A reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence but may determine only whether the agency's findings and decisions are against the manifest weight of the evidence. ( South Side Move of God Church v. Zoning Board of Appeals (1977), 47 Ill. App.3d 723, 365 N.E.2d 118.) If the findings are supported by competent evidence, the decision will be affirmed. St. James Temple of the A.O.H. Church of God, Inc. v. Board of Appeals (1968), 100 Ill. App.2d 302, 241 N.E.2d 525. The Chicago Zoning Ordinance, in pertinent part, provides:

We think the time has come and that this is an appropriate case in which to breathe vitality into the so far lifeless words of Judge FROESSEL that, notwithstanding that churches, with schools, enjoy a favored status in the law of zoning, nonetheless, they can be held subject to "appropriate restrictions" (Matter of Diocese of Rochester v Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 526). In our view New York should approach the position taken by the growing number of States holding what has been termed the "minority view" (1 Rathkopf, Law of Zoning and Planning [3d ed], pp 19-4-19-5; Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Latter-Day Saints v City of Porterville, 90 Cal.App.2d 656, app dsmd 338 U.S. 805, rehearing den 338 U.S. 939; Minney v City of Azusa, 164 Cal.App. 12; West Hartford Methodist Church v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 143 Conn. 263; Milwaukie Co. of Jehovah's Witnessesv Mullen, 214 Or. 281; St. James Temple of A.O.H. Church of God v Board of Appeals, 100 Ill. App.2d 302, cert den 395 U.S. 946; Miami Beach United Lutheran Church v City of Miami Beach, 82 So 2d 880 [Fla]). The issue here is not the validity of a zoning ordinance which totally excludes churches and synagogues from a residential district, or even the validity of the present regulatory ordinance in all circumstances. Rather the question is the validity of the 100-foot sideline setback restriction of this ordinance as applied specifically to respondent synagogue.

Furthermore, Evanston bases its argument on cases where churches were permitted uses somewhere in the municipality and the churches sought to locate in residential districts. See Defendant's Mem. at 8-12; South Side Move of God Church v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 47 Ill. App.3d 723, 7 Ill.Dec. 833, 365 N.E.2d 118 (1977); Coston Chapel A.M.E. Church v. Chaddick, 9 Ill. App.3d 321, 292 N.E.2d 215 (1972); St. James Temple of the A.O.H. Church of God, Inc. v. Board of Appeals, 100 Ill. App.2d 302, 241 N.E.2d 525 (1968); Minney v. City of Azusa, 164 Cal.App.2d 12, 330 P.2d 255 (1958); Corporation of Presiding Bishop C.J.L.D.S. v. Porterville, 90 Cal.App.2d 656, 203 P.2d 823, Appeal Dismissed, 338 U.S. 850, 70 S.Ct. 78, 94 L.Ed. 487 (1949). The general thrust of these cases was that churches affected the character of a residential neighborhood — by increasing traffic, making parking more difficult, and so forth — and that permitting churches only as special uses was rationally related to the municipality's exercise of its police power. Plaintiffs do not challenge Evanston's authority to regulate residential districts by means of a special use permit.

We could hold the Department has forfeited our review of these issues. People ex rel. Hartigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 117 Ill.2d 120, 131, 510 N.E.2d 865 (1987); see St. James Temple of the A.O.H. Church of God, Inc. v. Board of Appeals of the City of Chicago, 100 Ill. App.2d 302, 313, 241 N.E.2d 525 (1968) ("This court will consider only such questions as were raised and preserved in the trial court, and this principle likewise applies to review of an administrative determination.") Because the parties contest significant tax liability, we will consider the merits of the Department's appeal. While "[t]he findings and conclusions of the administrative agency on questions of fact shall be held to be prima facie true and correct" ( 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 1998)), a reviewing court may revisit the agency's conclusions of law de novo ( Branson v. Department of Revenue, 168 Ill.2d 247, 254, 659 N.E.2d 961 (1995)).

A fair reading of this ordinance suggests the effect of a proposed use on the neighborhood traffic flow as a relevant consideration in ruling on a special use application. As the court stated in St. James Temple of the A.O.H. Church of God, Inc. v. Board of Appeals (1968), 100 Ill. App.2d 302, 310, 241 N.E.2d 525, 529, cert. denied (1969), 395 U.S. 946, 23 L.Ed.2d 464, 89 S.Ct. 2019: "We realize that traffic congestion during church services is always present no matter where a church might be located, but a municipality must consider traffic and parking as important factors in determining whether the public safety and welfare are protected through the grant of a special use."

• 3 Of course, the location of churches and other religious sanctuaries can be regulated by zoning ordinances in proper cases. (See South Side Move of God Church v. Zoning Board of Appeals (1977), 47 Ill. App.3d 723, 365 N.E.2d 118; Coston Chapel A.M.E. Church v. Chaddick (1972), 9 Ill. App.3d 321, 292 N.E.2d 215; St. James Temple of the A.O.H. Church of God, Inc. v. Board of Appeals (1968), 100 Ill. App.2d 302, 241 N.E.2d 525.) However, in determining whether this is a proper case for such a restriction, we must take into account that the right of freedom of religion, and other first amendment freedoms, rise above mere property rights.

From a comparison of the statutory requirements with the notice sent to the plaintiff and included in the record, it appears that any deficiency of the Department's notice concerned its failure to allege that assessment was sought under the County Service Occupation Tax Act, and to refer to Rule 4 of the Department of Revenue's Retailers' Occupation Tax Rules. Despite this omission in the notice, we note that plaintiff failed to object at any point to the notice issued by the Department below. As such, any claim by plaintiff that the notice did not comply with section 10 will not be considered inasmuch as this matter has been waived by plaintiff's failure to object to the omission of the aforementioned items. St. James Temple of A.O.H. Church of God, Inc. v. Board of Appeals (1968), 100 Ill. App.2d 302, 241 N.E.2d 525, cert. denied (1969), 395 U.S. 946, 23 L.Ed.2d 464, 89 S.Ct. 2019. Plaintiff next argues, without citation to authority, that it was improper for a hearing to be held until it was determined that he was subject to tax, and that no authority to determine jurisdiction is given to the Department in the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act.

A reviewing court may examine the findings to determine whether they are supported by the evidence. If there is competent evidence to support the findings, the decision will be affirmed. St. James Temple of the A.O.H. Church of God, Inc. v. Board of Appeals (1968), 100 Ill. App.2d 302, 309, 241 N.E.2d 525, 528. La Salle National Bank v. County of Cook (1957), 12 Ill.2d 40, 145 N.E.2d 65, referred to by the trial court, is inapplicable.

Plaintiff also complains that the Committee limited his closing statement to five minutes. It is a well-settled rule that objections not raised or arguments not made during administrative proceedings will not be heard for the first time on review. St. James Temple of the A.O.H. Church of God, Inc. v. Board of Appeals (1968), 100 Ill. App.2d 302, 241 N.E.2d 525, cert. denied (1969), 395 U.S. 946, 23 L.Ed.2d 464, 89 S.Ct. 2019. From our review of the hearing transcript, we are unable to find any express limitation by the Committee of the time allowed to the parties for summation, nor does it appear that plaintiff made any objection to any limitation of his time for closing argument.

Upon administrative review, the trial court was authorized to examine the Board's findings to determine if they were supported by competent evidence. ( Roosevelt Memorial Hospital v. Chaddick (1st Dist. 1970), 131 Ill. App.2d 82, 87, 266 N.E.2d 755; St. James Temple v. Board of Appeals (1st Dist. 1968), 100 Ill. App.2d 302, 309, 241 N.E.2d 525.) We think the Board's decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.