Opinion
CASE NO. 406 CRD-4-85
APRIL 3, 1987
The claimant was represented at the trial level by Charles E. Tiernan, Esq., Lynch, Traub, Keefe, Errante, P.C. No appearance was made on behalf of claimant nor brief filed at oral argument. However, claimant is now represented by Lindalea Ludwick, Esq., Skarz Early, P.C.
The respondent was represented by James Coyne, Esq., Bai, Pollock and Dunnigan.
This Petition for Review from the April 23, 1985 Decision granting a Motion to Preclude entered by the Commissioner of the Fourth District was heard February 27, 1987, before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners Robin Waller and A. Thomas White.
FINDING
The Finding of the trial Commissioner is affirmed and adopted as the Finding of this tribunal.
OPINION
Respondent has appealed the granting of claimant's Motion to Preclude. The Commissioner found that respondent's Notice of Intention to Contest Liability (Form 43-67) failed to state the specific grounds on which liability for compensation was to be contested.
Menzies v. Fisher, 165 Conn. 338, 348 (1973) holds that Sec. 31-297(b) C.G.S. requiring notices of contest must state the specific grounds for denying liability. "The purpose of the requirement of stating the specific grounds' is to furnish the claimant such warning as would prompt him to make the inquiries he might deem necessary or prudent and in obtaining such information as he might deem helpful for his protection." Id. at 348.
In the instant matter the respondent's notice of contest stated "asbestos-caused pleural asbestosis, restrictive lung disease, and scarring on left side of lung," as its basis for contesting compensation liability. Additionally, the respondent added the word "alleged" before the word "injury" on that part of the form which requested information as to the "Date of Injury and Town where occurred." Such language states no grounds for contest. It simply restates the claim and by inserting the word "alleged" hopes that somebody will draw the inference that the respondent does not believe the allegations. The words quoted do not even amount to a general denial, but possibly the mere filing of the Notice of Intent to Contest Liability, Form 43, might be so interpreted. Menzies stated:
From the claimant's vantage point, an employer whose grounds of contest are no more specific that `[w]e deny a compensable accident or injury' leaves the claimant as much in the dark with regard to the nature of the contest as does a categorical denial or mere silence from the employer."
Id. at 347.
Thus, even if we accept the Respondent's filing of Form 43 as a general denial, that filing in no way conforms to the guidelines set down by Menzies. See also Skorupski v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 2 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 133 (1985), 338-CRD-3-84.
We, therefore, affirm the Fourth District's granting of claimant's Motion to Preclude.
Commissioners Robin Waller and A. Thomas White, Jr., concur in this opinion.