Spring v. State

7 Citing cases

  1. Akins v. State

    573 S.W.3d 290 (Tex. App. 2019)   Cited 3 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Distinguishing Riley because it "did not involve the issue of whether the defendant had abandoned the device that was searched"

    The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that " ‘it is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions ... (in) the body of private property law,’ and the [U.S.] Supreme Court has made it clear for a long time that courts ‘ought not bow to them in the fair administration of the criminal law[.]’ " Spring v. State , 626 S.W.2d 37, 41 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981) (quoting Jones v. United States , 362 U.S. 257, 266-67, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960) ). Rather, the ultimate criterion "is whether there was a violation of the claimant’s legitimate or reasonable expectation of privacy."

  2. Sanchez v. State

    No. 11-14-00290-CR (Tex. App. Jul. 28, 2016)

    The entry into a residence by officers is a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see also Spring v. State, 626 S.W.2d 37, 41 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). Thus, absent an exception to the warrant requirement, such as exigent circumstances, police may not enter the residence of a suspect without first obtaining a warrant. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 448; see also Waugh v. State, 51 S.W.3d 714, 718 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2001, no pet.).

  3. State v. Rodriguez

    529 S.W.3d 81 (Tex. App. 2015)   Cited 6 times

    Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 448. As noted by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Spring v. State, 626 S.W.2d 37, 41 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981) : (P)hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed, and (i)n terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.

  4. Sanchez v. State

    No. 07-08-0356-CR (Tex. App. Oct. 27, 2010)   Cited 2 times

    "`It is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions . . . [in] . . . the body of private property law,' and the Supreme Court [has] made it clear for a long time that courts `ought not bow to them in the fair administration of criminal law.'" Spring v. State, 626 S.W.2d 37, 41 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981) (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266-67, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960)). "The ultimate criteria is whether there was a violation of the claimant's legitimate or reasonable expectation of privacy."

  5. Barocio v. State

    117 S.W.3d 19 (Tex. App. 2003)   Cited 4 times

    "`(P)hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.'" Spring v. State, 626 S.W.2d 37, 41 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981) (quoting United States v. United States Dist. Court for E. Dist. Of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)); see State v. Steelman, 16 S.W.3d 483, 488 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2000), aff'd, 93 S.W.3d 102 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (a private dwelling is a sacrosanct place in search and seizure law). Thus, the Fourth Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance to the house.

  6. Dawson v. State

    106 S.W.3d 388 (Tex. App. 2003)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that when term of occupancy expired in hotel room, guest lost exclusive right to privacy and hotel manager may consent to search of room by police, because manager had legitimate reason to enter room in capacity as hotel manager

    Benjamin had a legitimate reason to enter the room, and the record indicates that his entry was intended to further his own ends as the motel manager, not simply to further the State's ends. Appellant relies principally on Spring v. State, 626 S.W.2d 37 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981), to argue that Benjamin acted as an agent of the State. We find the facts in Spring distinguishable from the facts here.

  7. Walters v. State

    680 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. App. 1984)   Cited 5 times

    We will assume, in resolving the first ground, that the initial entry, at the behest of Officer Hudson, was improper. Although there is some authority for a warrantless entry to rescue someone in danger, Corbett v. State, 493 S.W.2d 940, 946-47 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1131, 94 S.Ct. 871, 38 L.Ed.2d 756 (1974), the events described in this record fall far short of the kind of emergency that will permit a police officer to ignore the Fourth Amendment and enter private property without warrant or invitation. Nor can the policeman shield himself behind the private citizen who actually made the entry if, as here, that citizen is acting for the police as an agent of the State. Spring v. State, 626 S.W.2d 37, 41 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981). That error does not, however, mandate suppression of evidence discovered under an otherwise valid search warrant, if there is probable cause for the warrant from an independent source.