Ejectment is a possessory action only. R.S. 1919, sec. 1815; Rogers v. Mayes, 84 Mo. 520; Kelpe v. Kuppertz, 235 Mo. 479. E.E. Richards, Floyd M. Sprague and Chas. H. Mayer for respondent.
Sec. 779, R.S. 1929; Sissman v. Wells, 255 S.W. 937, 213 Mo. App. 474; Berryman v. Southern Surety Co., 227 S.W. 102, 285 Mo. 379; Platte v. Parker-Washington, 144 S.W. 143, 161 Mo. App. 669; Mathieson v. Ry. Co., 118 S.W. 12, 219 Mo. 542; Harris v. Hannibal St. J. Ry. Co., 37 Mo. 308; Newham v. Kenton, 79 Mo. 382; Springfield Engine Thresher Co. v. Donovan, 147 Mo. 622; Stafford v. Shinabarger, 81 S.W.2d 626; Jacobs v. Waldron, 317 Mo. 1133, 298 S.W. 773. (2) The answer of defendant did not convert or change plaintiffs' statutory action in ejectment into an action of equity. Rogers v. Mayes, 84 Mo. 520; Kelpe v. Kuppertz, 235 Mo. 479, 139 S.W. 335. (3) A prayer for equitable relief in an answer or petition, unsupported by allegations, is insufficient to convert cause into equity. Peterson v. Larson, 225 S.W. 704; Pearson v. Heumann, 242 S.W. 946, 294 Mo. 526; Stafford v. Shinabargar, 81 S.W.2d 626; Jacobs v. Waldron, 317 Mo. 1137, 298 S.W. 773. (4) An action to quiet and defend title is statutory. Kanan v. Wright, 270 S.W. 650. (5) The trial court should have sustained defendant, Eno Eversmeyer's motion to strike all that part of plaintiffs' reply which attempted to plead a new cause of action, that of subrogation.
Meek v. Clear Jack Mining Co., 124 S.W. 1084, 141 Mo. App. 648; Blurton v. Hanson, 135 Mo. App. 548; Tootle v. Buckingham, 190 Mo. 183. Under the homestead law, as it then existed, the widow though vested with the fee in an alloted homestead, could not convey the title to a stranger and thus deprive the minors of their homestead rights. Rogers v. Mayes, 84 Mo. 520. L.V. McPherson, Rex V. McPherson and J.M. McPherson for respondent.
A probate homestead is an entirety, and cannot be destroyed by the act of one of the parties interested therein. (Waples on Homestead and Exemption, 644; Rhorer v. Brockhage , 86 Mo. 544; Rogers v. Mayes , 84 Mo. 520; Whittle v. Samuels , 54 Ga. 548; Showers v. Robinson , 43 Mich. 512; Roberts v. Ware , 80 Mo. 363; Kochling v. Daniel , 82 Mo. 54; Miller v. Marckle , 27 Ill. 405; Walters v. People , 21 Ill. 178; Johnston v. Turner , 29 Ark. 280; Canole v. Hurt , 78 Mo. 649.) If the alleged mortgage creates any lien at all on the interest of Julia Hoppe (but we submit it does not), it cannot be enforced until the youngest child attains its majority.
Id. The court in State ex rel. District Attorney v. Adams, 794 P.2d 422 (Okla. 1990), stated: Title 19 O.S.Supp. 1989, § 215.9[ 19-215.
Id. The court in State ex rel. District Attorney v. Adams, 794 P.2d 422 (Okla. 1990), stated: Title 19 O.S.Supp. 1989, § 215.9[ 19-215.
The de facto officer/usurper distinction is perhaps best illustrated by way of example. For instance, Oklahoma law requires district attorneys to appoint a first assistant district attorney and file such designation of office with the Secretary of State. After this requirement is met and the designee has filed the statutorily required oath, the first assistant district attorney may, as a de facto officer, perform the duties required by law to be performed by the district attorney during the period of time between a resignation or death of the district attorney and the appointment by the Governor of a qualified person to serve the balance of the district attorney's unexpired term. See State ex rel. Dist. Attorney v. Adams, 794 P.2d 422, 422 (Okla. 1990). Standing in stark contrast to such an instance would be a situation where a person is appointed or hired by someone lacking appointing and hiring authority over the objection of the body vested with appointing and hiring authority.