Opinion
24A-JV-1744
12-09-2024
S.R., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT JUSTIN R. WALL WALL LEGAL SERVICES HUNTINGTON, INDIANA ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA COURTNEY STATON DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Wells Circuit Court The Honorable Kenton W. Kiracofe, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 90C01-2404-JD-13
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT JUSTIN R. WALL WALL LEGAL SERVICES HUNTINGTON, INDIANA
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA COURTNEY STATON DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Brown, Judge
[¶1] S.R., a juvenile, appeals the trial court's delinquency disposition order committing him to the Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC"). We reverse and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] On April 24, 2024, staff at Bluffton High School were alerted that sixteen-year-old S.R., a student, possessed a gun on school property. S.R. was taken to the principal's office where he spoke with Principal Steve Baker and School Resource Officer Phillip Kurut. The two adults confirmed that S.R. had an unloaded 9mm handgun in his lunchbox, and he reported that he had "another magazine and bullets in a bag in his locker." Appellant's Appendix at 15. In the locker, Officer Kurut located "an extended magazine" which was loaded with seven "9mm full metal jacket rounds." Id.
[¶3] When questioned by Principal Baker, S.R. indicated that he did not intend to harm or intimidate anyone at school. He explained that he brought the gun in order to transport it to his father's home "for protection since he had had items stolen from his father's residence in Bluffton" and "[h]e did not want to drive back after school to his home in Poneto," where he resides with his mother, to retrieve the weapon. Id. S.R.'s parents were surprised by this conduct and were not aware that S.R. had the gun. Additionally, his father was not aware of any stolen property from his home or any other reason S.R. would believe he needed the protection of a firearm. Arrangements were made by the Wells County Probation Department for S.R. to be detained at the Delaware County Detention Center pending a detention hearing.
[¶4] On April 25, 2024, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that S.R. committed what would be possession of a firearm on school property as a level 6 felony and dangerous possession of a firearm as a class A misdemeanor, if committed by an adult. That same day, the juvenile court held a detention hearing during which Probation Officer Stephanie Eddy testified that she was concerned that there may be "some underlying issue" with respect to S.R.'s mental health based upon his demeanor during her meeting with S.R. and his parents. Transcript Volume II at 27. Eddy recommended that S.R. remain in secure detention pending psychological testing. The court determined that S.R.'s continued detention was necessary and ordered that S.R. undergo a psychological assessment prior to the dispositional hearing. The court scheduled a status hearing for May 14, 2024.
[¶5] On May 13, 2024, the court received a copy of S.R.'s psychological assessment. The assessment indicated that S.R. claimed he brought a gun to school because he "was getting some threats from someone on the internet who might try to hurt [him] or steal from [him]." Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 67. The attending psychologist opined that S.R. was an appropriate candidate for "outpatient" services, but recommended additional psychological testing. Id. at 76.
[¶6] A status hearing was held on May 14, 2024, during which S.R. admitted the allegations in the delinquency petition. The court scheduled the dispositional hearing for June 4, 2024, ordered that a predispositional report ("PDR") be completed, and ordered S.R. to complete an additional psychological assessment. The court received the PDR on June 3, 2024. Regarding disposition, the PDR recommended that S.R. be committed to a residential treatment facility, with such commitment being suspended to probation for one year, with home detention for 120 days.
[¶7] The court held a dispositional hearing as scheduled on June 4th. At the outset of the hearing, the parties advised the court that S.R. had been unable to complete the second psychological assessment due to a "clerical error" with the transport order. Transcript Volume II at 68. The court determined it could not proceed with the dispositional hearing without the second psychological assessment. The court initially determined that S.R. should be returned to secure detention until the date of the continued dispositional hearing. However, S.R.'s counsel objected due to the continued hearing being outside the statutory deadline for conducting the dispositional hearing. The court determined that S.R. should be released to his mother's custody on electronic monitoring home detention.
It appears that the parties and the court relied upon the incorrect statute, Ind. Code § 31-34-19-1, which applies to the timing of a dispositional hearing in child in need of services ("CHINS") proceedings, as opposed to Ind. Code § 31-37-11-2, which applies to the timing of a dispositional hearing in juvenile delinquency proceedings. See Transcript Volume II at 68-71.
[¶8] The court received the second psychological assessment on July 2, 2024. The assessment revealed that while S.R. "attempts to present himself in an overly positive light," he "may have more risk of substance abuse than he admits to" and he "may have more problems with anger and danger control than he admits to." Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 94. The assessment revealed that S.R. "has histrionic features," "paranoid features," and "some underlying depression," and he "tends to be impulsive and to have poor judgment." Id. The attending psychologist ultimately diagnosed S.R. with oppositional defiant disorder and cannabis use disorder.
[¶9] The court held the continued dispositional hearing on July 16, 2024. Eddy testified that she reviewed the second psychological assessment and, while it brought up some "concerns," the Probation Department's current dispositional recommendation for S.R. was consistent with the previously-completed PDR and remained that he receive a one-year suspended commitment to a residential facility, with "one year of probation" and "a hundred twenty days of home detention." Transcript Volume II at 77-79. Eddy acknowledged the seriousness of S.R.'s offenses but stated that she felt this dispositional recommendation was appropriate due to S.R. "being a first-time offender." Id. at 78. Dr. Brad Yates, the superintendent of the Bluffton-Harrison Metropolitan School District, submitted a victim impact statement that explained the "enduring psychological trauma this event created" within the school system. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 90.
[¶10] After considering the PDR, the psychological assessments, the victim impact statement, and the arguments of counsel, the court concluded that S.R. should be committed to the DOC rather than continuing his placement on home detention. The court acknowledged that the current offense was S.R.'s "first contact with the juvenile justice system." Id. at 35. Nevertheless, the court found as follows: "The Court considered less restrictive alternatives; however, given the nature of the offense and its negative impact on the community, and taking into account that S.R. has untreated mental health diagnoses, the Court finds that imposition of these less restrictive options would diminish the gravity of the offense." Id. at 36. The court further found that "it is in the best interest of S.R. to be removed from the home environment and remaining in the home would be contrary to the welfare of S.R. because despite the numerous services provided S.R. continues to commit delinquent acts that pose a danger to himself and the community." Id. at 37. The court found that "reasonable efforts were made by the probation department to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of S.R." Id.
[¶11] On July 22, 2024, S.R., by pauper appellate counsel, filed a notice of appeal with this Court, and on July 24th, he filed a "Motion to Stay Dispositional Order" with the juvenile court. Id. at 96-99. The court denied the motion to stay on August 1, 2024. Accordingly, on August 2nd, S.R. filed his Verified Motion to Stay Dispositional Order with this Court. On August 9, 2024, a motions panel of this Court issued an order granting S.R.'s motion to stay and released him to his mother's custody on electronic monitoring home detention while this appeal remains pending.
Discussion
[¶12] S.R. asserts that the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to the DOC. He contends that there were less restrictive options available; namely, continuing him in the custody of his mother on electronic monitoring home detention.
[¶13] An abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies to a juvenile court's disposition of a delinquent child. G.W. v. State, 231 N.E.3d 184, 188 (Ind. 2024). The juvenile court's discretion is subject to the statutory considerations of the welfare of the child, the safety of the community, and the policy of favoring the least harsh disposition. M.C. v. State, 134 N.E.3d 453, 458 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019), trans. denied. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when the juvenile court's action is clearly erroneous and against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual inferences that can be drawn therefrom. R.G. v. State, 212 N.E.3d 720, 723 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023). The juvenile court is accorded wide latitude and great flexibility in fashioning dispositions for delinquents. Id.
[¶14] Ind. Code § 31-37-18-6 requires that the juvenile court enter a dispositional decree that reflects "the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available," "least interferes with family autonomy," "is least disruptive of family life," "imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child," and "provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the child's parent[.]" It is well-established that commitment to the DOC "should be treated as a last resort." C.H. v. State, 201 N.E.3d 202, 205 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022). However, that option may be appropriate when "consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child." Ind. Code § 31-37-18-6. "To properly balance these interests, the juvenile court must 'carefully follow the language and logic' of the Disposition Statute." G.W., 231 N.E.3d at 190 (quoting In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 108 (Ind. 2010)). Courts should be mindful that the nature of the juvenile process is rehabilitation rather than punishment, J.T. v. State, 111 N.E.3d 1019, 1026 (Ind.Ct.App. 2018), trans. denied, with the goal of aiding "the juvenile to direct his behavior so that he will not later become a criminal." Q.H. v. State, 216 N.E.3d 1197, 1200 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023).
[¶15] The record reveals that the current case was S.R.'s first contact with the juvenile justice system. By all accounts, at the time of his offenses, the sixteen-year-old was a good student, he participated in school choir and theatre, he was employed at McDonalds working approximately thirty-two hours per week, and he had a strong and positive relationship with both parents. S.R. was initially placed in Delaware County Detention and, during that time, there were "no issues or concerns with his behavior[.]" Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 88. Thereafter, prior to the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court placed S.R. in his mother's custody on electronic monitoring home detention. During that time, roughly forty-two days, he committed no violations of his placement, and he actively participated in community corrections, drug screens, and random home visits without issue. In addition, the PDR indicates that S.R.'s overall risk assessment score based on the Indiana Youth Assessment System Disposition Tool places him in the low risk to reoffend category. The PDR recommended that S.R. be committed to a residential treatment facility, with such commitment being suspended to probation for one year, and home detention for 120 days. Given the record, and the apparent success of a less-restrictive option, we conclude the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing S.R. to the DOC.
Our review of the Odyssey Case Management System does not reveal any recent filings regarding S.R. Accordingly, there is no indication that S.R. has violated the conditions of his current placement during the pendency of this appeal.
[¶16] We further note that the juvenile court made findings that are unsupported by the record and/or do not follow the language of our juvenile code which further convinces us that a mistake has been made. The court erroneously considered that "imposition" of "less restrictive options would diminish the gravity of the offense," while the proper consideration is the placement option most consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child as instructed by Ind. Code § 31-37-18-6. Id. at 36. Despite this being S.R.'s first offense and there being no evidence that he has engaged in any delinquent behavior since his initial detention, the court found that remaining in the home would "be contrary to the welfare of S.R. because despite numerous services provided S.R. continues to commit delinquent acts that pose a danger to himself and the community." Id. at 37. Finally, despite the probation department's recommendation that S.R. serve a suspended sentence with a period of home detention, the court stated that "reasonable efforts were made by the probation department to prevent or eliminate the removal of S.R." Id. These unsupported findings underscore what we believe to be clear error in the trial court's decision here.
[¶17] For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the juvenile court's commitment of S.R. to the DOC and remand with instructions for the court to enter a dispositional order consistent with this opinion.
[¶18] Reversed and remanded.
Mathias, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.