Opinion
22A-PC-1724
07-26-2023
Dwayne A. Springfield, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Amy E. Karozos Public Defender of Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana Deidre E. Eltzroth Deputy Public Defender Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana Ian McLean Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Angela Dow Davis, Judge The Honorable Patrick Murphy, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49D27-2011-PC-35789
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Amy E. Karozos Public Defender of Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana Deidre E. Eltzroth Deputy Public Defender Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana Ian McLean Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON REHEARING
MAY JUDGE
[¶1] Dwayne A. Springfield requests rehearing of our memorandum decision issued on May 22, 2023, in which we affirmed the denial of his petition for postconviction relief because he could not demonstrate prejudice from any alleged errors by his trial attorney. See Springfield v. State, 22A-PC-1724 (Ind.Ct.App. May 22, 2023) (affirming denial of petition for post-conviction relief). On rehearing, Springfield asserts we "misstated the facts in two significant ways." (Appellant's Rehearing Br. at 6.) Specifically, he contends we set forth erroneous facts when we "erroneously believed [the witnesses] were referring to Springfield" and "stated the witnesses identified Springfield in a photo array when this simply did not occur." (Id.)
[¶2] While we erroneously stated some facts in our original opinion, there are facts in the record outside of the erroneous facts to support our decision to affirm the trial court's denial of Springfield's petition for post-conviction relief. Therefore, we grant rehearing for the express purpose of correcting the factual errors, and we affirm our original opinion in all other respects.
Discussion and Decision
[¶3] In the facts in the memorandum decision, we stated, "Dudley testified she identified Springfield because she 'remember[ed] his skin complexion and that he had that gap between his teeth.'" Springfield, slip op. at *12 (internal citations omitted). Springfield argues Dudley's statement occurred during a portion of the transcript where she was responding to questions regarding the identification of Springfield's co-defendant, Carlos Rollins. Springfield is correct - Dudley's statements referred to Rollins, not Springfield. Springfield contends this error warrants reversal because our "reliance on this misunderstanding of the facts is significant because, if true, it would have served to bolster Dudley's in-court identification of Springfield when, in fact, there was no outside corroboration of Dudley's in-court identification." (Appellant's Rehearing Br. at 6-7.)
[¶4] Additionally, Springfield argues we applied facts regarding identification of Rollins to Springfield in the portion of the facts in our decision that stated, "Daniels testified she was 'certain' it was Springfield in the photo array because 'I know how to identify the person I seen that night.'" Springfield, slip op. at *13. Further, he contends we were incorrect when, in our memorandum decision, we stated all three witnesses identified Springfield as part of a photo array. Again, Springfield directs us to the portion of the transcript on which we rely, and he is correct - the three witnesses identified Rollins as part of a photo array, not Springfield. However, these errors do not require reversal of our memorandum decision.
[¶5] In our memorandum decision, we held Springfield could not demonstrate he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to request a severance and her beginning trial unprepared. "To meet the appropriate test for prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Davis v. State, 139 N.E.3d 246, 261 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019) (internal citation omitted), trans. denied. Even after removing misstated facts, the record contains the following evidence:
At the consolidated trial, Battle testified that, on the day of the crime, she saw Rollins and Springfield in a black car. After Rollins followed the vehicle in which Battle, Daniels, and Dudley were traveling, both vehicles stopped in a residential area. Battle testified Rollins exited the car and "pulled out [a] handgun." (Trial Tr. Vol. I at 60.) Springfield, at Rollins's direction, "started taking the stuff" including Battle's "purse and [] necklace." (Id. at 60-1.) As part of a photo array with possible suspects conducted by Detective King shortly after the crime, Battle identified Springfield as the man that robbed her. During trial, Battle identified Springfield in the courtroom as the person who robbed her, Daniels, and Dudley.
Springfield's trial counsel cross-examined Battle, challenging her identification of Springfield as one of the men who robbed her. Battle noted she identified Springfield as part of the photo array based on "[t]he way his hair was . . . two puffs, two ponytails." (Id. at 107.) Battle also identified Springfield as a man she later saw at a gas station in a black car. She testified the car was the same car Rollins and Springfield were in on the night of the crime. Battle testified she followed the car in an effort to obtain a license plate number to give to the police. This pursuit ultimately led to Springfield's arrest.
Similarly, Dudley testified she saw Rollins and Springfield in a black car on the night of the crime. She testified that, after the women pulled over their vehicle in a residential area, Battle and Dudley spoke with Rollins and Springfield. Rollins then pulled out a gun and told Springfield, "get they stuff." (Id. at 124)
(errors in original). Dudley testified she gave Springfield her purse and Springfield took her ID. She testified Springfield then "patted [her] down" after taking her purse. (Id. at 129.) Dudley identified Springfield in the courtroom as the man who robbed her. Springfield's trial counsel cross-examined Dudley and challenged her identification of Springfield as the man involved in the crime....
Daniels' testimony was consistent with that of Battle and Dudley. She testified she saw Rollins and Springfield in a black car on the night of the crime. During her testimony, Daniels positively identified Springfield in the courtroom as the person who took her "whole purse" after Rollins pointed a gun at the women. (Id. at 160.) She also testified she was with Battle when they later saw Springfield in a black car and followed him to get his license plate number for police....
All three victims told nearly identical versions of the events and . . . during trial, identified Springfield as the man that robbed them....
Springfield, slip op. At *5.
[¶6] All three victims made in-court identifications of Springfield as the man who took the items from them on the night of the robbery. Additionally, Battles and Daniels called police when they saw Springfield in a parking lot and recognized him as the person involved in the robbery with Rollins. This identification resulted in Springfield's arrest and subsequent charging. Even without the identification in a photo array, two of the victims identified Springfield in and out of the courtroom and all three victims gave almost identical accounts of the robbery. Thus, we conclude Springfield was not prejudiced and the post- conviction court did not err when it determined Springfield's trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 706 N.E.2d 149, 159 (Ind. 1999) (defendant not prejudiced by counsel's failure to investigate the crime scene or to call expert witnesses because overwhelming evidence supported his conviction).
Conclusion
[¶7] We grant rehearing to consider the alleged inaccuracies in the facts in our original memorandum decision to determine if those alleged inaccuracies affect our holding. After reexamination of the record, we concede there were misstatements of facts in our original memorandum decision. However, despite those errors, overwhelming evidence of Springfield's guilt remained, and Springfield did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of trial would have been different if his trial counsel had asked for severance of Springfield's trial. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of his petition for postconviction relief and affirm our original holding in all other respects.
[¶8] Affirmed.
Crone, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.