virtually, or a hybrid of In-Person and Virtual, at the discretion of the Presiding Judge[.]" (NYSCEF No. 6 [Resp. Ex. 6]). Despite the flexibility that this Memorandum offered, almost all MHL proceedings continued to be conducted 100% virtually. This is undoubtedly because one of the very few silver linings of the pandemic revealed the significant benefits that videoconferencing confers on civil litigation. Generally, such benefits include, among other things, reducing the cost and availability of legal services, additional flexibility in scheduling, and allowing judicial dockets to move with greater efficiency. The advancements in videoconferencing technology have made remote hearings almost indistinguishable from in-person proceedings. As a Supreme Court Justice from Queens County observed:
(See New York Courts’ Response to the Pandemic: Observations, Perspectives, and Recommendations , supra , at p. 19-20).
[T]here have been great advancements in audio-video technology since the days of closed circuit television. In truth, the current technology has made closed-circuit television, which involved the use of expensive equipment, quite obsolete. Computer programs such as Skype and Facetime are two examples of videotelephony software that allow individuals, using the internet, to see and hear one another through devices such as computers, cellphones, and Ipads. In short, it is an inexpensive means in which people can see and talk to one another in real time from remote locations. From a legal standpoint, it makes it possible for witnesses and litigants to give testimony that will be simultaneously transmitted into a courtroom, inexpensively and from great distances, thus allowing a jury to see and hear the individuals who testify. In fact, given that it allows a litigant or witness to provide a jury with a form of live testimony, it is, in some ways, much more reliable than admitting a deposition into evidence, even a videotaped one. This is especially so in this age of high definition television and computer screens.
( Nelson for Chirdo v. City of New York , 60 Misc.3d 353, 357, 77 N.Y.S.3d 262 [Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty., 2018] ). According to Petitioner, the benefits of virtual hearings in MHL proceedings include not having to transport the respondent patients to the courthouse, reducing interruptions to the schedules of medical staff who typically testify during the proceedings—thereby allowing them to see more patients throughout the day—and the elimination of security concerns when patients are at the courthouse. Mental Hygiene Legal Services ("MHLS") tacitly acknowledged during oral argument that, in many instances, its clients do not want to be transported for their hearings and, instead, prefer to remain at the hospital.
On June 5, 2023, after emergency conditions related to the pandemic began to subside, AO 162/23 was issued, which rescinded AO 144/21. (NYSCEF No. 6 [Resp. Ex. 1]). Thereafter, on June 26, 2023, a Memorandum from Counsel's Office at the New York State Office of Court Administration clarified that the rescission of AO 144/21 "was not intended to convey any new mandate. The rescission was simply meant to signal a return to the court's pre-COVID-19 posture." (NYSCEF No. 6 [Resp. Ex. 3]). MHLS promptly requested that all MHL matters return to in-person proceedings, regardless of whether their clients intend to appear in-person as well.
More specifically, MHLS argues that, before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, all MHL hearings were conducted in-person and hospitals were responsible for transporting patients to the courthouse, providing staff to travel with them, and producing the patient's physician for live testimony. MHLS further argues that their clients’ liberty interests outweigh the convenience of the hospitals, whether for its staff, doctors, or security personnel. In support of its argument that these proceedings must be in-person, MHLS largely relies on State v. Robert F. , 25 N.Y.3d 448, 13 N.Y.S.3d 319, 34 N.E.3d 829 (2015), and argues that neither consent nor exceptional circumstances are present to warrant a virtual hearing in this particular matter (see generally NYSCEF No. 5 [North Affirm.]).
In response, Petitioner argues that, notwithstanding the rescission of AO 144/21, this Court retains the discretion to conduct this matter virtually. Petitioner further argues that the right to face-to-face confrontation in a civil case is not absolute and, in any event, public policy and the reliability of virtual testimony—as proven by the successful use of remote hearings during the pandemic—satisfies the confrontation requirement. Petitioner takes issue with the fact that, in recent MHL matters, no evidence has been presented establishing that the respondents themselves, as opposed to MHLS, have expressed a desire to exercise their right to live, in-person, testimony. Petitioner urges the Court to determine whether the respondent, and not MHLS, is requesting an in-person proceeding on a case-by-case basis when considering whether to forego a virtual hearing.
Finally, Petitioner argues that the right to confrontation does not extend to a physician who testifies on behalf of the hospital in a MHL matter. In support of this argument, Petitioner cites In re Sawyer , 13 Misc.3d 497, 823 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Sup. Ct. Oneida Cnty., 2006), which held that, while a respondent patient in a MHL proceeding has the right to be in-person, "the Petitioner's witness may remain at the remote site and testify via video conference in full satisfaction of the Confrontation Clauses of the U.S. Constitution Amendment VI and NY Constitution Art. 1, § 6" ( In re Sawyer , 13 Misc.3d at 503-04, 823 N.Y.S.2d 641 ). In so ruling, the Sawyer court reasoned that, CPLR § 3117(a)(7), which "allows taped depositions of physicians to be played without a showing of exceptional circumstances or unavailability," ( id. at 503, 823 N.Y.S.2d 641 ), supported petitioner's request to have the physician witness testify remotely, notwithstanding respondent's objection to same ( id. ).
For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Robert F. , and not Sawyer , is binding on this Court and, absent Respondent's consent to a remote proceeding or the existence of exceptional circumstances, this matter must be conducted in-person.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Court's Inherent Power to Permit Remote Testimony Under Limited Circumstances
Under Judiciary Law § 2-b(3), "[a] court of record has power to devise and make new process and forms of proceedings, necessary to carry into effect the powers and jurisdiction possessed by it." The Court of Appeals has held that this provision affords courts the discretion to conduct matters, including MHL proceedings, remotely (see State v. Robert F. , 25 N.Y.3d 448, 453, 13 N.Y.S.3d 319, 34 N.E.3d 829 [2015] ["We see no compelling reason why a trial court should have this discretion ... in criminal trials, but not in Mental Hygiene Law proceedings"]). Indeed, "[l]ong before anyone had heard the words ‘COVID-19’ or ‘social distancing,’ trial courts used this authority to conduct proceedings by remote means, and appellate courts consistently upheld that authority" ( Bonilla v. State , 71 Misc.3d 235, 237, 141 N.Y.S.3d 289 [Ct. Cl., 2021] ). However, the Court of Appeals has also circumscribed this discretion, noting that "live televised testimony is certainly not the equivalent of in-person testimony, and the decision to excuse a witness's presence in the courtroom should be weighed carefully. Televised testimony requires a case-specific finding of necessity; it is an exceptional procedure to be used only in exceptional circumstances" ( Robert F. , 25 N.Y.3d at 454, 13 N.Y.S.3d 319, 34 N.E.3d 829 [quoting People v. Wrotten , 14 N.Y.3d 33, 40, 896 N.Y.S.2d 711, 923 N.E.2d 1099 [2009] ).
In Robert F. , respondent was determined to be a sex offender requiring civil management under Article 10 of the MHL. During the underlying dispositional hearing held pursuant to M.H.L. § 10.07(f), Supreme Court permitted petitioner to recall its expert witness, a physician, "via live, two-way videoconference" ( id. at 452, 13 N.Y.S.3d 319, 34 N.E.3d 829 ). Respondent objected to the expert witness testifying remotely and subsequently appealed. The Court of Appeals determined that permitting the expert to testify remotely was error ( id. at 454, 13 N.Y.S.3d 319, 34 N.E.3d 829 ["Permitting Dr. Peterson to deliver her testimony via videoconference over respondent's objection without requiring a proper showing of exceptional circumstances was error"]). In so ruling, the Court held that "Supreme Court has the discretion to utilize live, two-way video testimony pursuant to its inherent power, but only where exceptional circumstances so require, or when all parties consent " ( id. [emphasis added]). Notwithstanding this ruling, the Court held that the error in Robert F. was harmless "in light of the overwhelming evidence presented by the State" ( id. ).
Here, MHLS, on behalf of Respondent, has not consented to this matter being conducted virtually. Accordingly, pursuant to Robert F. , exceptional circumstances must be established. It does not appear that the Court of Appeals has specifically defined what constitutes an exceptional circumstance in the context of virtual testimony during a civil case. However, federal courts have found exceptional circumstances to exist when a witness is unavailable, their testimony is material, and allowing virtual testimony furthers the interests of justice. Given the rescission of AO 144/21 and the Court's return to in-person operations, the COVID-19 pandemic no longer constitutes an exceptional circumstance (cf. Bonilla v. State , 71 Misc.3d 235, 238, 141 N.Y.S.3d 289 [Ct. Cl., 2021] ["there is an exceptional circumstance in this instance: the COVID-19 pandemic"]; C.C. v. A.R. , 69 Misc.3d 983, 992, 133 N.Y.S.3d 200 [Kings Cty. Fam. Ct. 2020] ["the global pandemic is an ‘exceptional circumstance’ allowing this court to proceed on all aspects of this proceeding ... by virtual means"]; Ciccone v. One W. 64th St., Inc. , 69 Misc.3d 585, 592, 132 N.Y.S.3d 261 [Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty., 2020] ).
(See U.S. v. Donziger , 2020 WL 5152162, at *2 [S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2020] ["In determining whether to permit testimony by two-way video, courts in this Circuit have applied the rules used in connection with Rule 15 depositions and allowed video testimony ‘only when [1] the witness's testimony is material; [2] the Government has made good-faith and reasonable efforts to obtain the witness's presence and is unable to do so (that is, the witness is ‘unavailable’ within the meaning of the case law), and [3] allowing testimony by such means furthers the interests of justice."]; U.S. v. Patterson , 2022 WL 17825627, at *4 [2d Cir. Dec. 21, 2022] ["In [U.S. v. Gigante , 166 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1999) ] this Court concluded that a trial court may allow testimony via two-way video provided that the court make a finding that there are exceptional circumstances (which included in that case the unavailability of the witness), and that testimony via two-way video would further the interests of justice."]).
As noted above, Petitioner generally describes several logistical, administrative, and security benefits to proceeding with virtual testimony. However, the Court agrees with MHLS that Petitioner's reasons for conducting a virtual hearing pale in comparison to the significant liberty interests at stake in this matter and are not otherwise exceptional (see In re Sawyer , supra , 13 Misc.3d at 500, 823 N.Y.S.2d 641 ["Alleged savings on transportation costs are not a compelling interest sufficient to deny the respondent's constitutional right to be personally present in court for the hearing. The petitioner failed to show a risk of injury to either the public, the respondent himself, court personnel, or the staff involved in transporting the respondent."]; Robert F. , supra , 25 N.Y.3d at 454, 13 N.Y.S.3d 319, 34 N.E.3d 829 [exceptional circumstance not present where "the State merely indicated that Dr. Peterson could not appear in court on short notice and was somehow limited by her remaining employment with an Office of Mental Hygiene facility"]). The Court further notes that Petitioner has not argued that any of its witnesses are unavailable, that Respondent poses a heightened security threat, or allowing virtual testimony furthers the interests of justice under the circumstances of this case.
Significantly, despite advocating for the expansion of virtual hearings after the success of remote proceedings during the pandemic, the Pandemic Practices Working Group of the Commission to Reimagine the Future of New York's Courts continues to recommend in-person hearings for MHL Article 10 civil confinement proceedings as well as applications for assisted outpatient treatment under MHL Article 9 (See New York Courts’ Response to the Pandemic: Observations, Perspectives, and Recommendations , supra , at p. 69). This is due to the significant rights at stake during these proceedings.
B. Petitioner's Remaining Arguments
As discussed above, Petitioner argues that respondent's right to confrontation does not preclude the use of remote testimony. " New York Constitution, article I, § 6 guarantees a civil litigant the right to personally appear at trial and confront witnesses" ( In re Sawyer , supra , 13 Misc.3d at 499, 823 N.Y.S.2d 641 ; see also Matter of Donna K. , 132 A.D.2d 1004, 518 N.Y.S.2d 289 [4th Dept. 1987] ["While every litigant has a fundamental right, guaranteed by the due process clause of both the Federal and State Constitutions, to be present at every stage of the trial, this right is not absolute in civil actions"]). Once again, before AO 144/21 was rescinded and MHL proceedings were conducted virtually, respondents were physically present in the same hospital room as the petitioners’ witnesses while they testified remotely. Under these circumstances, the respondent's right to confrontation was satisfied.
(see In re Sawyer , 13 Misc.3d 497, 501-02, 823 N.Y.S.2d 641 [Sup. Ct. Oneida Cnty., 2006] ["Were the respondent to waive his right to be present in the courtroom, the witness would presumably be in the same room as the respondent during the hearing remote from the court. Therefore, the face-to-face confrontation requirement would be satisfied because the witness will be forced to testify in front of the respondent under oath, the respondent would have adequate time to cross-examine the witness, and via video conference with the proper equipment, the judge would be able to observe the witness's demeanor and the respondent's demeanor throughout the proceeding."]; U.S. v. Burke , 345 F.3d 416, 426 [6th Cir. 2003] ["Burke's right to confront the witnesses against him physically was not implicated. Unlike in cases where the defendant is present only via video-conferencing, Burke was in the courtroom, physically facing the witnesses, and it was only the judge who was remote."]; U.S. v. Algere , 457 F. Supp. 2d 695, 701 [E.D. La. 2005] ["even assuming arguendo that the Confrontation Clause applies to this pre-trial forcible medication hearing, the Court finds that its participation in the hearing by video teleconference will not interfere with Algere's right to confront witnesses against him. Algere will be in the same room as the witnesses, as will Algere's counsel and all other participants in the proceeding. Only the judge will be remote. Under these circumstances, Algere is able to confront the witnesses against him and to participate in their cross-examination, to the extent he is able given his mental status. Accordingly, the Court finds that its presence by video teleconference at the Sell hearing does not violate Algere's Confrontation Clause rights."]).
However, this Court's reading of Robert F. does not suggest that satisfying the right to confrontation by means other than personally appearing in the courtroom operates as an exception to Robert F. ’s central requirements for remote testimony—i.e., consent or exceptional circumstances. In other words, Robert F. dictates that testimony via videoconference should be the exception rather than the rule, particularly given that "live televised testimony is certainly not the equivalent of in-person testimony" ( Robert F. , supra , 25 N.Y.3d at 454, 13 N.Y.S.3d 319, 34 N.E.3d 829 ). Accordingly, whether respondents in MHL matters purportedly waive the right to confrontation—after that right has been asserted by counsel—by neglecting to personally attend an in-person hearing, is immaterial given the Court of Appeal's directive that either consent or exceptional circumstances must be established before remote testimony is permitted.
As discussed above, Petitioner argues that MHLS may not be discussing with their clients whether they will consent to a virtual hearing before withholding such consent. (NYSCEF No. 8, at ¶¶ 8-10 [Connolly Affirm.]). No specific evidence or information has been provided in support of these allegations and, as such, the Court will not address these allegations. Nonetheless, the Court presumes that MHLS is abiding by its ethical obligations, including Rules 1.2, 1.4, and 8.4 of 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1200.0, while representing its clients and when making representations to the Court.
Finally, Petitioner appears to suggest that Robert F. is antiquated and should not be strictly followed considering the widespread use and adoption of remote proceedings during the COVID-19 pandemic. (NYSCEF No. 8, at ¶ 5 [Connolly Affirm.]). Certainly, the Robert F. Court could not have anticipated the pandemic and the resulting assimilation of the court system and its users to remote proceedings. As discussed above, remote proceedings have largely been embraced and efforts are ongoing to further integrate technology and training to build upon the success and use of remote proceedings thus far. It is also this Court's view that continuing remote proceedings in MHL matters, particularly where the respondent him/herself does not personally appear, is appropriate.
Nonetheless, this Court is bound by Court of Appeals’ precedent, and it is ultimately for the Court of Appeals or the legislature to determine whether re-visiting this issue, given the experiences and lessons learned during the pandemic, is appropriate (see Margerum v. City of Buffalo , 148 A.D.3d 1755, 1758, 50 N.Y.S.3d 749 [4th Dept. 2017] ["It is axiomatic that the Appellate Division and the trial courts are ‘court[s] of precedent and [are] bound to follow the holding of the Court of Appeals’ "] quoting Jiannaras v. Alfant , 124 A.D.3d 582, 586, 1 N.Y.S.3d 332 [2d Dept. 2015] ). ACCORDINGLY , it is
ORDERED that Respondent's motion requesting that the proceedings in this matter be conducted in-person is GRANTED .
This shall constitute the Decision and Order of the Court.