We have recognized a number of situations in which the claimant was eligible for benefits despite the fact that the claimant was not available twenty-four hours per day. See Appeal of Beckman, 131 N.H. 315, 318, 553 A.2d 288, 290 (1988) (claimant available despite lack of transportation to particular job); Springer v. Dep't of Empl. Sec., 120 N.H. 520, 523, 418 A.2d 1277, 1279 (1980) (picketing four hours per week did not raise presumption that claimants were unavailable); St. Germain, 117 N.H. at 662, 377 A.2d at 623 (waitress unable to work every Sunday considered available). [3, 4] Implicit in our earlier decisions is the consideration that the claimant have a valid excuse for restricting his ability to work all shifts and all hours.

1981). [1, 2] The purpose of our unemployment compensation statute, RSA ch. 282-A, is to prevent the spread of unemployment and to lighten the burden on those workers who are involuntarily unemployed through no fault of their own. Laws 1981, 408:2; see Springer v. Dep't of Employ. Sec., 120 N.H. 520, 522-23, 418 A.2d 1277, 1278 (1980). By defining "employment" broadly, the statute provides coverage for a large number of workers.

The Commission's finding of fraudulent misrepresentation or nondisclosure of a material fact subjecting the claimant to the penalties of disqualification and reimbursement of the benefits received is wholly unsupported by the record and constitutes reversible error as a matter of law. See also Springer v. State, 120 N.H. 520, 418 A.2d 1277, 1279 (1980). The Commission had the duty to determine all of the issues which were properly and adequately raised by the evidence in order that one judicial review may effectively terminate the case.