Opinion
Civil Action 22-344E
11-21-2022
DANIEL L. SPUCK, Plaintiff, v. MARY KATHRYN SALYNSKI, ESQUIRE, Defendant.
Re: ECF No. 3
MAUREEN P. KELLY, MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
CATHY BISSOON, DISTRICT JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that this case be dismissed suet sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Dismissal should be without prejudice to filing a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, if appropriate.
II. REPORT
A. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff Daniel L. Spuck, (“Plaintiff') is a frequent civil litigant. He initiated the instant matter by filing an Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs (“In Forma Pauperis Motion” or “IFP Motion”) along with a self-styled Notice of Appeal (“Notice”) for a Civil Case (the “Complaint”) on November 9, 2022. ECF Nos. 1 and 1-1. The IFP Motion was granted on November 15, 2022, and the Notice was filed as a putative civil rights complaint on the same day. ECF Nos. 2 and 3. Also on November 15,2022, Plaintiff submitted what appears to be a hand-written copy of the Notice, which was filed on the docket as a Supplement. ECF No. 4.
On its face, the Notice appears to be a Notice of Appeal from an order of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Spuck v. Salynski, Docket No. 25 WM 2022. ECF No. 3 at 1 and 3-1 at 1. No inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp, v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
In determining whether Rooker-Feldman applies to a particular claim or claims, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has established the following test:
[T]here are four requirements that must be met for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply: (1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff “complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-court judgments; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments.Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at 166 (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284). The Third Circuit has been clear that “all four requirements” must be met in order for Rooker-Feldman to apply. Vuyanich v. Smithton Borough, 5 F.4th 379, 385 (3d Cir. 2021)
In this case, Plaintiffs Notice falls squarely within the scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. His sparse factual allegations are that he was injured by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision dated October 7, 2022 not to grant a motion for reconsideration in the appeal at Docket No. 25 WM 2022. ECF No. 3-1 at 1. This order closed that case. See Docket, Spuck v. Salynski, No 25 WM 202 (available at https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/Report/PacDocketSheet7dock etNumber=25%20WM%202022&dnh=y5UBTDunrq3nyWNUYo3BWg%3D%3D (last visited Nov. 21, 2022)). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's order pre-dates the filing of the instant federal lawsuit, and Plaintiff seeks this Court to sit as an appellate court to review that case.
This lawsuit is a clear invitation to “review and reject the state judgments.” Great W. Mining. 615 F.3d at 166. Such an invitation must be declined. See Middlebrook at Monmouth v. Liban, 419 Fed.Appx. 284, 285-86 (3d Cir. 2011) (observing that federal courts “cannot review proceedings conducted by a state tribunal to determine whether it reached its result in accordance with law”). As such, this case should be dismissed. As amendment would be futile, the same should be denied. Fletcher-Harlee Corp, v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247,251 (3d Cir. 2007). However, to the extent that Plaintiff is able to satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1257, he should be allowed to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, if appropriate.
To the extent that Plaintiff attempts to bring a stand-alone claim against his former attorney, this Court similarly lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs former attorney is not a state actor for the purposes of a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Polk Co. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Calhoun v. Young, 288 Fed.Appx. 47,49-50 (3d Cir. 2008) (public defender representing criminal defendant is not acting under color of state law). Additionally, Plaintiff has not pleaded facts that would allow this court to determine that diversity jurisdiction exists between himself (a resident of Wilcox, Pennsylvania), and his attorney (who he admits resides in Mercer County, Pennsylvania). 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that this case be dismissed sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Dismissal should be without prejudice to filing a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, if appropriate.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).