Petitioner "need not refer [to] chapter and verse [of] the U.S. Constitution." St. Helen v. Senkowski, 374 F.3d 181, 182 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (internal quotations and citations omitted, brackets in original), cert. denied sub nom. St. Helen v. Miller, 543 U.S. 1058 (2005). A petitioner can alert a State court to the federal constitutional nature of his claim in various ways, including "(a) reliance on pertinent federal cases employing constitutional analysis, (b) reliance on state cases employing constitutional analysis in like fact situations, (c) assertion of the claim in terms so particular as to call to mind a specific right protected by the Constitution, and (d) allegation of a pattern of facts that is well within the mainstream of constitutional litigation."
The circumstances under which a federal court may properly consider the substance of procedurally defaulted claims are quite limited; such claims may only be addressed where the petitioner can establish both cause for the procedural default and resulting prejudice, or alternatively, that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would occur absent federal court review.Dixon v. Miller, 293 F.3d 74, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Coleman v. Thompson); St. Helen v. Senkowski, 374 F.3d 181, 184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., St. Helen v. Miller, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct 871 (2005) ("In the case of procedural default (including where an unexhausted claim no longer can proceed in state court), [federal courts] may reach the merits of the claim 'only if the defendant can first demonstrate either cause and actual prejudice, or that he is actually innocent.'") (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998) (other citations omitted)); see generally Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986)