Opinion
No. 2-232 / 01-0121.
Filed July 19, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Greene County, JOEL E. SWANSON, Judge.
The plaintiffs appeal the dismissal, on the defendants' motion for summary judgment, of the plaintiffs' petition for declaratory judgment. AFFIRMED.
Richard St. Clair pro se, Jefferson, and Jack Tiffany pro se, Dana, for appellants.
Mark D. Lowe of Hopkins Huebner, Des Moines, for appellees.
Considered by MAHAN, P.J., and MILLER and HECHT, JJ.
The plaintiffs appeal the dismissal, on the defendants' motion for summary judgment, of the plaintiffs' petition for declaratory judgment. We affirm.
Defendant Eugene Blanshan was elected as a member of the Greene County Board of Supervisors in the November 1998 general election. On July 26, 2000, plaintiffs Richard St. Clair and Jack Tiffany filed a petition for declaratory judgment. They alleged Blanshan had established a residence in Guthrie County, Iowa, and by doing so either was not qualified for the office at the time he assumed the office or had since vacated the office. The plaintiffs requested that the court declare Blanshan's position as a supervisor vacant and that it had been vacant since a date to be determined by the court. They requested no other relief.
Iowa Code section 331.201 (1999) provided: "A supervisor must be a qualified elector of the county or supervisor district of the county which the supervisor represents." Iowa Code section 69.2 provided in relevant part that every civil office shall be vacant upon "The incumbent ceasing to be a resident of the district [or] county . . . by or for which the incumbent was elected."
The defendants answered and asserted affirmative defenses which included that Blanshan had tendered his resignation to be effective August 21, 2000. On August 29, 2000, the defendants moved for summary judgment on grounds that, among other things, Blanshan's resignation rendered the plaintiffs' petition moot. They supported their motion with an August 25 affidavit of the Greene County Auditor. It stated Blanshan had submitted his resignation, to be effective August 21, 2000, his resignation had been accepted, and his seat declared vacant as of August 21, 2000.
After a continuance sought by plaintiff St. Clair, the motion for summary judgment was heard November 13, 2000. The district court found that Blanshan had resigned effective August 21, the resignation was accepted, someone had been appointed pursuant to section 69.8(4) to replace him until the next election, and the position had been filled by the election of November 7, 2000. It sustained the motion, holding that because Blanshan had resigned and a new supervisor had been elected the request for declaratory relief was moot. The court also acknowledged but overruled the plaintiffs' contention that determining the exact date the vacancy occurred would be of significance in the lawsuit.
Our scope and standards of review of a grant of summary judgment are well established, as set forth in Wright v. American Cyanamid Co., 599 N.W.2d 668, 670 (Iowa 1999) and Zohn v. Menard, Inc., 598 N.W.2d 323, 325-26 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999), and need not be repeated here.
The plaintiffs raise several issues on appeal. We find it necessary to address only one.
The plaintiffs claim the district court erred in finding the issues raised by their lawsuit were moot. They assert that although the issue of whether the office claimed by Blanshan was vacant at the time of hearing was moot, the issues of when the vacancy occurred and whether Blanshan had sufficient occupancy of the office to be able to resign were not moot.
"An issue is moot when a judgment, if rendered, would have no practical effect upon the existing controversy." Elview Const. Co. v. North Scott Cmty. Sch. Dist., 373 N.W.2d 138, 142 (Iowa 1985). The "controversy" raised by and involved in the plaintiffs' lawsuit is whether Blanshan was a member of the Greene County Board of Supervisors. If as undisputed fact Blanshan was not a member of the board at the time the motion for summary judgment was heard and decided, the date on which or from which the position on the board became vacant was immaterial to any other issue or request for relief in the case.
Counsel for the defendants argued at the summary judgment hearing that following Blanshan's resignation his position on the board was filled pursuant to the procedure provided by Iowa Code chapter 69, and the position was subsequently filled through the November 7 general election. However, we find nothing in the record properly before the district court in the summary judgment proceeding that established as undisputed those two facts found by the court. Nevertheless, the record does establish as undisputed fact that Blanshan was not a member of the board at the time of the summary judgment hearing and ruling, whether because his resignation had been accepted or because he had never legally held the office. We therefore fully agree with the district court's conclusion that the issue or controversy involved in the plaintiffs' lawsuit, whether Blanshan was a member of the board, was moot. We also agree with the district court that because that issue had become moot, any issue concerning the date the vacancy had occurred became immaterial to any other issue or request for relief properly before the court, and therefore also became moot. We find no error in the district court's grant of summary judgment.
We have carefully considered all other issues raised by the plaintiffs in this appeal and find they are not preserved for review, are without merit, or their resolution is unnecessary to our decision.
AFFIRMED.