Opinion
CL-2022-0737
07-07-2023
S.R.E. v. SHELBY COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
Lisa C. Robinson, Birmingham, for appellant. Steve Marshall, att’y gen., and Felicia M. Brooks, chief legal counsel, and Elizabeth Hendrix, asst, att’y gen., Department of Human Resources, for appellee.
Lisa C. Robinson, Birmingham, for appellant.
Steve Marshall, att’y gen., and Felicia M. Brooks, chief legal counsel, and Elizabeth Hendrix, asst, att’y gen., Department of Human Resources, for appellee.
FRIDY, Judge.
S.R.E. appeals from a judgment of the Shelby Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") insofar as it purports to terminate his parental rights to N.A.T. Because the record on appeal does not affirmatively indicate that S.R.E. is the legal father of N.A.T. and, therefore, does not affirmatively indicate that the juvenile court had subject-matter jurisdiction to terminate S.R.E.’s parental rights to N.A.T., we dismiss the appeal with instructions.
S.R.E. married C.J. ("the mother"), N.A.T.’s mother, when N.A.T. was two years old. The undisputed evidence indicates that S.R.E. is not the biological father of N.A.T. After the mother married S.R.E., she gave birth to four other chil- dren, namely, S.E.E., C.E.E., Ja.N.E., and Je.E. The undisputed evidence indicates that S.R.E. is the biological father of those four children. S.R.E. and the mother were still married when the juvenile court held the final healing in this action.
S.R.E. testified that he had supported N.A.T. after he married the mother and that he had treated N.A.T. as though she was his own child while she was in his and the mother’s custody; however, the record contains no evidence indicating (1) that S.R.E. ever claimed in a written document filed with an Alabama court or with the Alabama Office of Vital Statistics that he was the father of N.A.T., (2) that S.R.E. was ever named as N.A.T.’s father on her birth certificate, (3) that S.R.E. is obligated to support N.A.T. by a written promise or a court order, or (4) that S.R.E. ever held out N.A.T. as his natural child. On October 19, 2021, in a child-support action that the Shelby County Department of Human Resources ("DHR") had brought against S.R.E., the juvenile court entered a consent judgment adjudicating him the legal father of S.E.E., C.E.E., Ja.N.E. and Je.E., his four biological children, and ordering him to pay child support for them. That consent judgment neither adjudicated him the legal father of N.A.T. nor ordered him to pay child support for N.A.T.
In February 2021, DHR commenced an action alleging that the mother and L.T. were the parents of N.A.T. and seeking the termination of their parental rights to N.A.T. The juvenile court held a final hearing in that action on March 2, 2022, and, on May 23, 2022, entered a final judgment. In pertinent part, the judgment stated:
DHR also commenced actions alleging that the mother and S.R.E. were the parents of S.E.E., C.E.E., Ja.N.E., and Je.E. and seeking the termination of their parental rights to those children.
"This Court specifically finds that there is clear and convincing evidence, competent, relevant, and material in nature that the mother … and the fathers, [S.R.E.] and [L.T.], and any persons, known or unknown who may claim an interest in … [N.A.T.] … are not willing or able to discharge their responsibilities to and for their minor children, … [N.A.T.] …; that the conduct or condition of the parents renders them unable to properly care for their minor child and that said conduct or condition is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. The Court further finds that there are no viable alternatives to Termination of Parental Rights and no potential relative resources available for the permanent placement of this child….
"….
"Wherefore, having considered such, this Court ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that all parental rights of the mother … and the fathers, [S.R.E.] and [L.T.], and any persons, known or unknown who may claim an interest in … [N.A.T.] … are, by my signature below, forever TERMINATED AND SEVERED."
(Capitalization in original.)
The Alabama Juvenile Justice Act ("the AJJA"), § 12-15-101 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, which governs the termination of parental rights, authorizes the termination of the parental rights only of "parents," § 12-15-319(a), Ala. Code 1975. The AJJA defines a "parent" as "[t]he legal mother or the legal father of a child under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court" pursuant to the AJJA. § 12-15-102(19), Ala. Code 1975 (emphasis added). "Alabama law recognizes a man as a legal father of a child when he is the ‘presumed father’ of the child, see § 26-17-204, Ala. Code 1975, or has been adjudicated as the father of the child, see § 26-17-201(b), Ala. Code 1975." J.R.C. v. Mobile Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 342 So. 3d 580, 582 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021).
[1] Section 26-17-204(a), Ala. Code 1975, that provides a "A man is presumed to be the father of a child if:
"(1) he and the mother of the child are married to each other and the child is born during the marriage;
"(2) he and the mother of the child were married to each other, and the child is born within 300 days after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce;
"(3) before the birth of the child, he and the mother of the child married each other in apparent compliance with law, even if the attempted marriage is or could be declared invalid, and the child is born during the invalid marriage or within 300 days after its termination by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce;
"(4) after the child’s birth, he and the child’s mother have married, or attempted to marry, each other by a marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with the law although the attempted marriage is or could be declared invalid, and:
"(A) he has acknowledged his paternity of the child in writing, such writing being filed with the appropriate court or the Alabama Office of Vital Statistics; or
"(B) with his consent, he is named as the child’s father on the child’s birth certificate; or
"(C) he is otherwise obligated to support the child either under a written voluntary promise or by court order;
"(5) while the child is under the age of majority, he receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child or otherwise openly holds out the child as his natural child and establishes a significant parental relationship with the child by providing emotional and financial support for the child; or
"(6) he legitimated the child in accordance with Chapter 11 of Title 26."
The evidence in the record does not indicate that N.A.T. was born during S.R.E.’s marriage to the mother. Likewise, there is no evidence in the record indicating that S.R.E. and the mother were married before the birth of N.A.T. To the contrary, the evidence in the record affirmatively indicates that S.R.E. and the mother did not marry until approximately two years after N.A.T.’s birth and that they had not terminated their marriage when the juvenile court held the final hearing in this action. Moreover, the evidence does not indicate (1) that S.R.E. ever filed a written acknowledgement of his paternity of N.A.T. with an Alabama court or the Alabama Office of Vital Statistics, (2) that N.A.T.’s birth certificate ever named S.R.E. as N.A.T.’s father, (3) that S.R.E. ever made a written promise to pay child support for N.A.T., or (4) that a court had ever ordered him to pay child support for N.A.T. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record indicating that the father ever held out N.A.T. as his natural child or that he ever legitimated N.A.T. Therefore, the evidence does not indicate that S.R.E. was a presumed father of N.A.T. The record also does not contain any evidence indicating that a court had ever adjudicated S.R.E. as the father of N.A.T.
[2] Because the record does not contain any evidence indicating that S.R.E. was either the presumed father of N.A.T. or that a court had adjudicated him as the father of N.A.T., the record does not indicate that S.R.E. was the legal father of N.A.T. Because a juvenile court is a court of limited jurisdiction, an appellate court cannot presume that a juvenile court has jurisdiction over an action; rather, every fact essential to its jurisdiction must affirmatively appear of record. See H.A.A. v. B.J.J., 368 So. 3d 876, — (Ala. Civ. App. 2022). Because the evidence did not indicate that S.R.E. was the legal father of N.A.T., the juvenile court acted outside its subject-matter jurisdiction insofar as it purported to terminate S.R.E.’s parental rights to N.A.T., and, therefore, that portion of its judgment is void. See J.R.C., 342 So. 3d at 583. Accordingly, because a void judgment will not support an appeal, id., we dismiss S.R.E.’s appeal with instructions to the juvenile court to vacate the portion of its judgment purporting to terminate S.R.E.’s parental rights to N.A.T.
APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Thompson, P.J., and Moore, Edwards, and Hanson, JJ., concur.