Under Florida law, "it is [also] established that the cause of action for false imprisonment accrues on the day of arrest." See Bush v. City of Daytona Beach, No. 6:12-cv-1541-ORL-36, 2013 WL 3209430, at *3 (M.D. Fla. June 24, 2013) (citing Dade v. Metro-Dade Police Dep't., 557 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (affirming that the false imprisonment claim accrued at the time of plaintiff's arrest rather than several years later when he allegedly discovered the subject computer error); see also Leatherwood v. City of Key West, 347 So. 2d 442, 442 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). In appropriate circumstances, to avoid a statute of limitations bar, a party may invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

Indeed, it is established that the cause of action for false imprisonment accrues on the day of arrest. See, e.g. Dade v. Metro-Dade Police Dept., 557 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 3d DCA1990) (affirming that the false imprisonment claim accrued at the time of plaintiff's arrest rather than several years later when he allegedly discovered the subject computer error); Leatherwood v. City of Key West, 347 So. 2d 442, 442 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (holding that a cause of action for false arrest and imprisonment accrues on the day of Plaintiff's arrest). In Response, Plaintiff merely refers to its argument on continuing torts and states that "the same analysis would apply to Plaintiffs' causes of action based upon false arrest/imprisonment as well as Civil Rights violations."

Based on the Florida Supreme Court's decisions in Wolkowsky v. Goodkind, 153 Fla. 267, 14 So.2d 398 (1943), and Leibovit v. Garfunkel, 68 Fla. 463, 67 So. 98 (1914), as well as this court's decision in General Hospital of Greater Miami, Inc. v. Gager, 160 So.2d 749 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 168 So.2d 145 (Fla. 1964), that a successor judge has the authority to rule upon a motion for a new trial in a jury case, we grant the petition and issue the writ of mandamus instructing the court to rule upon the merits of the pending motions. The suggestions to the contrary in K.C. v. A.P., 577 So.2d 669, 670 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 589 So.2d 289 (Fla. 1991), and State ex rel. Wesley Constr. Co. v. O'Connell, 347 So.2d 442, 443 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), are, in our view, dictum.

We agree with Carter that because of the expiration of his order of assignment, Judge Williams was without jurisdiction to hear any portion of Carter's motion to tax costs. State ex rel. Wesley Constr. Co. v. O'Connell, 347 So.2d 442 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). An order or judgment entered in a judicial proceeding as to a subject not within the judicial power of a court or a judge is a nullity. Caudell v. Leventis, 43 So.2d 853 (Fla. 1950); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Maxey, 64 Fla. 487, 60 So. 353 (1912).