Upon appeal before this court, the plaintiffs initially remind us that we previously have concluded that §§ 8-3 (g) and 8-7d (b), which provide for the automatic approval of site plan applications, are applicable to the submission of a site plan that is inseparable from an application for a special permit. SSM Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Plan Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 331, 336-37, 559 A.2d 196 (1989). Indeed, as both parties to the present case suggest, our decisions in cases such as SSM Associates Ltd. Partnership and its progeny have led to some confusion in this particular area of the law.

In its supplemental memorandum filed on May 20, 2005, the plaintiff argued as a matter of law that it is aggrieved with regard to approval of the amendment with conditions for two reasons. First, relying on SSM Associates Limited Partnership v. Plan Zoning Commission, 211 Conn 331, 559 A.2d 196 (1989) and River Bend Associates, Inc. v. Zoning Commission, 271 Conn. 1, 30-31, 856 A.2d 973 (2004), it argues that the zone change and site plan applications are integrally related to the proposed amendment to the zoning regulations and that the defendant's denials of the zone change and site plan applications, therefore, effectively constitute denial of the proposed regulation. In support of this contention, it argues that the proposed amendment was site specific, noting that it is applicable only to sites between nine and eleven acres in size having frontage on Route 7/Danbury Road which are not currently zoned DE-5 or DE-10. It maintains that these restrictions render the new regulation applicable to the subject property alone.

A The plaintiffs first claim that the trial court improperly concluded that the town's failure to render a decision on their site plan application did not result in automatic approval of their application pursuant to 8-3(g) and 8-7d. The plaintiffs contend that the decisions in SSM Associates Limited Partnership v. Plan Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 331, 335-37, 559 A.2d 196 (1989), and Carr v. Woolwich, 7 Conn. App. 684, 699-701, 510 A.2d 1358, cert. denied, 201 Conn. 804, 513 A.2d 698 (1986), control this case. We disagree.

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) SSM Associates Limited Partnership v. Plan Zoning Commission, 15 Conn. App. 561, 567, 545 A.2d 602 (1988), aff'd, 211 Conn. 331, 559 A.2d 196 (1989). As used in General Statutes 8-3 (g), a site plan is "a general term which is used in a functional sense to denote a plan for the proposed use of a particular site, purporting to indicate all the information required by the regulations for that use."

The plaintiff first claims that its site plan was approved automatically by virtue of General Statutes § 8-3 (g). It argues that § 8-3 (g) requires an affirmative denial of the application and that because of the tie vote on the motion to approve, there was not such a denial. Relying on SSM Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Plan Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 331, 559 A.2d 196 (1989), the plaintiff further argues that although § 8-3 (g) applies only to site plans, its special permit was approved because it was inseparable from the site plan. The defendants argue that according to parliamentary procedure, a tie vote on a motion to approve amounts to a denial and, therefore, the application was denied within the specified period in accordance with § 8-3 (g). Additionally, they argue that even if the site plan is deemed approved by virtue of the statute, the special permit was not subject to the automatic approval provisions of § 8-3 (g) and was denied by virtue of the tie vote.

A site plan is a plan for the proposed use of a particular site, purporting to indicate all of the information required by the regulations for the use. SSM Associates Ltd. Partnership v . Plan Zoning Commission, 15 Conn. App. 561, 565 n. 4, 545 A.2d 602 (1988), aff'd, 211 Conn. 331, 559 A.2d 196 (1989). The length of time that a use not permitted by zoning regulations has existed without the institution of court action to enforce the regulations can be a factor in determining whether the use may be continued.

Both this court and our Supreme Court have held that § 8-7d (b) governs the time constraints for decisions on site plan applications where no public hearing is required. SSM Associates Limited Partnership v. Plan Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 331, 559 A.2d 196 (1989); Carr v. Woolwich, 7 Conn. App. 684, 510 A.2d 1358, cert. denied, 201 Conn. 804, 513 A.2d 698 (1986), overruled on other grounds, 225 Conn. 432, 632 A.2d 1007 (1993); see footnote 2. General Statutes § 8-7d, generally, sets mandatory time limits on the review of site plan applications.

" Id. at 2639. The court in SSM Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Plan and Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 331, 559 A.2d 196 (1989), addressed this very issue. In that case, the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs finding that the plaintiffs had filed an application for the approval of a site plan. Citing Carr v. Woolwich, 7 Conn.App. 684, cert. denied, 201 Conn. 804 (1986), the court held that the commission's failure to act on the plaintiffs' site plan triggered the 65-day deadline and compelled automatic approval pursuant to General Statutes §§ 8-3(g) and 8-7d(b).

The court concluded that since the commission failed to act on the site plan within the time limit that it was considered approved under section 8-3(g). Id., 697, 700. A similar result was reached in SSM Associates Limited Partnership v. Plan and Zoning Commission, 15 Conn. App. 561 (1988), affirmed, 211 Conn. 331 (1989). The Supreme Court concluded however that the case was governed by subsection (b) of section 8-7d, and declined to decide whether mandatory approval also resulted from noncompliance with subsection (a) of the statute.

In Merlo v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 196 Conn. 676, 680-81, 495 A.2d 268 (1985), we acknowledged our prior implicit approval of the remedy of mandamus in cases where it is claimed that a zoning authority has failed to comply with statutory time limits. See also SSM Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Plan & Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 331, 332, 559 A.2d 196 (1989) (affirming judgment granting writ of mandamus in §§ 8-7d [b] and 8-3 [g] automatic approval case); Harlow v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 194 Conn. 187, 196-97, 479 A.2d 808 (1984) (mandamus is appropriate remedy when commission does not decide site plan application within sixty-five days); Caldrello v. Planning Board, 193 Conn. 387, 392-93, 476 A.2d 1063 (1984) (because failure to act on application within time limit results in approval by operation of law, plaintiff had clear legal right to issuance of certificate of approval for subdivision plan). Accordingly, under §§ 8-7d (b) and 8-3 (g), a plaintiff is entitled to a writ of mandamus when the statutory time limit has expired as long as "approval of a site plan is the only requirement to be met or remaining to be met under the zoning regulations . . . ."