The general proposition that damages may spring from delay can be simply stated: "In the absence of a specific contract provision to the contrary, a party to a contract may recover damages caused by delay in the commencement or completion of performance if it can be shown that the delay was a breach of that contract." St. Germain Son v. Taunton Redev. Authy., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 46, 48 (1976). It is possible to waive a "time is of the essence" clause orally or implicitly, but doing so requires unequivocal actions on the part of the waiving party.

Based upon our research, we conclude that the title of a document is not controlling as to its legal effect. See Columbia Club v. American Fletcher Realty, 720 N.E.2d 411 (Ind. App. 1999); Wayne J. Griffin Elec. v. Dunn Const., 622 So.2d 314 (Ala. 1993); Howard v. FMC Corp., 98 Idaho 465, 567 P.2d 10 (1977); St. Germain Son, Inc. v. Taunton Redevelop. Auth., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 46, 340 N.E.2d 916 (1976). [T]he designation that a party gives to an instrument, i.e., the title of a document or the caption of a provision, does not alter the meaning of the contents of the document — it does not control the interpretation or construction of the document, the legal effect of the document, or the relationship of the parties; and it does not determine the nature or character of the document.

Wes-Julian Constr. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 351 Mass. 588, 594 (1967). St. Germain Son v. Taunton Redevelopment Authy., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 46, 48 (1976). But a clause which exculpates the awarding authority from liability for damages arising out of delay is enforceable.

Moreover, the parties' agreement that the lease is free from ambiguity requires that the critical words and phrases of the lease be construed in accordance with their ordinary and usual sense, see Ober v. National Cas. Co., 318 Mass. 27, 30 (1945); Fried v. Fried, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 660, 663 (1977), giving reasonable meaning to each of the provisions of the lease. See McMahon v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 345 Mass. 261, 264 (1962); St. Germain Son v. Taunton Redevelopment Authy., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 46, 49 (1976). We say "[s]urprisingly" because, although the parties agreed that the language of section 12.2 is not ambiguous, and the judge accordingly ruled that parol evidence of the parties' intent, and circumstances pertaining to the execution of the lease, was inadmissible, we think, for several reasons, that such evidence would have been helpful and should have been admitted.

Lewis v. Commonwealth, 332 Mass. 4, 6 (1954). St. Germain Son v. Taunton Redev. Authy., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 46, 51 (1976). Poskus v. Braemoor Nursing Home, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 896, 897 (1978).

The judge correctly precluded Slater's attorney from cross-examining Hillman on immaterial and in many instances repetitious points concerning the details of the land damage action. See St. Germain Son v. Taunton Redevelopment Authy., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 46, 53-54 (1976). Hillman was questioned at length about the nature and extent of the services rendered on Slater's behalf, and it is obvious from the remarks of Slater's attorney at the side bar that much of the information now claimed to have been wrongfully excluded was not within the scope of the judge's narrow limitation on cross-examination and, in fact, had already been testified to by Hillman.

There is nothing on the face of that letter which even remotely suggests that Republic undertook to supervise the construction of the entire roof, nor was there any ambiguity such as that imagined by the trial judge. See St. Germain Son v. Taunton Redevelopment Authy., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 46, 51 (1976); Poskus v. Braemoor Nursing Home, Inc., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 896 (1980). 2.

Quite apart from the question whether all this evidence constituted inadmissible hearsay, as the trial judge ruled, the committee was not harmed by any of the exclusions. St. Germain Son v. Taunton Redev. Authy., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 46, 53-54 (1976). Burns v. Combined Ins. Co., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 86, 92 (1978).

Wes-Julian Constr. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 351 Mass. 588, 594 (1967). St. Germain Son v. Taunton Redevelopment Authy., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 46, 48 (1976). The master could properly estimate the delay to the over-all project arising out of the subcontractor's inaction.

Robert Industries, Inc. v. Spence, 362 Mass. 751, 755 (1973). St. Germain Son, Inc. v. Taunton Redevelopment Authy., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 46, 51 (1976). The FHA Owner-Architect Agreement provides that the services being recompensed include "all services already performed" and that its provisions "supercede and void all inconsistent provisions of any prior contract."