Opinion
No. C00-3106 MMC
June 26, 2001
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the Court is defendant Brenda Miller's ("Miller") motion, filed January 15, 2001, to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, respectively. Plaintiffs filed opposition, to which Miller replied.
Although defendant Miller moves on behalf of herself and the National Association of Legislative Review, Inc., ("NALR"), defendant NALR, a corporation, cannot appear without counsel. See Civil L.R. 3-9 (b). Where the Court's analysis applies equally to both the individual and corporate defendant, however, the Court is not precluded from ruling in favor of the corporate defendant simply by reason of that defendant's failure to file a separate motion. See Silverton v. Department of Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981).
Defendant additionally filed a "motion to compel final determination," and both parties filed additional exhibits.
By order filed January 25, 2001, the motion was deemed submitted without oral argument. Having considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Jimmie St. Clair, a state prisoner, and Barbara St. Clair, his sister, allege that Miller, President of NALR, sent each plaintiff letters which plaintiffs allege constitute "extortion." (See First Amended Complaint ("FAC") at ¶¶ 2, 6, 8.) Barbara St. Clair further alleges that Miller libeled her by publishing to state officials false statements that she was involved in criminal or fraudulent activity. (See id. at ¶¶ 10, 11.) All of Miller's letters include an allegation that Jimmie St. Clair was paid $200 to perform legal work for another prisoner, Charles Morgan ("Morgan"), and that Jimmie St. Clair refused to return the funds.
In their opposition, plaintiffs request that the Court allow them to amend their FAC allege their existing claims against two other NALR officers, Beverly Mowery ("Mowery") and James McBride ("McBride"). Both Mowery and McBride were named as defendants in plaintiffs' initial complaint and were dismissed by plaintiffs due to plaintiffs' inability to locate them. For the reasons expressed infra, plaintiffs' request to amend is hereby DENIED as futile.
The first letter, dated July 28, 1999 and sent to each of the plaintiffs, requested that plaintiffs return to Morgan $150 of the funds within 30 days, and stated, "[p]lease consider the weighty alternatives available to Mr. Morgan, by and through my Office, to promptly alleviate these matters should you prefer not to return the money." (See Def's Mot. Ex. B.) After receiving no response from plaintiffs, Miller sent a second letter dated September 9, 1999, giving plaintiffs "formal notice of [NALR's] intent to expose circumstances of wrong doing," demanding payment of the entire $200 no later than September 30, 1999, and stating she would contact state prison officials and the district attorney, as well as "commence our investigation" and thereafter file a "civil action against [plaintiffs] in the Sacramento Superior Court and promptly." (See id.) On September 22, 1999, Jimmie St. Clair responded to Miller's second letter by accusing her of committing "extortion." (See id. Ex. C.)
Thereafter, in a letter dated October 11, 1999, Miller made a complaint to the Director of the California Department of Corrections ("CDC") against Jimmie St. Clair, contending that his acceptance of money in exchange for legal services was in violation of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations. (See id.) Miller also allegedly sent a letter to the Amador County District Attorney in which Miller stated that Barbara St. Clair had committed "unspecified criminal acts." (See FAC at ¶ 11.)
The alleged letter has not been offered by any party, and Miller has neither admitted nor denied writing such a letter. For purposes of considering Miller's motion, however, the Court will assume the letter was sent.
After conducting an investigation, the CDC determined that both Morgan and Jimmie St. Clair had violated "CDC Rules DR 3163," which prohibits inmates from receiving compensation for preparing legal documents on behalf of other inmates. (See Def.'s Mot Ex. C.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Although Miller has alternatively noticed her motion as one for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), both parties have submitted evidence in support of their respective positions. Where a district court considers extrinsic evidence in resolving a motion seeking to resolve claims, "the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56." See Rule 12(b)(6).
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court may grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
The Supreme Court's 1986 "trilogy" of Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), requires that a party seeking summary judgment show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The moving party need not produce admissible evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact when the nonmoving party has the burden of proof, but may discharge its burden simply by pointing out that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324-25. Once the moving party has done so, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" See id. at 324 (quoting Rule 56(c)). "When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted). When determining whether there is a genuine issue for trial, "inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs' FAC includes two claims: an extortion claim on behalf of both plaintiffs, and a libel claim on behalf of Barbara St. Clair. (See Pl.'s Opp. at 1:27-28.)
A. Extortion Claim
Under California law, Jimmie St. Clair, a state prisoner, is not entitled to accept money to perform legal work on behalf of other prisoners. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3163. Miller thus argues that plaintiffs cannot prevail on their extortion claim because her letters to plaintiffs were reasonable efforts to assist Morgan in his attempt to recover money wrongfully obtained by Jimmie St. Clair.
California recognizes a cause of action in tort where a defendant attempts to obtain property by wrongful conduct, such as a threat to institute legal proceedings "where the defendant [knows] the claim asserted [is] false." See Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal.2d 195, 204 (Cal. 1959) (holding plaintiffs stated a claim for duress by alleging they suffered economic loss due to defendants' filing of civil action where defendants knew claims made therein were false; noting "threat" to file such action would also constitute duress). Whether the claim is denominated as "extortion, menace, or duress," "[t]o be actionable the threat of prosecution must be made with the knowledge of the falsity of the claim." See Fuhrman v. California Satellite Systems, Inc., 179 Cal.App.3d 408, 426 (Cal.Ct.App. 1986), disapproved on other grounds, Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal.3d 205, 212-13 (Cal. 1990).
Plaintiffs argue that the truth is no defense to a claim of extortion. Irrespective of whether plaintiffs' argument is correct as to the crime of extortion, it is an incorrect statement of the law as to a civil action in tort.
In her first letter to plaintiffs, Miller stated that Morgan was the source of defendant's information. (See Def.'s Mot. Ex. B.) Specifically, Miller advised plaintiffs that Morgan had reported to NALR that Jimmie St. Clair had been paid $200 to perform legal work for Morgan, and that Morgan had twice written letters to Barbara St. Clair in an unsuccessful effort to get Jimmie St. Clair to return the funds. (See id.) Plaintiffs do not dispute that Miller wrote the letters to plaintiffs after Morgan told Miller about his contacts with plaintiffs and asked for Miller's assistance.
California inmates are not allowed to correspond with each other unless they receive prior approval from "the institutional head of the correctional facility where the inmates are confined." See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3139.
Moreover, Jimmie St. Clair has admitted receiving the funds and that such funds were provided to him to perform legal work for Morgan. (See Pls.' Opp. at 3.) Jimmie St. Clair has further admitted that he pleaded guilty to the charge that he violated prison regulations by accepting money to perform legal work for Morgan. (See id.) Barbara St. Clair has admitted receiving from Morgan correspondence about the "deed" to which defendant referred in her letters. (See Def.'s Req. for Judicial Notice, Ex. A.) Because Miller's letters were based on Morgan's report to NALR and plaintiffs' admissions establish that Morgan's report is based on true facts, plaintiffs cannot establish that the charges Miller made in her letters to plaintiffs were false. See Leeper, 53 Cal.2d at 204; Fuhrman, 179 Cal.App.3d at 426. Accordingly, Miller is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' claim of extortion.
Moreover, after receiving Miller's letter of September 9, 1999, Barbara St. Clair wrote Morgan to advise him to ask Miller to stop seeking a return of the money because Miller's involvement might cause Morgan to suffer "some consequences." (See id. Ex. B.)
B. Libel Claim
Plaintiffs allege that Miller libeled Barbara St. Clair by reporting to the district attorney that she had committed criminal acts, and by indicating to the CDC that she was possibly acting in concert with Jimmie St. Clair with respect to his violations of prison regulations. (See FAC at 11.)
Pursuant to § 47(b) of the California Civil Code, a letter sent to a district attorney "designed to prompt a criminal prosecution" is absolutely privileged. See Passman v. Torkan, 34 Cal.App. 4th 607, 616 (Cal.Ct.App. 1995) (holding letter sent to district attorney accusing plaintiff of "numerous fraudulent and criminal acts" absolutely privileged). The absolute privilege applies even if a plaintiff reports a crime "in bad faith." See Cabesuela v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 68 Cal.App.4th 101, 112 (4th Dist. 1998) (holding report to police falsely accusing plaintiff of crime was absolutely privileged). Accordingly, Miller's letter to the district attorney was absolutely privileged under California law.
The Court's jurisdiction over the instant action is based on diversity and, consequently, the action is governed by California law.
As to Miller's letter to the CDC, Miller requested that the Director investigate whether Jimmie St. Clair violated state regulations by accepting funds to perform legal work on behalf of Morgan. Miller also reported to the Director that Morgan had unsuccessfully sought the return of the funds by writing Barbara St. Clair at an address provided to Morgan by Jimmie St. Clair, and that Barbara St. Clair was "possibl[y] acting in concert" with her brother. (See Def.'s Mot Ex. C.) Under § 47(b)(3), communications designed to "prompt official action" by an agency which has the power to conduct "quasi-judicial" proceedings are likewise privileged. See Brody v. Montalbano, 87 Cal.App.3d 725, 731-32 (Cal.Ct.App. 1978) (holding letter to school board requesting investigation into conduct of vice principal absolutely privileged). The Director of the CDC is empowered to investigate and prosecute actions concerning violations of prison regulations. See Cal. Gov't Code § 11180 (empowering department heads to investigate and prosecute charges that department regulations have been violated); Cal. Penal Code § 5052 (providing that Director of CDC has powers set forth in § 11180 of the Government Code). The CDC is also empowered to take "legal or administrative measures" against a person who, in corresponding with an inmate, does not comply with prison regulations. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3132(b). The charges made in Miller's letter requesting an investigation fall within the scope of the CDC's quasi-judicial authority. Accordingly, Miller's letter to the CDC was absolutely privileged.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Miller's motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED as to both defendant Miller and defendant NALR.
The Clerk shall close the file and terminate any pending motions.
IT IS SO ORDERED.