Opinion
# 2020-031-012 Motion No. M-95217
05-13-2020
REGINALD SPRATT v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
REGINALD SPRATT, PRO SE HON. LETITIA JAMES New York State Attorney General BY: RAY A. KYLES, ESQ. Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Claimant has failed to demonstrate either a reasonable excuse for his delay or the merit of his proposed claim. His application for permission to file a late claim related to alleged medical malpractice/negligence is denied.
Case information
| UID: | 2020-031-012 |
| Claimant(s): | REGINALD SPRATT |
| Claimant short name: | SPRATT |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | None |
| Motion number(s): | M-95217 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | RENÉE FORGENSI MINARIK |
| Claimant's attorney: | REGINALD SPRATT, PRO SE |
| Defendant's attorney: | HON. LETITIA JAMES New York State Attorney General BY: RAY A. KYLES, ESQ. Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | May 13, 2020 |
| City: | Rochester |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
The following papers, numbered 1 to 3, were read on motion by Claimant for permission to file a late claim:
1. Claimant's Notice of Motion, filed January 29, 2020;
2. Claimant's Affidavit, sworn to December 7, 2019, with attached exhibit;
3. Affirmation of Ray A. Kyles, Esq., dated February 11, 2020.
With this motion, Reginald Spratt (Claimant) requests permission to file a late claim pursuant to section 10 (6) of the Court of Claims Act (CCA). Mr. Spratt's proposed claim sets forth a cause of action for negligent failure to protect him from a vicious attack by other inmates at Auburn Correctional Facility on March 2, 2019. He also alleges a cause of action for medical malpractice or medical neglect that involved the medical care Defendant provided for Mr. Spratt following the assault on March 2, through March 27, 2019.
With regard to the assault, Claimant alleges that he was assaulted without warning by a group on inmates in the "C & D corridor" as he was returning to his cell after breakfast (Proposed Claim, ¶ 3). Claimant asserts that, at the time of the assault, there were no guards present in this area of the corridor. He also alleges that, after the assault, he learned that another inmate was assaulted by unknown prison gang members the night before he was assaulted and that he believed his assault was also related to gang activity.
With regard to his medical malpractice cause of action, Claimant asserts that immediately after the assault, he was sent to an outside hospital, where he received sutures on his face. He alleges that his face started swelling immediately after his sutures were put in. Mr. Spratt has alleged that for the next several weeks, he continually complained about pain, and the need to remove the sutures (or portions thereof) that were put in place at the hospital.
Subdivision 6 of section 10 of the CCA enumerates six factors to be weighed in connection with a late claim motion: (1) whether the delay was excusable; (2) whether Claimant has any other remedy; (3) whether Defendant had notice of the essential facts constituting the claim; (4) whether Defendant had an opportunity to investigate; (5) whether Defendant would be substantially prejudiced; and (6) whether the claim appears to be meritorious. This list is not exhaustive and the presence or absence of any one factor is not dispositive. Rather, the Court in its discretion balances these factors in making its determination (Bay Terrace Coop. Section IV v New York State Employees' Retirement Sys. Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement Sys., 55 NY2d 979 [1982]).
In its opposition to this motion, Defendant disputes only factors 1 (excuse for the delay) and 6 ( merit). Accordingly, the other factors are presumed to weigh in Claimant's favor (see Calzada v State of New York, 121 AD2d 988 [1st Dept 1986]; Cole v State of New York, 64 AD2d 1023, 1024 [4th Dept 1978]).
With regard to his excuse for the delay, Claimant asserts that he is a lay person and that his status as an inmate made compliance with the statute impossible. This, of course, is not a legally recognizable excuse for Claimant's delay (Matter of Sandlin v State of New York, 294 AD2d 723 [3d Dept 2002]). This factor, therefore, weighs in favor of Defendant. The absence of an excuse, however, is only one of the factors considered by the Court in reviewing an application pursuant to section 10 (6), and does not necessarily preclude the relief sought (Bay Terrace Coop. Section IV v New York State Employees' Retirement Sys. Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement Sys., 55 NY2d 979).
Of the six enumerated factors in CCA §10 (6), it is the appearance of merit that is most significant, as it would be pointless to grant permission to file late if the proposed claim did not have at least the appearance of merit (Matter of Martinez v State of New York, 62 AD3d 1225 [3d Dept 2009]). On this point, Defendant opposes both causes of action set forth in the application, pointing out that Defendant had no notice of the assault upon Claimant, and that Claimant has failed to offer an affidavit of an expert demonstrating how Defendant's care of Claimant following the assault deviated from community standards.
With regard to the negligent failure to protect cause of action, I note that the State has a duty to use reasonable care to protect inmates in its correctional facilities from foreseeable risks of harm, including the risk of harm from other inmates (Blake v State of New York, 259 AD2d 878 [3d Dept 1999]; Colon v State of New York, 209 AD2d 842 [3d Dept 1994]). The State, however, is not an insurer of the safety of inmates, and the mere fact that an assault occurs does not give rise to an inference of negligence (Sebastiano v State of New York, 112 AD2d 562 [3d Dept 1985]). In order to establish liability, Claimant must allege and prove that the State knew or should have known that there was a risk of harm to Claimant which was reasonably foreseeable and which the State could have prevented (Sanchez v State of New York, 99 NY2d 247 [2002]]; Melvin v State of New York, 101 AD3d 1654 [4th Dept 2012]).
In this instance, Claimant asserts that he was attacked by members of a gang. He further asserts that a different inmate had been attacked by gang members the day before his assault. However, even if the Court accepts Claimant's version of these events, the fact that gangs, which are not permitted in the correctional setting, nonetheless exist, does not give rise to notice of any specific dangerous situation (Ferrell v State of New York, UID No. 2012-010-043 [Ct Cl, Ruderman, J., Nov. 19, 2012]; Savoca v State of New York, UID 2003-010-037 [Ct Cl, Ruderman, J., Dec. 3, 2003]). Also, Claimant concedes that the assault was unexpected and came completely without warning to him. Accordingly, I find that Defendant did not have notice of a dangerous situation. Without notice that a dangerous situation exists, unremitting supervision is not required (Padgett v State of New York, 163 AD2d 914 [4th Dept 1990], lv denied 76 NY2d 711 [1990]).
I find that Claimant has failed to demonstrate that the assault upon him was reasonably foreseeable or that any actions or inactions on the Defendant's part contributed to the assault. Accordingly, Claimant has failed to demonstrate the merit of his negligent failure to protect cause of action.
Claimant has not submitted the affidavit of an expert demonstrating that medical personnel employed by Defendant deviated from the appropriate standard of care or otherwise failed to utilize their professional judgment in treating him. Although he alleges that Defendant failed to alleviate his suffering from the injuries incurred in the assault, and that he subsequently endured an infection at the site of his sutures, I note that evaluating these assertions involves the appropriate level of patient care, and the exercise of professional judgment. For that reason, I cannot accept Claimant's own statement that the level of care afforded him was inadequate as the basis for a cause of action sounding in medical malpractice (see Twitchell v MacKay, 78 AD2d 125 [4th Dept 1980]; Hale v State of New York, 53 AD2d 1025 [4th Dept 1976], lv denied 40 NY2d 804 [1976];see also Morgan v State of New York, 40 AD2d 891 [3d Dept 1972] [expert medical testimony required to establish malpractice involving patient care]).
To the extent that Claimant's allegations could be construed to state a cause of action for medical neglect, I also find that Claimant has failed to demonstrate the merit of his claim. A cause of action sounding in medical neglect, in essence, alleges negligent omissions or commissions by State caregivers which can be readily determined without the necessity of expert testimony. However, this theory is limited to "those cases where the alleged negligent act may be readily determined by the trier of the facts based on common knowledge" (Coursen v New York Hosp.-Cornell Med. Ctr., 114 AD2d 254, 256 [1st Dept 1986]). Such cases have involved scalding a patient with a hot water bottle (Phillips v Buffalo Gen. Hosp., 239 NY 188 [1924]), leaving an electric light bulb under the sheets (Dillon v Rockaway Beach Hosp., 284 NY 176 [1940]), leaving a postoperative patient unattended in a bathroom (Coursen v New York Hosp.-Cornell Med. Ctr., 114 AD2d 254), and other similar circumstances. I find that no such easily identified cause of action exists here and that an expert opinion is necessary to demonstrate how Claimant's care was improper.
Upon reviewing and balancing all of the factors enumerated in CCA § 10 (6), the Court finds that they weigh in Defendant's favor. Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED, that Claimant's motion for permission to file a late claim is denied.
May 13, 2020
Rochester, New York
RENÉE FORGENSI MINARIK
Judge of the Court of Claims