Opinion
24A-JC-1071
12-23-2024
In the Matter of G.S., A Child in Need of Services, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner S.R., Mother, Appellant-Respondent
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT KAY A. BEEHLER TERRE HAUTE, INDIANA GREGORY V. RIDENOUR DECATUR, INDIANA ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA MARJORIE H. LAWYER-SMITH DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Adams Circuit Court The Honorable Chad E. Kukelhan, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 01C01-2401-JC-6
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT KAY A. BEEHLER TERRE HAUTE, INDIANA GREGORY V. RIDENOUR DECATUR, INDIANA
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA MARJORIE H. LAWYER-SMITH DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Foley, Judge
[¶1] S.R. ("Mother") appeals the trial court's order adjudicating her child, G.S. ("Child"), to be a Child in Need of Services ("CHINS"). Mother raises one issue for our review: whether sufficient evidence was presented to support the trial court's CHINS adjudication. Because we find no error, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] During 2013 and 2014, the Indiana Department of Child Services ("DCS") became involved with Mother and her family when three assessments were conducted, and a CHINS petition was filed, due to concerns regarding Mother's ability to care for her oldest son, D.R, who was alleged to be the victim of neglect. Mother had previously been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and borderline personality disorder and exhibited "relatively severe" symptoms, including unstable moods and ineffective coping mechanisms. Ex. Vol. 1 p. 18. Mother's parental rights to D.R. were terminated in 2015 because of her untreated mental health issues and lack of progress in services. Mother's daughter, J.G., was also removed in 2014 and again in 2019 due to concerns about Mother's mental health and her ability to parent. J.G. was again removed from Mother's care in November 2023 due to allegations of physical abuse and Mother's non-compliance with services, and a CHINS petition was filed. At the time of the fact-finding hearing in Child's case, J.G. had been adjudicated a CHINS, and the permanency plan in her case was adoption with a concurrent plan of reunification due to Mother's non-compliance with services and her failure to address mental health concerns.
[¶3] On January 31, 2024, DCS received three reports concerning then seven-year-old Child, which included allegations of physical abuse, educational neglect, and fire-setting by Child. On the morning of January 31, Child's special needs school bus driver observed Mother repeatedly "yanking" Child backward by his clothing and grabbing his arm with "excessive force" as he approached the bus, causing his feet to slide out from under him. Tr. Vol. 1 p. 26; Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 38. Mother continued screaming profanities at Child even after he entered the bus and was crying and "extremely upset." Tr. Vol. 1 p. 27. The bus driver closed the doors in an attempt to shelter Child from Mother's screaming.
[¶4] On January 31, it was also reported that Child had missed more than twenty days of school and was only permitted to attend half days at school due to behavioral issues that posed risks to himself and others. His behavior significantly worsened after J.G.'s removal and included throwing chairs and desks, physical aggression toward others, and screaming in the hallways. On January 31, it was also reported that Child had started a fire in his home that day. Child lit an envelope on fire and dropped it while Mother was not paying attention. When DCS later suggested Mother have a safety plan with the lighters in the home, she would not engage in the conversation.
[¶5] At the time DCS went to the home to investigate the January 31 reports, Mother was uncooperative and refused to allow DCS caseworkers to enter the home. Child reported feeling unsafe speaking with DCS in Mother's presence. After assessing the reports, DCS removed Child from Mother's care on January 31. On February 1, 2024, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a CHINS.
[¶6] A fact-finding hearing was held on March 15, 2024. At the hearing, evidence was presented that there was "always a lot of yelling [and] hostility" in Mother's home. Id. at 50. Mother refused to allow providers inside the home and required Child's skills coach to work with him outside. Mother responded to behavioral issues by yelling or putting Child in the corner, which proved ineffective, and she rejected the skills coach's behavior management suggestions. Child's skills coach worked with him for a year on anger management, communications skills, and social skills after receiving a referral from his school. The skills coach testified Child "definitely" needed therapy and additional intensive services to address his needs, even considering inpatient treatment after he expressed hatred toward everyone and never wanting to return home. Id. at 52. The skills coach testified that when she recommended that Child attend therapy for his behaviors, Mother refused, claiming it would not help.
[¶7] The DCS family case manager ("the FCM") expressed concern for Child's physical and emotional safety if he returned to Mother's care because of Mother's failure to engage in services and failure to address her mental health concerns. The guardian ad litem ("the GAL") for Child's sister, J.G., testified that Child needed support and that his behavior issues were "compounded" by what she saw as "physical abuse and emotional abuse" by Mother. Id. at 79. She noted that school personnel and people who have worked with him reported his behaviors were worsening. In particular, the GAL stated that she believed that, if Child was returned to Mother's care, his emotional and physical safety would be at risk because of the threat of abuse, especially because she believed that Child was now the target of Mother's abuse since DCS removed J.G. from the house. The GAL had further concerns about Mother's mental health and stated that Mother needed mental health treatment and other services before either of the children would be safe in her care. She testified that Mother's cooperation with DCS and services had declined significantly to the point where Mother would not even allow DCS personnel inside the house to assess the living conditions.
[¶8] On April 11, 2024, the trial court issued an order adjudicating Child a CHINS. In the order, the trial court concluded that Mother was "unable or unwilling to provide [Child] with a home free from abuse and neglect." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 39. The court further found that Mother's behavior and her treatment of Child was nearly identical to the basis for DCS involvement regarding her older children, and it appeared that "Mother's ability to parent . . . Child is negatively impacted by her own mental health needs." Id. The trial court also determined that the intervention of the court was "necessary to ensure [Child's] safety [because Child] show[ed] signs of escalating behavior issues," and Mother had not responded "appropriately or obtained the necessary services for [Child]." Id. On May 8, 2024, a dispositional hearing was held, and Mother was ordered to participate in reunification services. Mother now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶9] A CHINS adjudication focuses on the needs and condition of the child and not the culpability of the parent. In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010). The purpose of a CHINS adjudication is not to punish the parent but to provide proper services for the benefit of the child. Id. at 106. While we acknowledge a certain implication of parental fault in many CHINS adjudications, the truth of the matter is that a CHINS adjudication is simply that-a determination that a child is in need of services. Id. at 105. Standing alone, a CHINS adjudication does not establish culpability on the part of a particular parent. Id.
[¶10] A CHINS proceeding is civil in nature, so DCS must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code. Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3. The CHINS petition here was filed pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, which states:
A child is a child in need of services if before the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age:
(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:
(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or
(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and
(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
(A) the child is not receiving; and
(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.
[¶11] Our Supreme Court has interpreted this statute to require "three basic elements: that the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child, that the child's needs are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion." In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014). "When determining whether a child is a CHINS under section 3134-1-1, the juvenile court 'should consider the family's condition not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard.'" Ad.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 103 N.E.3d 709, 713 (Ind.Ct.App. 2018) (quoting In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290).
[¶12] Where the trial court issues findings of fact and conclusions thereon under Trial Rule 52, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re A.M., 121 N.E.3d 556, 561 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019), trans. denied. We consider first whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings support the judgment. Id. We will set aside the trial court's findings and conclusions only if they are clearly erroneous and a review of the record leaves us firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. Id. In reviewing a trial court's determination that a child is a CHINS, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1286 (citations omitted). Instead, "[w]e consider only the evidence that supports the trial court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom." Id. at 1287. Appellate courts generally grant latitude and deference to trial courts in family law matters. In re E.K., 83 N.E.3d 1256, 1260 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017), trans. denied. This deference recognizes the trial court's "unique ability to see the witnesses, observe their demeanor, and scrutinize their testimony, as opposed to this court's only being able to review a cold transcript of the record." Id.
[¶13] Mother argues that there was insufficient evidence presented at the fact-finding hearing to support the trial court's determination that Child was a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1. Mother contends that there was no evidence presented that Child was not receiving care, treatment, or rehabilitation that he needed. She asserts that at the time of the fact-finding hearing, she had already taken steps to take advantage of the services offered to her by DCS. She also argues that the evidence established that she had addressed the issues regarding school absences and had appropriately disciplined Child for trying to start a fire. Mother maintains that she was doing her best with a child who had behavioral issues and during a simultaneous CHINS proceeding with another child.
[¶14] As previously stated, under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, as synthesized by the Indiana Supreme Court, DCS was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Mother's "actions or inactions have seriously endangered the [Child], that the [Child's] needs are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion." In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287. The evidence presented at the fact-finding hearing revealed that the home environment under Mother's care seriously endangered Child's physical and emotional well-being. The record reflected that there was "always a lot of yelling, hostility in the home," tr. vol. 1 p. 50, Child did not feel safe speaking to DCS with Mother present, Mother struggled to parent due to her mental health needs and unwillingness to change, and there were concerns for neglect and abuse of Child. Indeed, on the morning of January 31, 2024, Mother was observed using excessive force with Child, yanking Child backward by his clothing and grabbing his arm, while screaming profanities at Child. The bus driver had to close the bus doors in an attempt to shelter Child from Mother's screaming, and once on the bus, Child was very upset and frustrated. The GAL for J.G. testified that she believed that Child's emotional and physical safety were at risk if he returned to Mother's care and that Child became the target of Mother's abuse when J.G. was removed from the home. Child's skills coach testified that the home environment made it difficult to make any progress with Child because she was not allowed in the home and was forced to have her sessions with him outside, and because there was always yelling occurring in the home. Due to Child's behaviors, his skills coach recommended therapy and even believed that he could use in-patient therapy because he made comments about hating everyone and never wanting to go home. Mother's behavior and treatment of Child was "nearly identical to the basis for [DCS] involvement" regarding her older children, which included hostility and physical abuse. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 39. Further, Child started a fire in the home while Mother was not paying attention, and when DCS suggested Mother needed a safety plan for the lighters in the home, she would not engage in the conversation.
[¶15] The evidence also established that Child's behaviors at school continued to escalate after J.G. was removed from the home. The school requested that Child attend half-days due to his behaviors and conduct, which included throwing chairs and desks, physical aggression toward others, and screaming in the hallways. As Child's behaviors were escalating, Mother was not responding appropriately or obtaining the necessary services to assist Child. As of January 31, 2024, Child had already missed more than twenty unexcused days of school. Although Mother testified that many of these absences were due to medical appointments, the school never received excuse forms. The evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that Mother has been "unable or unwilling to provide [Child] with a home free from abuse and neglect." Id.
[¶16] The evidence also supported the trial court's conclusion that Child's needs would not be met without court intervention. To determine whether court intervention is necessary, we ask "whether the parents must be coerced into providing or accepting necessary treatment for their child." In re E.K., 83 N.E.3d at 1262. "The same evidence used by the court to determine that a parent's acts or omissions injured or endangered a child may also support that coercive intervention is necessary to safeguard the child." In re N.E., 198 N.E.3d 384, 390 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022).
[¶17] Here, the evidence revealed that Mother's cooperation with DCS and services had declined significantly to the point where she would not even allow DCS or other providers inside her home. Mother was not cooperative with engaging in services for herself without court intervention and was resistant to additional services for Child to address his needs and his "escalating behavior issues." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 39. Mother did not implement any of the suggestions the skills coach offered to assist in managing Child's behaviors. Further, although the skills coach stated that Child "definitely" needed therapy and additional services to address his needs, Mother refused, saying it would not "help" because Child "doesn't listen to anybody." Tr. Vol. 1 pp. 50, 52. Additionally, the FCM had concerns for Child's physical and emotional safety if returned to Mother's care because of Mother's failure to participate in services and to address her own mental health concerns. Mother had a lengthy history with DCS involving her three children and had been offered numerous services and treatments over that time period. However, she remained unable or unwilling to provide a safe environment free from abuse and neglect for Child and repeated the same behaviors with Child that resulted in the removal of her older children. Additionally, Mother's refusal to effectively address her own mental health issues had been a factor in the removal of her older children, and it continued to endanger Child's mental and physical well-being and necessitated the coercive intervention of the court to ensure Child would receive the services and protection he needed.
[¶18] Therefore, the evidence presented at the fact-finding hearing supported the trial court's conclusions that Mother's actions or inactions seriously endangered Child, that Child's needs were unmet, and that those needs were unlikely to be met without court intervention. Mother's contentions to the contrary are merely requests to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287. We conclude that the trial court did not err when it adjudicated Child to be a CHINS.
[¶19] Affirmed.
Bailey, J. and Bradford, J. concur.